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{{Short description|One of six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy}}
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{{About|an ancient school of Hindu philosophy|annual Science quiz competition|Mimamsa-IISER}}
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{{Hindu philosophy}}
'''''Mīmāṁsā''''' ([[Sanskrit]]: मीमांसा;<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://spokensanskrit.org/index.php?tran_input=mImAMsA&direct=se&script=hk&link=yes&mode=3|title=Mimamsa in Sanskrit}}</ref> [[International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration|IAST]]: Mīmāṃsā) is a [[Sanskrit]] word that means "reflection" or "critical investigation" and thus refers to a tradition of contemplation which reflected on the meanings of certain [[Vedic]] texts.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Definition of MIMAMSA |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Mimamsa |access-date=2023-12-16 |website=www.merriam-webster.com |language=en}}</ref><ref name="britenc">{{Cite web |title=Mimamsa {{!}} Vedic Rituals, Dharma & Nyaya|work=Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mimamsa |access-date=2023-12-16 |language=en}}</ref> This tradition is also known as '''Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā''' because of its focus on the earlier (''pūrva'') Vedic texts dealing with ritual actions, and similarly as '''Karma-Mīmāṁsā''' due to its focus on ritual action (''karma'').<ref name="olil2">Chris Bartley (2013), "Purva Mimamsa", in ''Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy'' (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge, 978-0415862530, pages 443–445.</ref> It is one of six Vedic "affirming" ([[Āstika and nāstika|āstika]]) schools of [[Hindu philosophy]]. This particular school is known for its philosophical theories on the nature of [[Dharma]], based on [[hermeneutics]] of the [[Vedas]], especially the [[Brahmana|Brāḥmanas]] and [[samhita]]s.<ref name="olil">Oliver Leaman (2006), Shruti, in ''Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy'', Routledge, {{ISBN|978-0415862530}}, page 503.</ref> The Mīmāṃsā school was foundational and influential for the [[Vedanta|Vedāntic]] schools, which were also known as Uttara-Mīmāṁsā for their focus on the "later" (''uttara'') portions of the Vedas, the [[Upanishads]]. While both "earlier" and "later" Mīmāṃsā investigate the aim of human action, they do so with different attitudes towards the necessity of ritual praxis.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ram-Prasad |first1=Chakravarti |title=Knowledge and Action 1: Means to the Human End in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta |journal=Journal of Indian Philosophy |date=2000 |volume=1 |issue=28 |pages=1–24|doi=10.1023/A:1004744313963 |s2cid=170635199 }}</ref>
Mīmāṁsā has several sub-schools, each defined by its [[pramana]]. The Prabhākara sub-school, which takes its name from the seventh-century philosopher [[Prabhākara]], described the five epistemically reliable means to gaining knowledge: ''[[pratyaksha|pratyakṣa]]'' or perception; ''anumāna'' or inference; ''[[upamāṇa]]'', comparison and analogy; ''arthāpatti'', the use of postulation and derivation from circumstances; and ''[[shabda]]'', the word or testimony of past or present reliable experts.<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood/> The [[Kumārila Bhaṭṭa|Bhāṭṭa]] sub-school, from philosopher [[Kumārila Bhaṭṭa]], added a sixth means to its canon; ''[[anupalabdhi]]'' meant non-perception, or proof by the absence of cognition (e.g., the ''lack'' of gunpowder on a suspect's hand)<ref name=dpsb/><ref name="jag">John A. Grimes, ''A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English'', State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|978-0791430675}}, page 238.</ref>
The school of Mīmāṃsā consists of both [[nontheism|non-theistic]] and [[theism|theistic]] doctrines, but the school showed little interest in systematic examination of the existence of Gods. Rather, it held that the soul is an eternal, omnipresent, inherently active spiritual essence, and focused on the epistemology and metaphysics of ''Dharma''.<ref name=olil2/><ref>{{cite book |last=Neville |first=Robert |title=Religious Truth |publisher=SUNY Press |year=2001}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Worthington |first=Vivian |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5aI9AAAAIAAJ |title=A History of Yoga |publisher=Routledge |year=1982 |isbn=9780710092588 |page=66}}</ref> For the Mīmāṃsā school, ''Dharma'' meant rituals and social duties, not ''[[Deva (Hinduism)|Devas]]'', or Gods, because Gods existed only in name.<ref name=olil2/> The Mīmāṃsakas also held that Vedas are "eternal, author-less, [and] infallible", that Vedic ''vidhi'', or injunctions and [[mantra]]s in rituals are prescriptive ''kārya'' or actions, and the rituals are of primary importance and merit. They considered the Upaniṣads and other texts related to self-knowledge and spirituality as subsidiary, a philosophical view that Vedānta disagreed with.<ref name=olil2/><ref name=olil/><ref>Peter M. Scharf, ''The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy'' (1996), Chapter 3</ref>
While their deep analysis of language and [[linguistics]] influenced other schools of Hinduism,<ref>Annette Wilke and Oliver Moebus (2011), Sound and Communication: An Aesthetic Cultural History of Sanskrit Hinduism, Walter de Gruyter GmbH (Berlin), {{ISBN|978-3110181593}}, pages 23–24, 551–663.</ref> their views were not shared by others. Mīmāṃsakas considered the purpose and power of language was to clearly ''prescribe'' the proper, correct and right. In contrast, Vedāntins extended the scope and value of language as a tool to also ''describe'', ''develop'' and ''derive''.<ref name=olil2/> Mīmāṁsakās considered orderly, law driven, procedural life as central purpose and noblest necessity of [[Dharma]] and society, and divine (theistic) sustenance means to that end.
