View source for United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China

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[[File:Trump on China - Putting America First (November 2, 2020), front cover.png|thumb|Since the beginning of the first Trump administration, the [[Foreign policy of the United States|U.S. foreign policy]] toward China has shifted from "engagement" to "competition".<ref>{{cite web |title=The End of Engagement: Expertise, Domestic Politics, and U.S. China Strategy under Trump |url=https://mershoncenter.osu.edu/sites/default/files/2020-09/mccourt_the_end_of_engagement.pdf |publisher=Mershon Center |access-date=2020-10-17}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author1=Stephanie Christine Winkler |title=Strategic Competition and US–China Relations: A Conceptual Analysis |journal=The Chinese Journal of International Politics |date=28 June 2023 |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=333–356 |doi=10.1093/cjip/poad008 |url=https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/16/3/333/7209645 |doi-access=free |access-date=18 February 2024 |archive-date=18 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240218195726/https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/16/3/333/7209645 |url-status=live }}</ref>]]
The [[foreign policy of the United States|United States foreign policy]] toward the [[China|People's Republic of China]] originated during the [[Cold War]]. At that time, the U.S. had a [[containment]] policy against [[communist state]]s. The leaked ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' indicated the efforts by the U.S. to contain China through military actions undertaken in the [[Vietnam War]]. The containment policy centered around an [[island chain strategy]]. President [[Richard Nixon]]'s [[1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China|China rapprochement]] signaled a shift in focus to gain leverage in containing the [[Soviet Union]]. Formal diplomatic ties between the U.S. and China were established in 1979, and with normalized trade relations since 2000, the U.S. and China have been linked by closer economic ties and more cordial relations. In his first term as [[U.S. president]], [[Barack Obama]] said, "We want China to succeed and prosper. It's good for the United States if China continues on the path of development that it's on".<ref name="poli_Obama_China">{{Cite web |title=Obama: China should prosper but play by rules |last=Lee |first=Carol E. |publisher=[[Politico]] |date=November 9, 2010 |access-date=January 31, 2021 |url= https://www.politico.com/story/2010/11/obama-china-should-prosper-but-play-by-rules-044883}}</ref>
During the 2010s and early 2020s, there was a significant shift in America's China policy. U.S. military presence in the region, efforts to improve [[India–United States relations|relations with India]]<ref>{{cite journal |last=Ejaz |first=Ahmad |title=United States-India Relations: An expanding strategic partnership |url=http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/4%20-%20Ahmad%20Ejaz%20Artical-2_v13No1.pdf |journal=Pakistan Vision |volume=13 |issue=1 |access-date=2013-12-17 |archive-date=2013-05-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513122230/http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/4%20-%20Ahmad%20Ejaz%20Artical-2_v13No1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[United States–Vietnam relations|Vietnam]],<ref name="clumsy" /> and the [[presidency of Barack Obama|Obama administration]]'s 2012 "[[East Asian foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration|Pivot to Asia]]" strategy for increased American involvement in the Western [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]], have been associated with a policy aimed at countering China's [[China as an emerging superpower|growing clout]]. Current U.S. military presence in the region includes military alliances [[Mutual Defense Treaty (United States–South Korea)|with]] [[South Korea]],<ref name="clumsy">{{cite web|last=Carpenter|first=Ted|title=Washington's Clumsy China Containment Policy|publisher=[[The National Interest]]|date=30 November 2011|url=http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/washington%E2%80%99s-clumsy-china-containment-policy-6202|access-date=7 March 2013|archive-date=14 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130914155330/http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/washington%E2%80%99s-clumsy-china-containment-policy-6202|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Security Treaty between the United States and Japan|with]] [[Japan]],<ref>{{cite web|last=Jinan|first=Wu|date=25 January 2013|title=Containment of China Is Abe's Top Target|url=http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/containment-of-china-is-abes-top-target/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130129035413/http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/containment-of-china-is-abes-top-target/|archive-date=29 January 2013|access-date=7 March 2013|publisher=[[China-United States Exchange Foundation]]}}</ref> and [[Mutual Defense Treaty (United States–Philippines)|with]] the [[Philippines]]. The [[Indo-Pacific]] region has become the focus of competition between the two powers.<ref name="Trump" />
As [[strategic competition]] is often used by the [[Federal government of the United States|United States government]] to describe the economic, technological and geopolitical ties between the U.S. and China,<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sino-US-strategic-competition1.pdf|title=Sino.U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia: China's Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy|last1=Ming-Te|first1=Hung|last2=Tai-Ting|first2=Tony Liu|date=2011|website=Political Perspectives|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170328235948/http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sino-US-strategic-competition1.pdf|archive-date=28 March 2017|access-date=9 May 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> '''U.S. Strategic Competition with China''' intensifies.