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{{For|the China Railways DF21 narrow gauge locomotive|List of locomotives in China#Diesel-electric transmission}}
{{Infobox weapon
|is_missile=yes
|name=DF-21/CSS-5 Mod 1
|image=DF-21A TEL - Chinese Military Museum Beijing.jpg
|caption= DF-21 and [[transporter erector launcher]] vehicle at the Beijing Military Museum.
|origin= China
|type=[[MRBM]]/[[IRBM]]
|used_by=[[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force]] <br> [[Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force]]
|manufacturer=
|production_date=
|service=1991
|engine=Solid fueled
|weight={{convert|14700|kg|lb}}
|length={{convert|10.7|m|ft}}
|diameter={{convert|1.4|m|ft}}
|wingspan=
|speed= Mach 10 (estimated maximum before re-entry)
|vehicle_range={{convert|1770|km|mi|abbr=on}} (DF-21/DF-21A)<ref name=dod-congress-2007>{{cite report |url=http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf |title=The Military Power of the People's Republic of China - Annual Report to Congress |publisher=Office of the Secretary of Defense |year=2007 |page=42 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070704071049/http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf|archive-date=4 July 2007}}</ref><br />{{convert|1700|km|mi|abbr=on}} (DF-21C)<br />{{convert|1500|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}} (DF-21D [[ASBM]])<ref name=USDOD-2013>{{cite report|url=http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf |title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China |publisher=U.S. Department of Defense |work=Office of the Secretary of Defense |year=2013 |access-date=3 May 2014 |quote=The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150113120816/http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf |archive-date=13 January 2015 }}</ref>
|ceiling=
|altitude=
|filling= [[conventional weapons|conventional]] 600kg: 1, or 5-6 (improved variant)<ref>{{Cite web |title= New Chinese Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region |last=Fisher Jr|first=Richard |website=International Assessment and Strategy Center - Research |date=24 July 2007|url= https://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.165/pub_detail.asp|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141209015512/http://strategycenter.net/research/pubID.165/pub_detail.asp|archive-date=9 December 2014 }}</ref> [[nuclear weapons|nuclear]] 200-300-500&nbsp;[[kiloton|kt]] nuclear<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nti.org/db/China/wwhmdat.htm |title=Nuclear Warhead Modernization|date=2007<!--copyright--> |publisher=NTI|url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605041609/http://www.nti.org/db/China/wwhmdat.htm |archive-date=2011-06-05 }}</ref>
|detonation=
|guidance=[[Inertial guidance|Inertial]] + [[terminal guidance|terminal]] [[active radar homing|active radar]] guidance<ref name="sinodefence.com"/>
|accuracy = DF-21 700m, DF-21A 50m, DF-21B 10m CEP (with [[BeiDou Navigation Satellite System]] and active radar)<ref>Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 51st ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.:Jane's Information Group, 2010)</ref>
|launch_platform=Mobile launcher
}}
The '''Dongfeng 21''' ('''DF-21'''; [[NATO]] reporting name '''CSS-5''' - Dong-Feng ({{zh|t=東風|s=东风|l=East Wind}}) is a [[two-stage rocket|two-stage]], [[solid-fuel rocket|solid-fuel]], single-[[warhead]] [[medium-range ballistic missile]] (MRBM) developed by [[China]]'s Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy. A part of the [[Dongfeng (missile)|Dongfeng missile family]], the DF-21's development started in the late 1960s, and it was completed around 1985–86, but not deployed until 1991. It was developed from the [[JL-1]] [[submarine-launched missile]], and is China's first solid-fuel land-based [[missile]]. The [[United States Department of Defense|U.S. Department of Defense]] in 2008 estimated that China had 60-80 missiles and 60 launchers;<ref>{{Cite web | title= Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008 |url=http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf | publisher=Office of the Secretary of Defense |page=56 (p66 of PDF) }}</ref> approximately 10-11 missiles can be built annually.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/23a01071-5dac-433a-8452-09c542163ae8/From-Bottle-Rockets-to-Lightning-Bolts--China-s-Mi|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304204038/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/23a01071-5dac-433a-8452-09c542163ae8/From-Bottle-Rockets-to-Lightning-Bolts--China-s-Mi|url-status=dead|title=Pradun: From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts, p.12|archive-date=March 4, 2016}}</ref>
Originally developed as a [[strategic weapon]], the DF-21's later variants were designed for both [[nuclear warfare|nuclear]] and [[conventional warfare|conventional]] missions. It is thought to be able to carry a high explosive, [[cluster munition|submunition]] for [[tactical]]/[[theater (warfare)|theater]]-level missions, or a 300&nbsp;[[kiloton|kt]] nuclear warhead for strategic strikes. The latest variant, the DF-21D, was said to be the world's first [[anti-ship ballistic missile]] (ASBM). The DF-21 has also been developed into a [[space warfare]]-capable [[anti-satellite weapon]]/anti-missile weapon carrier.