The Mīmāṁsā school is a form of [[philosophical realism]].<ref>M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120810860}}, pages 323–325.</ref> A key text of the Mīmāṁsā school is the [[Purva Mimamsa Sutras|Mīmāṁsā Sūtra]] of [[Jaimini]].<ref name=olil2/><ref name="mhiri">M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120810860}}, pages 298-335.</ref>
==Terminology==
Mīmāṃsā ([[International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration|IAST]]), also romanized Mimansa<ref>{{cite book|author=M.C. Nyayaratna|title=The Mimansa Darsana |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Welq8SN8tPEC|year=1863|publisher=Bishop's College Press|pages=Cover Page}}</ref> or Mimamsa,<ref name=britenc/> means "reflection, consideration, profound thought, investigation, examination, discussion" in Sanskrit.<ref name=monierwilliamsm>[http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MWScan/tamil/index.html Mimamsa], Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon (Germany)</ref> It also refers to the "examination of the Vedic text"<ref name=monierwilliamsm/> and to a school of Hindu philosophy that is also known as {{IAST|''Pūrva Mīmāṃsā''}} ("prior" inquiry, also {{IAST|''Karma-Mīmāṃsā''}}), in contrast to  {{IAST|''Uttara Mīmāṃsā''}} ("posterior" inquiry, also {{IAST|''Jñāna-Mīmāṃsā''}}) – the opposing school of [[Vedanta]]. This division is based on classification of the Vedic texts into ''{{IAST|karmakāṇḍa}}'', the early sections of the Veda treating of mantras and rituals ([[Samhita]]s and [[Brahmana]]s), and the ''{{IAST|jñānakāṇḍa}}'' dealing with the meditation, reflection and knowledge of Self, Oneness, [[Brahman]] (the Upaniṣads).<ref name=olil/><ref name=mhiri/> Between the ''Samhitas'' and ''Brahmanas'', the Mīmāṃsā school places greater emphasis to the Brahmanas – the part of Vedas that is a commentary on Vedic rituals.<ref>M. Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120810860}}, page 299</ref>
The word comes from the desiderative stem of √man (Macdonell, A. A, 1883, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary), from [[Proto-Indo-European]] *men- (“to think”). Donald Davis translates Mīmāṃsā as the "desire to think", and in colloquial historical context as "how to think and interpret things".<ref name="DonaldRDavidJr2010">{{cite book|author=Donald R. Davis, Jr |title=The Spirit of Hindu Law |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9oEhAwAAQBAJ |year=2010|publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-48531-9 |pages=47–48}}</ref> In the last centuries of the first millennium BCE, the word Mīmāṃsā began to denote the thoughts on and interpretation of the Vedas, first as ''Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā'' for rituals portions in the earlier layers of texts in the Vedas, and as ''Uttara-Mīmāṃsā'' for the philosophical portions in the last layers.<ref name="DonaldRDavidJr2010"/><ref name="fxclooneyp25"/> Over time, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā was just known as the Mīmāṃsā school, and the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā as the [[Vedanta]] school.<ref name="fxclooneyp25">{{cite book|author=Francis Xavier Clooney |title=Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=86zWAAAAMAAJ |year=1990|publisher=De Nobili, Vienna |isbn=978-3-900271-21-3 |pages=25–28 }}</ref>
Mīmāṃsā scholars are referred to as ''Mīmāṃsāka''s.{{sfn|Francis X. Clooney|1997|p=337}}
==Darśana (philosophy) – central concerns==
{{Further|Hindu philosophy}}
Mīmāṁsā is one of the six classical Hindu ''darśanas''. It is among the earliest schools of Hindu philosophies.<ref name=britenc/> It has attracted relatively less scholarly study, although its theories and particularly its questions on exegesis and theology have been highly influential on all classical Indian philosophies.{{sfn|Francis X. Clooney|1997|pp=337–340}}{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=26–31}}{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2008|pp=57–61, 89–98}} Its analysis of language has been of central importance to the legal literature of India.<ref>{{cite book|author=Maurice Winternitz|author-link=Moriz Winternitz|title=History of Indian Literature|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ql0BmInD1c4C |year=1963|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |isbn=978-81-208-0056-4|pages=511–512}}</ref>
Ancient Mīmāṁsā's central concern was [[epistemology]] (''[[pramana]]''), that is what are the reliable means to knowledge. It debated not only "how does man ever learn or know, whatever he knows", but also whether the nature of all knowledge is inherently circular, whether those such as [[Foundationalism|foundationalists]] who critique the validity of any "justified beliefs" and knowledge system make flawed presumptions of the very premises they critique, and how to correctly interpret and avoid incorrectly interpreting [[dharma]] texts such as the [[Vedas]].{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=28–32}} It asked questions such as "what is ''devata'' (god)?", "are rituals dedicated to ''devatas'' efficacious?", "what makes anything efficacious?", and "Can it be proved that the Vedas, or any canonical text in any system of thought, is fallible or infallible (''svatah pramanya'', intrinsically valid)?, if so, how?" and others.{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=26–33}}{{sfn|Francis X. Clooney|1997|pp=337–342}} To Mīmāṁsā scholars, the nature of non-empirical knowledge and human means to it are such that one can never demonstrate certainty, one can only falsify knowledge claims, in some cases.{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=27, 29–30}} According to [[Francis Xavier Clooney|Francis Clooney]], the Mīmāṁsā school is "one of the most distinctively Hindu forms of thinking; it is without real parallel elsewhere in the world".{{sfn|Francis X. Clooney|1997|p=337}}
