View source for Dillon v. Legg

{{Use mdy dates|date=September 2023}}
{{Infobox California Supreme Court case
|Litigants= Dillon v. Legg
|ArgueDate=
|ArgueYear=
|DecideDate= June 21
|DecideYear= 1968
|FullName= Margery M. Dillon v. David Luther Legg
|Citations= [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1779068908894362158&q=dillon+legg&hl=en&as_sdt=2006 68 Cal.2d 728]<br>441 P.2d 912<br>69 Cal.Rptr. 72<br>29 A.L.R.3d 1316
|Prior=
|Subsequent=
|Holding= A bystander that suffers damages by the conduct of a negligent tortfeasor can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
|ChiefJudge=[[Roger J. Traynor]]
|AssociateJudges=[[Mathew Tobriner]], [[Raymond E. Peters]], [[Stanley Mosk]], [[Raymond L. Sullivan]], [[Louis H. Burke]], [[Marshall F. McComb]]
|Majority= Tobriner
|JoinMajority= Peters, Mosk, Sullivan
|Concurrence=
|JoinConcurrence=
|Concurrence/Dissent=
|Dissent= Traynor
|JoinDissent=
|Dissent2= Burke
|JoinDissent2= McComb
|LawsApplied=
}}
'''''Dillon v. Legg''''', [[case citation|68 Cal. 2d 728]] (1968), was a [[legal case|case]] decided by the [[Supreme Court of California]] that established the [[tort]] of [[negligent infliction of emotional distress]].  To date, it is the most persuasive decision of the most persuasive state supreme court in the United States during the latter half of the 20th century: ''Dillon'' has been favorably cited and followed by at least twenty reported out-of-state appellate decisions, more than any other California appellate decision in the period from 1940 to 2005.<ref>Jake Dear and Edward W. Jessen, ''" Followed Rates" and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005'', <span style="font-variant: small-caps;">[http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/41/2/essay/DavisVol41No2_Dear.pdf 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 683, 694]</span>(2007).</ref> It was also favorably cited by the [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]] in an important case on [[nervous shock]], ''[[McLoughlin v O'Brian]]'' [1983].
==Background==
A mother, Margery M. Dillon, and her daughter Cheryl witnessed the death of her other child in a car accident caused by a [[negligent]] driver, David Luther Legg. Two-year-old Erin Dillon was fatally struck by Legg's vehicle while crossing Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane (near the Dillons' residence in the [[unincorporated area]] of [[Arden-Arcade, California|Arden-Arcade]] in [[Sacramento County, California|Sacramento County]]). The mother and daughter sued for emotional distress as a result of witnessing the accident. The trial court dismissed the claim under the prevailing zone of danger rule: the plaintiff needed to be in physical danger of the accident itself to recover for emotional distress.<ref>Henderson, J.A. et al.  ''The Torts Process, Seventh Edition.'' Aspen Publishers, New York, NY: 2007, p. 305</ref><ref name="Meyer">{{cite book|last=Meyer|first=Robert G. |author2=Christopher M. Weaver|title=Law and mental health: a case-based approach  |publisher=Guilford Press|date=December 15, 2005|isbn=1-59385-221-5|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_zU4PCsY774C&q=Dillon+v.+Legg&pg=PA182}}</ref>
==Decision==
===Majority opinion===
The court relied on [[foreseeability]] to establish whether or not a negligent defendant owed a [[duty of care]] to a bystander. The court urged a [[Balancing test|case-by-case analysis of several factors]] to determine if foreseeability would create a duty to a bystander:
*Whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident,
*Whether the plaintiff suffered an emotional shock from contemporaneously observing the accident, and
*Whether the plaintiff is closely related to the victim
Using these criteria, the court determined that it was foreseeable that the negligent operation of an automobile could cause emotional distress to a mother witnessing the injury of her child in an accident.<ref>Henderson, J.A. et al., p. 307</ref>
===Traynor's dissent===
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Traynor asserted that the case should have been decided according to the zone of danger rule enunciated in the case ''Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.''<ref>''Dillon v. Legg'', 68 Cal.2d 728, 748 (1968)</ref>
===Burke's dissent===
In dissent, Justice Burke asserted that the majority had adopted arguments that were previously rejected in ''Amaya''.  Burke criticized the guidelines offered by the majority as insufficient protection against possibly limitless liability.  Burke viewed the limitations on liability inherent in the zone of danger rule as logical and necessary, and thought that such a pronounced change in liability rules should be adopted by the legislature and not the courts.<ref>''Dillon'', 68 Cal.2d at 749-52</ref>
==See also==
*''[[Thing v. La Chusa]]'' (1989) - transformed ''Dillon's'' test into a strict [[bright-line rule]]
==References==
{{reflist}}
==External links==
*[http://www.audiocasefiles.com/acf_cases/9067-dillon-v-legg Edited text and audio of opinion at Audio Case Files]
{{United States tort case law}}
[[Category:United States negligence case law]]
[[Category:1968 in United States case law]]
[[Category:Supreme Court of California case law]]
[[Category:1968 in California]]
[[Category:History of Sacramento, California]]
[[Category:Traffic collisions]]