Though the [[missile vehicle|launcher vehicle]] itself is mobile to reduce vulnerability, an actual launch unit requires support vehicles that can cover a 300×300-meter area, making it hard to move quickly and easier to detect.  Also, the wheeled launcher is not made to travel off-road and requires firm ground when firing to prevent backblast and debris damage due to the [[hard launch]], restricting its firing locations to roads and pre-made launch pads.<ref name="fas28sep10">{{cite web |url=http://fas.org/blogs/security/2010/09/df21c/ |title=DF-21C Missile Deploys to Central China |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |date=September 28, 2010 |website=fas.org |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |access-date=27 November 2013}}</ref>
== DF-21/A/C (CSS-5 Mod-1/2/3) ==
The basic variant DF-21 had a range of 1,770+&nbsp;km,<ref name="dod-congress-2007"/> and a payload of {{convert|600|kg|lb|abbr=on}} consisting of a single 500&nbsp;kt nuclear warhead, with an estimated [[circular error probable]] (CEP) of 300~400&nbsp;m; this version did not enter operational service.<ref name="sinodefence.com">{{cite web|url=http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp|title=DF21C|work=SinoDefence|date=13 July 2007|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080201232409/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp|archive-date=2008-02-01}}</ref> The DF-21A was operational by 1996 and has improved accuracy with an estimated CEP of 100~300&nbsp;m.<ref name="sinodefence.com"/> This version is reported to have a similar 1,770+&nbsp;km range,<ref name=dod-congress-2007/> with a potential extended range of {{convert|2150|km|mi|abbr=on}}.<ref name="fas28sep10"/><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/|title=DF-21 (Dong Feng-21 / CSS-5)|website=Missile Threat}}</ref>
Revealed in 2006, the DF-21C is a [[Terminal guidance|terminally guided]] version<ref name=janes-20150830/> that has a maximum range believed to be about {{convert|1700|km|mi|abbr=on}}<ref name=NASIC-1031-0985-09>{{cite report |url=http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/NASIC2009.pdf |title=Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat |work=National Air and Space Intelligence Center |publisher=Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency |id=NASIC-1031-0985-09 |date=April 2009 |access-date=20 February 2013}}</ref> and accuracy estimated to be 50~100m.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/23a01071-5dac-433a-8452-09c542163ae8/From-Bottle-Rockets-to-Lightning-Bolts--China-s-Mi|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304204038/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/23a01071-5dac-433a-8452-09c542163ae8/From-Bottle-Rockets-to-Lightning-Bolts--China-s-Mi|url-status=dead|title=Pradun: From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts, p.11|archive-date=March 4, 2016}}</ref> The missile was the first dual-capable version, able to be armed with either a nuclear or conventional warhead. In 2010, the DF-21C was being deployed in central Western China.<ref name="fas28sep10"/>
== {{Anchor|DF-21D|CSS-5 Mod-4|Anti-ship ballistic missile}} DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod-4) Anti-ship ballistic missile ==
{{see also|Anti-ship ballistic missile}}
[[File:Dongfeng-21D.JPG |thumb|300px|right|The DF-21D missile as seen after the military parade on September 3, 2015.]]
[[File:PLA ballistic missiles range.jpg|thumb|300px|Range of various Chinese missiles (2007); DF-21 A/B range in red.]]