The central text of the Mīmāṁsā school is Jamini's ''Mīmāṁsā Sutras'', accompanied by the historically influential commentary of Sabara and Kumarila Bhatta's commentary (''Ślokavārttika'') on Sabara's commentary.{{sfn|Francis X. Clooney|1997|p=337}}{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=27–29}} Together, these texts develop and apply the rules of language analysis (such as the rules of contradiction), asserting that one must not only examine injunctive propositions in any scripture but also examine the alternate related or reverse propositions for better understanding. They suggested that to reach correct and valid knowledge it is not only sufficient to demand proof of a proposition, it is important to give proof of a proposition's negative as well as declare and prove one's preferred propositions. Further, they asserted that whenever perception is not the means of direct proof and knowledge, one cannot prove such non-empirical propositions to be "true or not true", rather one can only prove a non-empirical proposition is "false, not false, or uncertain".{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=28–35}}
For example, Mīmāṁsakas welcome not only the demand for proof of an injunctive proposition such as "[[agnihotra]] ritual leads one to heaven", but suggest that one must examine and prove alternate propositions such as "ritual does not lead one to heaven",  "something else leads one to heaven", "there is heaven", "there is no heaven" and so on. Mīmāṁsā literature states that if satisfactory, verifiable proof for all of such propositions cannot be found by its proponents and its opponents, then the proposition needs to be accepted as a part of a "belief system".{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=27–29}}{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2008|pp=57–79}} Beliefs, such as those in the scriptures (Vedas), must be accepted to be true unless its opponents can demonstrate the proof of the validity of their own texts or teacher(s) these opponents presume to be ''prima facie justified'', and until these opponents can demonstrate that the scriptures they challenge are false. If they do not try to do so, it is hypocrisy; if they try to do so, it can only lead to an infinite regress, according to Mīmānsākas.{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=28–32}}{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2008|pp=89–114}} Any historic scripture with widespread social acceptance, according to Mīmāṁsāka, is an activity of communication (''vyavaharapravrtti'') and is accepted as authoritative because it is socially validated practice unless perceptually verifiable evidence emerges that proves parts or all of it as false or harmful.{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=31–33, 36–38}}
Mīmāṁsākas were predominantly concerned with the central motivation of human beings, the [[summum bonum|highest good]], and actions that make this possible.{{sfn|Prasad|1994|pp=317–318}} They stated that human beings seek ''niratisaya priti'' (unending ecstatic pleasure, joy, happiness) in this life and the next. They argued that this highest good is the result of one's own ethical actions (''[[dharma]]''), that such actions are what the Vedic sentences contain and communicate, and therefore it important to properly interpret and understand Vedic sentences, words and meaning.{{sfn|Prasad|1994|pp=317–318}}{{sfn|P. T. Raju|1985|pp=17, 41–47, 61–63, Quote (p. 62): "The ideal life, according to the Mimamsa, is thus a life of continuous ethical activity and enjoyment of its fruits."}} Mīmāṁsā scholarship was centrally concerned with the philosophy of language, how human beings learn and communicate with each other and across generations with language in order to act in a manner that enables them to achieve that which motivates them.{{sfn|Prasad|1994|pp=317–319}}{{sfn|Staal|1976|pp=112–117}} The Mīmāṁsā school focussed on ''dharma'', deriving ethics and activity from the ''karma-kanda'' (rituals) part of the Vedas, with the argument that ethics for this life and efficacious action for ''svarga'' (heaven) cannot be derived from sense-perception, and can only be derived from experience, reflection and understanding of past teachings.{{sfn|Shyam Ranganathan|2007|pp=298–302, 348–349}}
<blockquote style="background-color:none;margin-right:5em;margin-left:0em;border-left:solid 6px #FFE0BB;padding:1.0em">
<poem>
In every human activity, the motivating force to perform an action is his innate longing for ''priti'' (pleasure, happiness<ref>Jan Gonda, Johannes Bronkhorst and Elisa Freschi translate "priti" as happiness; e.g. see, {{cite book|author=Elisa Freschi|title=Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prabhakara Mimamsa|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EhX3I99EbQ0C&pg=PA380|year=2012|publisher=BRILL Academic|isbn=978-90-04-22260-1|page=380}}</ref>),
whether at the lowest level or the highest level.
At the highest level, it is nothing but an unsurpassed state of ''priti'',
which is ensured only by performing ethical actions.