<ref name="Trump">{{Cite web|url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html|title=U.S. Strategic Competition with China: A RAND Research Primer|last=Timothy|first=R. Heath|date=2021|website=RAND Corporation|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210622143023/https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA290-3.html|archive-date=22 June 2021|access-date=9 June 2021|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[First presidency of Donald Trump|first Trump administration]] stated, "The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems". It designated China as a "[[Revisionist state|revisionist power]]" seeking to overturn the [[liberal international order]] and displace the United States, and called for a [[whole-of-government approach]] to China guided by a return to principled [[Realism (international relations)|realism]]. The [[presidency of Joe Biden|Biden administration]] stated that previous optimistic approaches to China were flawed, and that China poses "the most significant challenge of any nation-state in the world to the United States".<ref name="wsj._Blinken_Backs">{{Cite web |title=Blinken Backs Tough Approach to China, Says Will Work With GOP |last1=Mauldin |first1=William |last2=Gordon |first2=Michael R. |newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |date=January 20, 2021 |access-date=January 28, 2021 |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/blinken-to-address-u-s-rivalry-with-china-russia-in-senate-hearing-11611069439?mod=article_inline |archive-date=August 31, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210831153310/https://www.wsj.com/articles/blinken-to-address-u-s-rivalry-with-china-russia-in-senate-hearing-11611069439?mod=article_inline |url-status=live }}</ref> China remains "the only competitor out there with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, a power to do so" according to the U.S.-released National Defense Strategy in 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |title=China Remains Top Threat in New US National Defense Strategy |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/china-remains-top-threat-in-new-national-defense-strategy/6808577.html |access-date=2023-03-16 |website=VOA |date=27 October 2022 |language=en}}</ref> However, the [[National Security Advisor (United States)|U.S. National Security Advisor]], [[Jake Sullivan]], has stated that the Biden administration does not pursue a fundamental transformation of the Chinese political system.<ref>{{cite web |title=CNN.com - Transcripts |url=https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2021-11-07/segment/01 |website=transcripts.cnn.com |access-date=9 November 2021 |archive-date=2021-11-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211109002140/https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2021-11-07/segment/01 |url-status=live }}</ref>
==Strategic background==
[[File:Geographic Boundaries of the First and Second Island Chains.png|thumb|right|The First and Second island chains in America's [[Island Chain Strategy]], studied by Chinese military strategists to avoid encirclement]]
{{Main|China–United States relations}}
===Cold War era===
After their defeat in the [[Chinese Civil War]], parts of the [[Kuomintang in Burma|Nationalist army]] retreated south and crossed the border into Burma.<ref name=":Han">{{Cite book |last=Han |first=Enze |title=The Ripple Effect: China's Complex Presence in Southeast Asia |date=2024 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-769659-0 |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=65}} The United States supported these Nationalist forces because the United States hoped they would harass the People's Republic of China from the [[Southwestern China|southwest]], thereby diverting Chinese resources from the [[Korean War]].<ref name=":Han" />{{Rp|page=65}} The Burmese government protested and international pressure increased.<ref name=":Han" />{{Rp|page=65}} Beginning in 1953, several rounds of withdrawals of the Nationalist forces and their families were carried out.<ref name=":Han" />{{Rp|page=65}} In [[1960–61 campaign at the China–Burma border|1960, joint military action]] by China and Burma expelled the remaining Nationalist forces from Burma, [[Kuomintang Chinese in Thailand|although some went on to settle]] in the [[Myanmar–Thailand border|Burma-Thailand borderlands]].<ref name=":Han" />{{Rp|pages=65-66}}
During the [[Cold War]] the United States tried to prevent the [[domino theory]] of the spread of [[communism]] and thwart communist countries including the People's Republic of China.<ref name="'70s 43">{{cite book|title=How We Got Here: The '70s|last=Frum|first=David|author-link=David Frum|year=2000|publisher=Basic Books|location=New York, New York|isbn=978-0-465-04195-4|page=[https://archive.org/details/howwegothere70sd00frum/page/43 43]|url=https://archive.org/details/howwegothere70sd00frum/page/43}}</ref> Washington assumed that Communist [[North Vietnam]] would be a puppet state of China. However [[Sino-Vietnamese War|those two later went to war]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, and Rosemary Foot, '' From containment to containment? Understanding US relations with China since 1949'' ( Blackwell, 2003).</ref>
===Post-Cold War===
{{see also|US-China strategic engagement|East Asian foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration}}
In more contemporary times, with the [[Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China|Nixon rapprochement]] and the signing of the [[Shanghai Communiqué]], improvement in U.S.-Sino relations was made possible. Formal diplomatic ties were established in 1979, and with normalized trade relations since 2000, the US and China have been linked by closer economic ties.<ref name="cfr._Timeline_U.S.">{{Cite web |title=Timeline: U.S. Relations With China 1949–2020 |author= |publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] |date= |access-date=January 31, 2021 |url=https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china |archive-date=August 16, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816002922/https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china |url-status=live }}</ref>