===Development===
This is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has a maximum range exceeding {{convert|1450|km|mi nmi}}, according to the U.S. [[National Air and Space Intelligence Center]]. The Intelligence Center did not believe it was deployed in 2009.<ref name=NASIC-1031-0985-09/> {{as of|2009}}, the guidance system was thought to be still in an evolutionary process as more [[UAV]]s and satellites are added.<ref>[http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/03/plan-asbm-development.html PLAN ASBM development], informationdissemination.net, March 28, 2009.</ref>
The US Department of Defense stated in 2010 that China has developed and reached [[initial operating capability]] (IOC)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://defensetech.org/2010/12/28/chinas-carrier-killer-ballistic-missiles-are-operational/|title=China's Carrier Killer Ballistic Missiles are Operational|work=Defense Tech}}</ref> of a conventionally armed<ref>{{cite web|url=http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/11/oth-radar-and-asbm-threat.html|title=IMINT & Analysis|author=Sean O'Connor|work=geimint.blogspot.com|date=11 November 2008}}</ref> [[Hypersonic#Classification of Mach regimes|high hypersonic]]<ref name=USNI>{{cite web|url=https://www.usni.org/forthemedia/ChineseKillWeapon.asp|title=Report: Chinese Develop Special "Kill Weapon" to Destroy U.S. Aircraft Carriers|website=U. S. Naval Institute|date=March 31, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130121141828/http://www.usni.org/news-and-features/chinese-kill-weapon|archive-date=21 January 2013}}</ref> land-based anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21. This is the first ASBM and weapon system capable of targeting a moving [[aircraft carrier]] strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers.<ref>Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, p. 2 (p12 of PDF)</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=c5e8d58715cbe110VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News |title=How China could scupper US naval power |access-date=2009-01-10 |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post|SCMP]] |date=10 July 2009 |archive-date=2012-07-13 |archive-url=https://www.webcitation.org/697meav4E?url=http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=c5e8d58715cbe110VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012270241.htmls |title=U.S. commander says China aims to be a 'global military' power |access-date=2011-01-05 |newspaper=[[Asahi Shimbun]] |date=28 December 2010}}</ref> The DF-21D is thought to employ [[maneuverable reentry vehicle]]s (MaRVs) with a terminal guidance system. Such a missile may have been tested in 2005-6, and the launch of the Jianbing/[[Yaogan]]  satellites would give the Chinese targeting information from SAR ([[synthetic-aperture radar]]) and visual imaging respectively. The upgrades enhance China's ability to prevent US carriers from operating in the [[Taiwan Strait]].<ref>Gertz, Bill, "Inside the Ring:  China's anti-carrier missiles", ''[[The Washington Times]]'', Sep 3, 2009, p. B1.</ref> Some have also suggested China could develop a DF-21D with [[multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|multiple reentry vehicles]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Kazianis|first=Harry|title=China's Anti-Access Missile|url=https://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/11/18/chinaa-anti-access-missile/|magazine=The Diplomat|access-date=2011-12-29}}</ref>
====Guidance and navigation====
Between 2009 and 2012, China launched a series of satellites to support its ASBM efforts:
* [[Yaogan]]-VII [[electro-optical]] satellite - 9 December 2009
* Yaogan-VIII [[synthetic aperture radar]] satellite - 14 December 2009
* Yaogan-IX [[Naval Ocean Surveillance System]] (NOSS) constellation (3 satellites in formation) - 5 March 2010.<ref>"Chinese Anti-ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power", Wendell Minnick, [[Defense News]], p6a, 5 April 2010</ref>
* Yaogan-XVI [[Naval Ocean Surveillance System]] (NOSS) constellation  - 25 November 2012
China was reported to be working on an [[over-the-horizon radar]] in 2013 to locate the targets for the ASBM.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf|title=CRS RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress}}</ref> An apparent test of the missile was made against [https://fas.org/man/eprint/gobi.pdf a target] in the [[Gobi Desert]] in January 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/130130/chinas-test-df-21d-missile-mock-us-aircraft-carrier-gobi-d|title=China tests DF-21D missile on mock US aircraft carrier in Gobi desert|author=Daniel DeFraia|work=GlobalPost}}</ref>
====Re-entry vehicle====