</poem>
– Sabara, 2nd century Mīmānsā scholar{{sfn|Prasad|1994|p=339 note 5, Mimamsasutrabhasya 4.3.15}}
</blockquote>
According to Daniel Arnold, Mīmāṁsā scholarship has "striking affinities" with that of [[William Alston]], the 20th century Western philosopher, along with some notable differences.{{sfn|Daniel Arnold|2001|pp=41–43}} The Mīmāṁsākas subjected to a radical critique, more than two thousand years ago, states Francis Clooney, the notions such as "God," the "sacred text," the "author" and the "anthropocentric ordering of reality".<ref>{{cite journal|title= Why the Veda Has No Author: Language as Ritual in Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern Theology |author= Francis X. Clooney|journal= Journal of the American Academy of Religion| volume= 55| number= 4| year= 1987| pages= 660–661| publisher= Oxford University Press| jstor= 1464680| doi=10.1093/jaarel/lv.4.659}}</ref>
==Epistemology==
In the realm of [[epistemology|epistemological]] studies, subsequent Mīmāṃsākas scholars have made significant contributions. Unlike the [[Nyaya]] or the [[Vaisheshika]] systems, the {{IAST|Prābhākara}} branch of Mīmāṃsā recognizes five means of valid knowledge (Skt. ''[[pramāṇa]]''). In addition to these, the {{IAST|Bhāṭṭa}} sub-school of Mīmāṃsā acknowledges a sixth means, namely ''anuapalabdhi'', akin to the [[Advaita Vedanta]] school of Hinduism. The following are the six epistemically reliable means of gaining knowledge:
===Pratyaksa===
{{Main|Pratyaksha}}
''[[Pratyaksha|Pratyakṣa]]'' (प्रत्यक्ष means perception. It is of two types in Mīmānsā and other schools of Hinduism: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.<ref name=kamal>MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, ''Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies'', 46(2): 13–16</ref><ref>B Matilal (1992), "Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge", Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|978-0198239765}}</ref> The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:<ref name=kpmat/> ''Indriyarthasannikarsa'' (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), ''Avyapadesya'' (non-verbal; correct perception is not through [[hearsay]], according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), ''Avyabhicara'' (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and ''Vyavasayatmaka'' (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).<ref name=kpmat>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in ''Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies'', Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 160–168</ref> Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as ''pramana'' and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included ''pratibha'' (intuition), ''samanyalaksanapratyaksa'' (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and ''jnanalaksanapratyaksa'' (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).<ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 168–169</ref> Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from ''Pratyakṣa-pramana'', so as to contrast ''nirnaya'' (definite judgment, conclusion) from ''anadhyavasaya'' (indefinite judgment).<ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 170–172</ref>
===Anumana===
{{Main|Anumana}}
''[[Anumāṇa]]'' (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason.<ref>W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|0-7914-0362-9}}, page 26-27</ref> Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of ''Anumana''.<ref name=kamal/> In all except one Hindu philosophies,<ref>Carvaka school is the exception</ref> this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: ''pratijna'' (hypothesis), ''hetu'' (a reason), and ''drshtanta'' (examples).<ref name=jl4647>James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in ''The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism'', Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 46-47</ref> The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: ''sadhya'' (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and ''paksha'' (the object on which the ''sadhya'' is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if ''sapaksha'' (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if ''vipaksha'' (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand ''Vyapti'' – the requirement that the ''hetu'' (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both ''sapaksha'' and ''vipaksha''.<ref name=jl4647/><ref>Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0779-0}}</ref> A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a ''nigamana'' (conclusion).<ref>Monier Williams (1893), ''Indian Wisdom – Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus'', Luzac & Co, London, page 61</ref>
===Upamana===
{{main|Upamāṇa}}
''[[Upamāṇa]]'' means comparison and analogy.<ref name="dpsb">DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, {{ISBN|978-1-4419-8109-7}}, page 172.</ref><ref name="gflood">[[Gavin Flood]], An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|978-0521438780}}, page 225.</ref> Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge.<ref>VN Jha (1986), "The upamana-pramana in Purvamimamsa", SILLE, pages 77–91</ref> ''Upamana'', states Lochtefeld,<ref name=jl721/> may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like a cow, but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.<ref name=jl721>James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in ''The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism'', Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 721</ref> The subject of comparison is formally called ''upameyam'', the object of comparison is called ''upamanam'', while the attribute(s) are identified as ''samanya''.<ref name=mw457>Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom – Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, pages 457–458</ref> Thus, explains [[Monier Monier-Williams]], if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is ''upameyam'', the moon is ''upamanam'', and charmingness is ''samanya''. The  7th century text [[Bhaṭṭikāvya]] in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not.<ref name=mw457/> In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of ''Upanama'' and their value in epistemology are debated.
===Arthāpatti===
{{Main|Arthāpatti}}
''[[Arthāpatti]]'' (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation, derivation from circumstances.<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood/> In contemporary logic, this ''pramāṇa'' is similar to circumstantial [[Modus ponens|implication]].<ref>[https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36920/arthapatti Arthapatti] ''Encyclopædia Britannica'' (2012)</ref> As example, if a person left in a boat on a river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this ''pramāṇa'' as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted.<ref>James Lochtefeld, "Arthapatti" in ''The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism'', Vol. 1: A–M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 55</ref> However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for ''arthāpatti'' found in the texts of Mīmāṃsā  and other schools of Hinduism is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in the day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge.<ref>Stephen Phillips (1996), Classical Indian Metaphysics, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120814899}}, pages 41–63</ref> The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other ''pramāṇas'' or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.<ref>DM Datta (1932), The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical study of the Advaita theory of knowledge, University of Calcutta, Reprinted in 1992 as {{ISBN|978-8120835269}}, pages 221–253</ref>
===Anupalabdhi===
{{Main article|Anupalabdhi}}{{see also|Abhava}}
''[[Anupalabdhi]]'' (अनुपलब्धि), accepted only by Kumarila Bhatta sub-school of Mīmāṃsā, means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof.<ref name=eliottjag/> ''Anupalabdhi pramana'' suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means.<ref>James Lochtefeld, "Abhava" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, page 1</ref> In the two schools of Hinduism that consider ''Anupalabdhi'' as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either ''sadrupa'' (positive) or ''asadrupa'' (negative) relation – both correct and valuable. Like other ''pramana'', Indian scholars refined ''Anupalabdi'' to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a ''pramana''. The schools that endorsed ''Anupalabdi'' affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five ''pramanas'' fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.<ref name=ds/>
''[[Abhava]]'' (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider ''Anupalabdi'' to be same as ''Abhava'',<ref name=dpsb/> while others consider ''Anupalabdi'' and ''Abhava'' as different.<ref name=ds>D Sharma (1966), Epistemological negative dialectics of Indian logic — Abhāva versus Anupalabdhi, ''Indo-Iranian Journal'', 9(4): 291–300</ref><ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in ''Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies'', Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|81-208-0309-4}}, pages 155–174, 227–255</ref> ''Abhava-pramana'' has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of ''[[Padārtha]]'' (पदार्थ, referent of a term). A ''Padartha'' is defined as that which is simultaneously ''Astitva'' (existent), ''Jneyatva'' (knowable) and ''Abhidheyatva'' (nameable).<ref name=chba/> Specific examples of ''padartha'', states Bartley, include ''dravya'' (substance), ''[[Guṇa|guna]]'' (quality), ''karma'' (activity/motion), ''samanya/jati'' (universal/class property), ''samavaya'' (inherence) and ''vishesha'' (individuality). ''Abhava'' is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to "[[Sense and reference|referents]] of positive expression" in ''Padartha''.<ref name=chba/> An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, ''asatkaryavada'' theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. ''Abhava'' was further refined in four types, by the schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: ''dhvamsa'' (termination of what existed), ''atyanta-abhava'' (impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction), ''anyonya-abhava'' (mutual negation, reciprocal absence) and ''pragavasa'' (prior, antecedent non-existence).<ref name=chba>Chris Bartley (2013), ''Padartha'', in ''Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy'' (Editor: Oliver Leaman), Routledge, {{ISBN|978-0415862530}}, pages 415–416</ref><ref>Mohan Lal (Editor), ''The Encyclopaedia of Indian Literature'', Vol. 5, Sahitya Akademy, {{ISBN|81-260-1221-8}}, page 3958</ref>
===Shabda===
{{Main|Shabda}}
''[[Shabda]]'' (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts.<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=eliottjag>
*Eliott Deutsche (2000), in ''Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy'' Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, {{ISBN|978-0815336112}}, pages 245–248;
*John A. Grimes, ''A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English'', State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|978-0791430675}}, page 238</ref> Hiriyanna explains ''Sabda-pramana'' as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.<ref name=mhir>M. Hiriyanna (2000), The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120813304}}, page 43</ref>  He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through ''Sabda'' (words).<ref name=mhir/> The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the ''Sabda'' of reliable sources.<ref name=eliottjag/><ref name=mhir/> The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as [[Charvaka]], state that this is never possible, and therefore ''Sabda'' is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.<ref>P. Billimoria (1988), "Śabdapramāṇa: Word and Knowledge", ''Studies of Classical India'' Volume 10, Springer, {{ISBN|978-94-010-7810-8}}, pages 1–30</ref>
=== Svatah Pramanya ===
The doctrine of svatah pramanya in Mīmāṃsā emphasizes accepting appearances as they are. It holds that since a cognition initially appears true, it should be accepted as true unless there is concrete evidence to the contrary. If no such evidence ever appears, the cognition is considered genuinely true.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Taber |first=John |date=1992 |title=What Did Kumārila Bhaṭṭa Mean by Svataḥ Prāmāṇya? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/603701 |journal=Journal of the American Oriental Society |volume=112 |issue=2 |pages=204–221 |doi=10.2307/603701 |issn=0003-0279}}</ref>
===Relation to Vedanta school===
An interesting feature of the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy is its unique epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ''ipso facto'' true (Skt. ''svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda''). Thus, what is to be proven is not the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mīmāṃsākas advocate the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (''utpatti'') and ascertainment (''jñapti''). Not only did the Mīmāṃsākas make a very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the [[Veda]]s, but later Vedantists also drew freely upon this particular Mīmāṃsā contribution.{{citation needed|date=January 2015}}
==Metaphysics and beliefs==
The core tenets of {{IAST|''Pūrva Mīmāṃsā''}} are [[ritual]]ism ([[orthopraxy]]) and anti-asceticism. The central aim of the school is elucidation of the nature of ''[[dharma]]'', understood as a set ritual obligations and prerogatives to be performed properly.