In 2014, the U.S. Navy reported that images that have appeared on the internet showed similarities of a DF-21D re-entry vehicle to the American [[Pershing II]] missile's RV, which was withdrawn from service in 1988. The Pershing II's RV weighed {{convert|1,400|lb|kg|abbr=on}} and was fitted with four control fins to perform a 25-G pull-up after reentering the atmosphere, traveling at Mach 8 and then gliding {{convert|30|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} to the target to pitch into a terminal dive. Army training manuals about the missile are available on the internet and [[Pershing missile bibliography|public open-source literature]] extensively describes it; the DF-21 has a comparable range and payload. Though much is made of the DF-21D's damage infliction ability based solely on velocity and kinetic energy, the [[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]] has calculated that the energy of an inert {{convert|500|kg|lb|abbr=on}} RV impacting at Mach 6 had similar energy to the combined kinetic and explosive power of the American subsonic [[Harpoon (missile)|Harpoon]] anti-ship missile, which is one-quarter the energy of the Russian supersonic {{convert|12,800|lb|kg|abbr=on}} [[Kh-22]] missile traveling at Mach 4 with a {{convert|2,200|lb|kg|abbr=on}} warhead.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_01_27_2014_p18-657278.xml&p=1|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006085611/http://aviationweek.com/awin/us-navy-sees-chinese-hgv-part-wider-threat|archivedate=October 6, 2014|title=U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV As Part Of Wider Threat|website=Aviationweek.com|date= 27 January 2014}}</ref>
===Impact on naval warfare===
In 2009, the [[United States Naval Institute]] stated that there was "currently ... no defense against [a warhead able to destroy an aircraft carrier in one hit]" if it worked as theorized. It was reported in 2010 that China was finalizing development of a MaRV warhead for the DF-21.<ref>{{cite magazine|url=https://www.wired.com/2010/03/china-testing-ballistic-missile-carrier-killer/|title=China Testing Ballistic Missile 'Carrier-Killer'|date=March 29, 2010|magazine=Wired}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201008250379.html|title=China's anti-ship missile is nearly operational|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100827131804/http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201008250379.html|archivedate=August 27, 2010|newspaper=Asahi Shimbin|date=August 26, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.andrewerickson.com/2010/12/china-testing-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm/|title=China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Updated With Latest Analysis & Sources|date=December 25, 2010|website=andrewerickson.com}}</ref> The [[United States Navy]] has responded by switching its focus from a close blockade force of [[Zumwalt class destroyer|shallow water vessels]] to return to building deep water [[Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System|ballistic missile defense]] (BMD) destroyers.<ref name="USNI"/> The United States has also assigned most of its ballistic missile defense capable ships to the Pacific, extended the BMD program to all Aegis destroyers and increased procurement of [[RIM-161|SM-3]] BMD missiles.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf|title=China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.}}</ref> The United States also has a large network optimized for tracking ballistic missile launches which may give carrier groups sufficient warning in order to move away from the target area while the missile is in flight.<ref>Pomfret, John. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/24/AR2010122403009.html "Military strength is eluding China."] ''[[The Washington Post]]'', 25 December 2010.</ref> Kinetic defenses against the DF-21D would be difficult. The Navy's primary ballistic missile interceptor, the SM-3, would not be effective since it is designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course phase in space, so it would have to be launched almost immediately to hit before reentry or from an Aegis ship positioned under its flight path. The [[RIM-67|SM-2 Block 4]] can intercept missiles reentering the atmosphere, but the warhead will be performing high-G maneuvers that may complicate interception.<ref>[http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-carrier-killer-really-threat-the-us-navy-13765 Is China's "Carrier-Killer" Really a Threat to the U.S. Navy?] - Nationalinterest.org, 2 September 2015</ref> By 2016, the US Navy was testing the vastly more capable [[RIM-174 Standard ERAM|SM-6]], which is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the terminal phase.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-the-us-navy-trying-make-chinas-carrier-killer-missiles-18766|title=How the U.S. Navy is Trying to Make China's 'Carrier-Killer' Missiles Obsolete|first=Dave|last=Majumdar|date=December 16, 2016|website=The National Interest}}</ref> The SM-6 began deployment in 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/standard-missile-6/|title=Projects: Standard Missile-6|publisher=Naval Technology|accessdate=August 4, 2021}}</ref>