=== Apaurusheya ===
The term [[Apauruṣeyā|Apaurusheya]], central to the Mīmāṃsā school, asserts that the Vedas are not of human origin.<ref>{{Citation |last=Johnson |first=W. J. |title=apauruṣeya |date=2009-01-01 |work=A Dictionary of Hinduism |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780198610250.001.0001/acref-9780198610250-e-231 |access-date=2024-08-13 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en |doi=10.1093/acref/9780198610250.001.0001/acref-9780198610250-e-231 |isbn=978-0-19-861025-0}}</ref> Instead, they are considered uncreated, without any specific author, and self-validating in their authority. Jaimini explains in his fifth Mīmāṃsā Sutra that the relationship between words and their meanings in the Vedas is primordial, meaning it has existed since the beginning of time.<ref>{{Citation |last=Arnold |first=Daniel |title=Kumārila |date=2024 |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/kumaarila/ |access-date=2024-08-13 |edition=Summer 2024 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>
===Non-theism===
Mīmāṃsā theorists decided that the evidence allegedly proving the [[existence of God]] was insufficient. They argue that there was no need to postulate a maker for the world, just as there was no need for an author to compose the Vedas or a God to validate the rituals.<ref>{{cite book|title=Religious truth|first=Robert|last=Neville|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ThLR13JpCWsC|page=51|isbn=9780791447789|year=2001|publisher=SUNY Press }}</ref> Mīmāṃsā argues that the Gods named in the Vedas have no existence apart from the ''[[mantra]]s'' that speak their names. To that regard, the power of the mantras is what is seen as the power of Gods.<ref>{{cite book|title=The perfectibility of human nature in eastern and western thought |first=Harold |last=Coward |author-link=Harold Coward |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LkE_8uch5P0C|page=114|isbn=9780791473368 |date=2008-02-07 |publisher=SUNY Press }}</ref>
===''Dharma''===
[[Dharma]] as understood by Pūrva Mīmāṃsā can be loosely translated into English as "virtue", "morality" or "duty". The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school traces the source of the knowledge of dharma neither to sense-experience nor inference, but to verbal [[cognition]] (i.e. knowledge of words and meanings) according to Vedas. In this respect it is related to the [[Nyāya]] school, the latter, however, accepts only four sources of knowledge (''pramāṇa'') as valid.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kapoor|first=Subodh|title=The Philosophy Of Vaisnavism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Lariw7EILCAC&pg=PA60|year=2004|publisher=Cosmo Publications|isbn=978-81-7755-886-9|page=60}}</ref>
The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school held [[dharma]] to be equivalent to following the prescriptions of the [[Samhita|Saṃhitās]] and their [[Brāhmaṇa]] commentaries relating the correct performance of [[yajña|Vedic ritual]]s. Seen in this light, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is essentially ritualist ([[orthopraxy]]), placing great weight on the performance of [[karma]] or action as enjoined by the Vedas.
===Relation to Vedānta===
Emphasis of Yajnic Karmakāṇḍas in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is erroneously interpreted by some to be an opposition to Jñānakāṇḍa of Vedānta and Upaniṣads. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā does not discuss topics related to Jñānakāṇḍa, such as salvation (''mokṣa''), but it never speaks against [[mokṣa]]. Vedānta quotes Jaimini's belief in Brahman as well as in mokṣa:
In Uttara-Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta (4.4.5–7), Bāḍarāyaṇa cites Jaimini as saying (ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरूपन्यासादिभ्यः) "''(The mukta Puruṣa is united with the Brahman) as if it were like the Brahman, because descriptions (in Śruti etc) prove so''".
In Vedānta (1.2.28), Bāḍarāyaṇa cites Jaimini as saying that "There is no contradiction in taking Vaishvānara as the supreme Brahman".
In 1.2.31, Jaimini is again quoted by Bāḍarāyana as saying that the nirguna (attribute-less) Brahman can manifest itself as having a form.
In 4.3.12, Bādarāyana again cites Jaimini as saying that the mukta Purusha attains Brahman.
In Pūrva Mīmāṃsā too, Jaimini emphasises the importance of faith in and attachment to the Omnipotent Supreme Being Whom Jaimini calls "The Omnipotent Pradhaana" (The Main):
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 6.3.1: "sarvaśaktau pravṛttiḥ syāt tathābhūtopadeśāt" (सर्वशक्तौ प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् तथाभूतोपदेशात्). The term ''upadeśa'' here means instructions of the śāstras as taught. We should tend towards the omnipotent supreme being. In the context of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 6.3.1 shown above, next two sutras becomes significant, in which this Omnipotent Being is termed as "[[Pradhana|pradhāna]]", and keeping away from Him is said to be a "doṣa", hence all beings are asked to get related ("abhisambandhāt" in  tadakarmaṇi ca doṣas tasmāt tato viśeṣaḥ syāt pradhānenābhisambandhāt; Jaimini 6, 3.3) to the "Omnipotent Main Being" (api vāpy ekadeśe syāt pradhāne hy arthanirvṛttir guṇamātram itarat tadarthatvāt; Jaimini 6, 3.2). Karma-Mīmāṃsā supports the Vedas, and Rgveda says that one Truth is variously named by the sages. It is irrelevant whether we call Him as Pradhāna or Brahman or Vaishvānara or Shiva or God.
==History==
The school for some time in the Early Middle Ages exerted near-dominant influence on learned Hindu thought, and is credited as a major force contributing to the [[decline of Buddhism in India]], but it has fallen into decline in the High Middle Ages and  today is all but eclipsed by Vedanta.{{Sfn|Lars Göhler|1995|p=5f}}
==Mīmāṃsā texts==
The foundational text for the Mīmāṃsā school is the [[Purva Mimamsa Sutras|Purva Mīmāṃsā Sutras]] of [[Jaimini]] (ca. 5th to 4th century BCE). A major commentary was composed by [[Śabara]] in ca. the 5th or 6th century CE. The school reaches its height with [[Kumārila Bhaṭṭa|{{IAST|Kumārila Bhaṭṭa}}]] and {{IAST|[[Prabhākara]]}} (fl. ca. 700 CE). Both Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhākara (along with {{IAST|Murāri}}, whose work is no longer extant) have written extensive commentaries on Śabara's Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣyam.
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Mandana Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sucarita Miśra, Ramakrishna Bhatta, Madhava Subhodini, Sankara Bhatta, Krsnayajvan, Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta, Ragavendra Tirtha, VijayIndhra Tirtha, Appayya Dikshitar, Paruthiyur Krishna Sastri, Mahomahapadyaya Sri Ramsubba Sastri, Sri Venkatsubba Sastri, Sri A. Chinnaswami Sastri, Sengalipuram Vaidhyanatha Dikshitar were some of Mīmānsā scholars.
The ''{{IAST |Mīmāṁsā Sūtra}}'' of Jaimini (c. 3rd century BCE) has summed up the general rules of ''{{IAST |nyāya}}'' for Vedic interpretation. The text has 12 chapters, of which the first chapter is of philosophical value. The commentaries on the ''{{IAST |Mīmāṁsā Sūtra}}'' by {{IAST |Bhartṛmitra}}, {{IAST |Bhavadāsa}}, Hari and {{IAST|Upavarṣa}} are no more extant. {{IAST |Śabara}} (c. 1st century BCE) is the first commentator of the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā Sūtra}}'', whose work is available to us. His ''{{IAST |bhāṣya}}'' is the basis of all later works of ''{{IAST |Mīmāṁsā }}''. {{IAST |Kumārila Bhaṭṭa}} (7th century CE), the founder of the first school of the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā}}'' commented on both the ''{{IAST|Sūtra}}'' and its ''{{IAST |Śabara Bhāṣya}}''. His treatise consists of 3 parts, the ''{{IAST|Ślokavārttika}}'', the ''{{IAST |Tantravārttika}}'' and the ''{{IAST |Ṭupṭīkā}}''. {{IAST|Manḍana Miśra}} (8th century CE) was a follower of {{IAST |Kumārila}}, who wrote ''Vidhiviveka'' and  ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsānukramaṇī}}''. There are several commentaries on the works of {{IAST|Kumārila}}. {{IAST|Sucarita Miśra}} wrote a ''{{IAST|Kāśikā}}'' (commentary) on the ''{{IAST|Ślokavārttika}}''. {{IAST|Someśvara Bhatta}} wrote ''{{IAST|Nyāyasudhā}}'', also known as ''{{IAST|Rāṇaka}}'', a commentary on the ''{{IAST |Tantravārttika}}''. {{IAST|Pārthasarathi Miśra}} wrote ''{{IAST|Nyāyaratnākara}}'' (1300 CE), another commentary on the ''{{IAST|Ślokavārttika}}''. He also wrote ''{{IAST |Śāstradīpikā}}'', an independent work on the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā}}'' and ''Tantraratna''. {{IAST|Venkaṭa Dīkṣita}}’s   ''{{IAST|Vārttikabharaṇya}}'' is a commentary on the ''{{IAST |Ṭupṭīkā}}''. {{IAST |Prabhākara}} (8th century CE), the originator of the second school of the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā}}'' wrote his commentary ''{{IAST|Bṛhatī}}'' on the ''{{IAST |Śabara Bhāṣya}}''. {{IAST |Śālikanātha}}’s ''{{IAST |Ṛjuvimalā}}'' (ninth century CE) is a commentary on the ''{{IAST|Bṛhatī}}''. His ''{{IAST |Prakaraṇapañcikā}}'' is an independent work of this school and the ''{{IAST|Pariśiṣṭa}}'' is a brief explanation of the ''{{IAST |Śabara Bhāṣya}}''. {{IAST |Bhavanātha}}’s ''{{IAST|Nyāyaviveka}}'' deals with the views of this school in details. The founder of the third school of the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā}}'' was {{IAST|Murāri}}, whose works have not reached us.