In late 2013, a Russian Military Analysis report of the DF-21D concluded that the only way to successfully counter it would be through [[electronic countermeasures]]. Conventional interceptions of high-speed objectives have worked in the past, with the Russian report citing the [[Operation Burnt Frost|2008 interception of a malfunctioning satellite]] by a U.S. cruiser, but in that situation the warship had extensive knowledge of its location and trajectory. Against an attack from the Mach 10 DF-21D without knowing the missile's launch point, the U.S. Navy's only way to evade it would be through electronic countermeasures.<ref>[http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year-2013-news/december-2013-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security-global-news/1423-electronic-countermeasures-maybe-only-way-to-counter-chinese-df-21d-ballistic-missile-.html Electronic Countermeasures maybe only way to counter Chinese DF-21D Ballistic Missile] - Navyrecognition.com, 14 December 2013</ref>
Use of such a missile has been said by some experts to potentially lead to nuclear exchange, regional arms races with India and Japan, and the end of the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty|INF Treaty]] between the United States and the [[Soviet Union]], to which the [[People's Republic of China]] is not a party.<ref name=autogenerated1>{{cite journal |last1=Erikson |first1=Andrew S. |last2=Yang |first2=David D. |year=2009 |title=On the Verge of a Game-Changer |journal=Proceedings Magazine |volume=135 |issue=5 |publisher=United States Naval Institute |url=http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-05/verge-game-changer |access-date=3 February 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Can a treaty contain China's missiles? |author=Mark Stokes |author2=Dan Blumenthal |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123104108.html |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=2 January 2011 |access-date=3 February 2011}}</ref>
===Skepticism===
The emergence of the DF-21D has some analysts claiming that the "carrier killer" missiles have rendered the American use of aircraft carriers obsolete, as they are too vulnerable in the face of the new weapon and not worth the expense. Military leaders in the U.S. Navy and Air Force, however, do not see it as a "game changer" to completely count carriers out.{{Cn|date=January 2021}}
First, the missile may not be able to single-handedly destroy its target, as the warhead is believed to only be enough to inflict a "mission kill" that makes a carrier unable to conduct flight operations.<ref name="airforcemagdec13">[http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/December%202013/1213china.aspx China's Carrier Killer: Threat and Theatrics] - AirForcemag.com, December 2013</ref>
Secondly, there is the problem of finding its target. The DF-21D has a range estimated between {{convert|1,035|to|1,726|mi|nmi km|abbr=on}}, so a carrier battle group would need to be located through other means before launching. [[Over-the-horizon radar]]s cannot pinpoint a carrier's exact location, and would have to be used in conjunction with Chinese recon satellites. Though recon aircraft and submarines could also be used to look for the carrier, they are vulnerable to the carrier battle group's defenses.<ref name="airforcemagdec13"/>
Finally, although the DF-21D has radar and optical sensors for tracking, it has not yet been tested against a ship target moving at-sea at up to {{convert|55|km/h|kn mph|abbr=on}}, let alone ones using clutter and countermeasures. The missile's "kill chain" requires processing and constantly updating a carrier's location details, preparing the launch, programming information and firing. The U.S. military's [[AirSea Battle]] concept involves disrupting such kill chains.<ref name="airforcemagdec13"/> Some U.S. analysts believe that the DF-21D does not fly any faster than Mach 5.<ref>[http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/house-gop-defense-heavies-slam-china-after-hypersonic-missile-test/ House GOP Defense Heavies Slam China After Hypersonic Missile Test] - Breakingdefense.com, 14 January 2014</ref>
The DF-21D may also not be as fast as theorized. While ballistic missiles reenter the atmosphere at speeds between Mach 8-15 at an altitude of {{cvt|50|km|ft|abbr=on}}, increasing air resistance in the denser low-atmosphere region reduces terminal speed to around Mach 2 at {{cvt|3-5|km|ft|abbr=on}}. It cannot acquire its target until this point due to ionization blockage, leaving a relatively short time to actually search for a ship. This could enable the target to leave the area if the missile is detected soon enough before it engages its terminal sensors, and the slower speed upon reentry leaves it vulnerable to missile interceptors.<ref>[https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3996716 Can China's DF-21D missile destroy US aircraft carriers as advertised?]. ''[[Taiwan News]]''. 29 August 2020.</ref>
===Appearances and deployments===
The missile was shown to the public during the parade in Beijing celebrating 70 years since the end of World War II on September 3, 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defenseworld.net/news/13938/China___s____Carrier_Killer____Missile_Is_For_Real|title=China's 'Carrier-Killer' Missile Is For Real|work=defenseworld.net}}</ref><ref name="janes.com">{{Cite web|url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news|title=Janes &#124; Latest defence and security news|website=Janes.com}}</ref> A parade video shows missiles marked as DF-21D.<ref name="youtube.com">{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wC8jyxbBfRM |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160313042519/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wC8jyxbBfRM |archive-date=2016-03-13 |url-status=dead|title=CHINA SHOWS OFF ITS MILITARY POWER ON V-DAY 70TH PARADE; Strategic Strikes Module Displays MISSILES|last=WORLD TV|date=3 September 2015|via=YouTube}}</ref>
On 26 August 2020, along with a DF-26B, a [[DF-21D]] was launched into an area of the [[South China Sea]] between [[Hainan]] and the [[Paracel Islands]], one day after China said that an [[America]]n [[U-2 (plane)|U-2]] [[Reconnaissance aircraft|spy plane]] entered a [[no-fly zone]] without its permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in [[Bohai Sea]] off its north coast<ref name="u2">{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning |title=Chinese military fires 'aircraft-carrier killer' missile into South China Sea in 'warning to the United States' |website=South China Morning Post |author=Huang, Kristin |date=26 August 2020 |access-date=26 August 2020 |quote=The move came one day after China said a US U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in the Bohai Sea off its north coast. |archive-date=26 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200826140231/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning |url-status=live }}</ref> and came as Washington blacklisted 24 Chinese companies and targeted individuals it said were part of construction and military activities in the South China Sea.<ref name=Jibes/><ref name=Japantimes>{{cite news |title=China fires missiles into South China Sea as U.S. sanctions Beijing |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/27/asia-pacific/missiles-south-china-sea-us-sanctions/ |agency=The Japan Times |publisher=The Japan Times |date=Aug 27, 2020}}</ref><ref name=UStargetChinese>{{cite news |title=U.S. targets Chinese individuals, companies amid South China Sea dispute |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-southchinasea-companies/us-targets-chinese-individuals-firms-amid-south-china-sea-dispute-idUSKBN25M1O6 |work=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |date=Aug 26, 2020 |quote=A U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Reuters that on Wednesday China launched four medium-range ballistic missiles that hit the South China Sea between Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands.}}</ref> US officials subsequently assessed that the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had fired four medium-range ballistic missiles in total.<ref name=Japantimes/><ref name=Jibes>{{cite news |title=U.S., China trade jibes as military tensions worsen |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defence-china/us-china-trade-jibes-as-military-tensions-worsen-idUSKBN25N0D6 |work=Reuters |date=August 27, 2020}}</ref> The missile tests drew criticism from Japan, the Pentagon and Taiwan.<ref name=Japantimes/><ref name=Jibes/><ref>{{cite news |title=Tsai calls on China to 'restrain itself' |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/08/28/2003742411 |agency=Taipei Times, CNA and Bloomberg |date=August 28, 2020}}</ref>
=={{Anchor|DF-26|Dongfeng 26}} DF-26 ==
{{Main|DF-26}}
The DF-26 is an enhancement of the DF-21 with range increased to more than {{convert|5,000|km|mi|abbr=on}}. Its existence was officially confirmed by the Chinese state in the mid-2010s, but it had already been in service for several years.<ref name=janes-20150830>{{cite news |url=http://www.janes.com/article/53896/china-previews-new-ballistic-missiles-in-practices-for-3-september-parade |title=China previews new ballistic missiles in practices for 3 September parade |author=Richard D Fisher Jr, James Hardy |publisher=IHS |work=Jane's Defence Weekly |date=30 August 2015 |access-date=3 September 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://missilethreat.com/china-produces-guam-killer-2/|title=China Produces A Guam Killer|work=Missile Threat|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141025223347/http://missilethreat.com/china-produces-guam-killer-2/|archive-date=2014-10-25}}</ref>
On 26 August 2020, a DF-26B was fired from [[Qinghai]] province into an area between [[Hainan]] and the [[Paracel Islands]] as a response to a U.S. [[U-2 (plane)|U-2]] spy plane entering into a no-fly zone during a Chinese live-fire naval drill the day earlier.<ref name="u2" />
== SC-19 ==
[[anti-satellite missile|Anti-satellite]] and [[Anti-ballistic missile]] version based on DF-21. Multiple test was conducted. The missile is capable of targeting ballistic missiles and satellite outside of the Earth atmosphere.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://indsr.org.tw/uploads/enindsr/files/202206/fe289bec-3b2f-43ab-b2b6-0aa5cedac64f.pdf |title=China's Missile Defense Capability |website=Taiwan Defense Research Institute |author=Hsiao-Huang Shu* }}</ref><Ref>{{cite web|url=https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf |title=2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet |website=Secure World Foundation |first=Brian |last=Weeden }}</ref>