{{IAST|[[Āpadeva]]}} (17th century) wrote an elementary work on the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā}}'', known as ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakaśa}}'' or ''{{IAST|Āpadevī}}''.  ''{{IAST |Arthasaṁgraha}}'' of  {{IAST |Laugākṣi Bhāskara}} is based on the ''{{IAST|Āpadevī}}''. {{IAST|Vedānta Deśika}}’s ''{{IAST |Śeśvara Mīmāṁsā}}'' was an attempt to combine the views of the ''{{IAST|Mīmāṁsā}}'' and the ''{{IAST|Vedānta}}'' schools.<ref>Radhakrishnan, S. ''Indian Philosophy'', Vol. II, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, {{ISBN|0-19-563820-4}}, pp.376–78</ref>
==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
*[[Śrauta]]
*[[Vaikhanasa]]
*[[Nambudiri]]
*[[Saura (Hinduism)|Saura]]
*[[Charvaka]]
*[[Vaisheshika]]
*[[Samkhya]]
*[[Yoga (philosophy)|Yoga]]
*[[Nyaya]]
*[[Vedanta]]
*[[Śālikanātha]]
*[[Mimamsa-IISER|Mimamsa – IISER Pune]]
{{div col end}}
==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}
===Bibliography===
*{{cite journal| author= Daniel Arnold|title =Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā | journal= Philosophy East and West|volume =  51| number= 1| pages= 26–53| publisher = University of Hawai'i Press | jstor= 1400034| year = 2001| doi=10.1353/pew.2001.0002|s2cid =144863536 }}
*{{cite book|author=Daniel Arnold|title= Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=-h8keDXhSYUC |year= 2008|publisher= Columbia University Press|isbn= 978-0-231-13281-7}}
*{{cite journal| author= Francis X. Clooney|title = What's a God? The Quest for the Right Understanding of devatā in Brāhmaṇical Ritual Theory (Mīmāṃsā)|journal = International Journal of Hindu Studies| publisher = Springer | jstor = 20106477 |volume= 1| number= 2| year=1997 |author-link=Francis Xavier Clooney | pages=337–385| doi=10.1007/s11407-997-0005-x|s2cid = 147226628}}
*{{cite book|author=Lars Göhler|title=Wort und Text bei {{IAST|Kumārila Bhaṭṭa}}: Studie zur mittelalterlichen indischen Sprachphilosophie und Hermeneutik|series=Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe 20, Philosophie; vol. 468|publisher=Peter Lang|year=1995}}
*{{cite journal| first =  Hari Shankar|last= Prasad |title = The Context Principle of Meaning in Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā| journal= Philosophy East and West| volume= 44| number= 2| year= 1994| pages= 317–346| publisher= University of Hawai'i Press| jstor= 1399597| doi=10.2307/1399597}}
*{{cite book|author=P. T. Raju|title=Structural Depths of Indian Thought|url=https://archive.org/details/structuraldepths0000raju |url-access=registration|year=1985|publisher=State University of New York Press|isbn=978-0-88706-139-4}}
*{{cite book|author=Shyam Ranganathan|title=Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x89I_zEGPhkC |year=2007|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |isbn=978-81-208-3193-3}}
*{{cite book|first=J. F. |last=Staal|chapter=Sanskrit Philosophy of Language|pages=102–136|editor=Herman Parret|title=History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hQh0bC5RAe8C |year=1976|publisher=Walter de Gruyter|isbn=978-3-11-005818-5}}
==Further reading==
*{{cite book|editor=Mahesh Chandra Nyayratna Bhattacharyya|editor-link=Mahesh Chandra Nyayratna Bhattacharyya|title=The Mimansa Darsana (Bibliotheca Indica)|url=https://archive.org/stream/bibliothecaindi04unkngoog#page/n6/mode/1up|year=1889|publisher=Baptist Mission Press}}
*{{cite book |last=Chatterjee |first=Satischandra |author2=Datta, Dhirendramohan |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |year=1984 |publisher=University of Calcutta |location=Calcutta |edition=Eighth Reprint }}
*{{cite book | last = Müeller | first = Max | author-link= Max Müller |year = 1899 | title = Six Systems of Indian Philosophy; Samkhya and Yoga, Naya and Vaiseshika| publisher = Susil Gupta (India) Ltd.| location = Calcutta | isbn=0-7661-4296-5}} Reprint edition; Originally published under the title of ''The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy''.
*{{cite book |last=Radhakrishnan |first=S. |author-link=Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan |author2=Moore, CA |author-link2=Charles A. Moore |title=A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy |year=1967 |publisher=Princeton |isbn=0-691-01958-4 |url=https://archive.org/details/sourcebookinindi00radh }}
*{{cite book |last=Ramaswami Shastri|first=R.A.|title=A Short History Of The Purva Mimamsa Shastra|series=Annamalai University Sanskrit Series No. 3|year=1936}}
*{{cite book |last=Potter |first=Karl H. |author-link=Karl Harrington Potter |title=Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Volume 16: Philosophy of Purva-Mimamsa|year=2014 |publisher=Motilal Barnassidas |location=Calcutta  }}
*{{cite book|last=Verpoorten|first=Jean-Marie|title=Mimamsa literature (A History of Indian literature)|year=1987|publisher=Otto Harrassowitz Verlag|isbn=978-3447026765|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PqlMW3WVb8cC}}
*{{cite book |last=Zimmer |first=Heinrich |author-link=Heinrich Zimmer |title=Philosophies of India |year=1951 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=New York, New York |isbn=0-691-01758-1 }} Bollingen Series XXVI; Edited by [[Joseph Campbell]].
==External links==
{{NIE Poster|Mimamsa}}
*[https://archive.org/details/mimamsasutra00jaimuoft The Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini]
*[https://archive.org/stream/lokavartikatra00kuma#page/n25/mode/2up Introduction to Purva-Mimamsa] G. Jha (Translator), Asiatic Society of Bengal
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20160911153658/http://www.shastranethralaya.org/LecturePurva.html Complete Lectures on Purva Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini at ShastraNethralaya]
*[[S. Srikanta Sastri]], "The Logical system of [[Madhvacharya ]]" Published in Poona Oriental Series, No. 75 – "A Volume of Studies in Indology", presented to [[P. V. Kane]] [http://www.srikanta-sastri.org/logical-system-of-madvacharya/4581147325 on his 60th birthday] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200717032348/https://www.srikanta-sastri.org/logical-system-of-madvacharya/4581147325 |date=17 July 2020 }}
{{Hindudharma}}
{{Indian philosophy}}
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Mimamsa}}
[[Category:Hindu philosophical concepts]]
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[[Category:Schools and traditions in ancient Indian philosophy]]
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