== KF-21 ==
The "KF-21" (possible Chinese designation,<ref name=twz_2>{{cite web|url=https://www.twz.com/air/chinas-h-6k-bomber-seen-firing-air-launched-ballistic-missile-for-first-time |title=China's H-6K Bomber Seen Firing Air-Launched Ballistic Missile For First Time |website= The War Zone |date=1 May 2024 |first=Thomas |last=Newdick }}</ref> [[NATO reporting name|NATO designation]]: CH-AS-X-13) is reported to be an [[air-launched ballistic missile|air-launched]] variant of the DF-21<ref name="iiss_lrs">{{cite report |last1=Nouwen |first1=Veerle |last2=Wright |first2=Timothy |last3=Graham |first3=Euan |last4=Herzinger |first4=Blake |date=January 2024 |title=Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability |url=https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/01/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the--asia-pacific-implications-for-regional-stability/ |publisher=[[The International Institute for Strategic Studies]] |page=12 |docket= |access-date= |quote=}}</ref> with a nuclear or anti-ship role. It is a two-stage missile with a range of 3000 km. Weight may have been reduced by using composite materials.<ref name=dp>{{cite web|url= https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/revealed-chinas-nuclear-capable-air-launched-ballistic-missile/ |title= Revealed: China's Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Ballistic Missile |website=The Diplomat |date=10 April 2018 |first= Ankit |last=Panda }}</ref> ''The War Zone'' reported two possible warhead configurations; a DF-21D-style "double-cone" tip, and a hypersonic guild vehicle (HGV) similar to the [[DF-ZF]] on the [[DF-17]] missile.<ref name=twz_2 />
It was in development by 2018.<ref name="iiss_lrs"/> In 2018, the United States projected it would be ready for deployment by 2025.<ref name=dp/>
The missile is carried by the [[Xian H-6]]N bomber; the aircraft has a recessed underside to carry the missile externally.<ref name="iiss_lrs"/>
==Saudi Arabian purchase==
{{Main|Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force}}
The DF-21 may have been exported to [[Saudi Arabia]].<ref>{{Cite book |author=The International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2024 |date=13 February 2024 |publisher=Routledge |location=London |isbn=978-1-032-78004-7 |page=384 }}</ref> In January 2014, ''[[Newsweek]]'' reported that the missiles were purchased in 2007. Conventionally-armed [[DF-3]] missiles were bought by Saudi Arabia in 1988, but were not used during the 1990-1991 [[Gulf War]] due to their poor accuracy and the potential for [[collateral damage]]. Saudi Arabia wanted the shorter-ranged but much more accurate DF-21 as an upgrade. The United States approved of the purchase on the condition that the missiles were conventionally-armed.<ref>{{cite web |last1= |first1= |title=Exclusive: CIA Helped Saudis in Secret Chinese Missile Deal |url=https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-cia-helped-saudis-chinese-missile-deal-227283 |website=Newsweek |date=22 April 2014 |access-date=2 June 2024}}</ref> The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) examined the modified nosecones and concluded that nuclear warheads that might be purchased from China or Pakistan could not be fitted.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fitzpatrick |first1=Mark |title=Saudi Arabia's ballistic-missile programme: an overview |url=https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/08/saudi-arabia-ballistic-missile-programme/ |website=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] |date=27 August 2021 |access-date=2 June 2024}}</ref>
== See also ==
*[[Dong Neng-3]]
== References ==
{{Reflist}}
== External links ==
* [https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/ CSIS Missile Threat - Dong Feng-21]
* [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/df-21.htm Global Security description]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080201232409/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp Sinodefense description]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080829122514/http://astronautix.com/lvs/df21.htm Encyclopedia Astronautica description]
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXLKZDVcBt8 The Chinese DF-21D anti carrier weapon kill chain] - Youtube.com
{{S-start}}
{{Succession box|title=DF-21 |before=[[DF-5]] |after=[[DF-31]] |years=1999-}}
{{S-end}}
{{Chinese_Missiles}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Df-21}}
[[Category:Ballistic missiles of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Weapons of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Nuclear missiles of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Anti-satellite missiles]]
[[Category:Synthetic aperture radar]]
[[Category:Medium-range ballistic missiles]]
[[Category:Military equipment introduced in the 1990s]]
[[Category:Surface-to-surface missiles of China]]