The United States' 2006 [[Quadrennial Defense Review]] stated that China has "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies".<ref name="arch_Quadrennial_Defense">{{Cite web |title=Quadrennial Defense Review Report |author= |publisher=[[United States Department of Defense]] |date=February 6, 2006 |access-date=31 January 2021 |url=https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf |archive-date=25 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210125062726/https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> The 2006 [[National Security Strategy (United States)|National Security Strategy]] stated that the U.S. wanted China to continue down the road of [[Chinese economic reform|reform and openness]]. It said that as economic growth continues, China would face a growing demand from its own people to follow the path of East Asia's many modern democracies, adding [[political freedom]] to [[economic freedom]]. The document continues by stating that China cannot stay on this peaceful path while holding on to "old ways of thinking and acting" that exacerbate regional and international security concerns. The U.S. referred to the "old ways" in terms of non-transparent military expansion, [[mercantilism]], and supporting resource-rich regimes with a record of unacceptable behavior.<ref name="geor_The_National">{{Cite web |title=The National Security Strategy 2006 |author= |publisher=[[The White House]] |date=September 1, 2006 |access-date=January 31, 2021 |url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ |archive-date=September 14, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170914044113/https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
[[File:Barack Obama and Joe Biden talk with Vice President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China, 2012.jpg|thumb|US President [[Barack Obama]], Vice President [[Joe Biden]] and Foreign Secretary [[Hillary Clinton]] with Chinese Vice President [[Xi Jinping]], February 2012]]
The United States' political leadership began to shift policy stances in 2011, starting with the [[Obama administration]]'s "pivot" toward Asia. Then-[[United States Secretary of State|secretary of state]] [[Hillary Clinton]] called for "increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region", which was seen as a move to counter China's growing clout.<ref name="cfr._Timeline_U.S."/> Supporters of increased American involvement in [[East Asia]] have cited the United States as a counterbalance to the excesses of Chinese expansion. Relevant to the argument is the fact that countries in territorial disputes with China, such as in the [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|South China Sea]] and the [[Senkaku Islands dispute|Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands]], have complained about China's harassment in the disputed areas.<ref>{{cite web|last=Blumenthal|first=Daniel|title=Riding a tiger: China's resurging foreign policy aggression|publisher=[[Foreign Policy]]|date=15 April 2011|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/15/riding-a-tiger-chinas-resurging-foreign-policy-aggression/|access-date=January 31, 2021|archive-date=11 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211054030/https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/15/riding-a-tiger-chinas-resurging-foreign-policy-aggression/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Japan protest over China ship's radar action|newspaper=[[BBC News]]|date=5 February 2013|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21337444|access-date=7 March 2013|archive-date=10 February 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130210163136/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21337444|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=China and Vietnam in row over detention of fishermen|newspaper=[[BBC News]]|date=22 March 2013|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17471269|access-date=7 March 2013|archive-date=24 March 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120324180204/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17471269|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Page|first=Jeremy|title=Vietnam Accuses Chinese Ships|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|date=3 December 2012|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323717004578157033857113510|access-date=7 March 2013|archive-date=13 January 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150113103539/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323717004578157033857113510|url-status=live}}</ref> Some experts have suggested that China may leverage their economic strength in such disputes, one example being the sudden restriction on Chinese imports of Filipino bananas during tensions over the [[Scarborough Shoal]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Higgins|first=Andrew|title=In Philippines, banana growers feel effect of South China Sea dispute|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|date=10 June 2012|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of-south-china-sea-dispute/2012/06/10/gJQA47WVTV_story.html?noredirect=on|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130412040300/http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-10/world/35461588_1_chinese-fishermen-president-benigno-aquino-iii-south-china-sea|url-status=live|archive-date=12 April 2013|access-date=7 March 2013}}</ref>
==Recent development==
{{Original research section|date=January 2021}}
{{See also|Foreign policy of the Donald Trump administration|Foreign policy of the Joe Biden administration}}
In April 2019, the fourth iteration of the influential [[neoconservative]] think tank, the [[Committee on the Present Danger]], was unveiled,  as the [[Committee on the Present Danger: China (CPDC)]] in a press conference in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]].<ref name=diplomatcpdc>{{cite web|last=Skidmore|first=David|title=The US Scare Campaign Against China|publisher=The Diplomat|date=July 23, 2019|url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-us-scare-campaign-against-china/|access-date=January 19, 2020|archive-date=October 14, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014183408/https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-us-scare-campaign-against-china/|url-status=live}}</ref> The organization was reformed by former Trump administration White House Chief Strategist [[Steve Bannon]] and former [[Reagan administration]] official [[Frank Gaffney]] to "educate and inform American citizens and policymakers about the existential threats presented from the Peoples Republic of China under the misrule of the [[Chinese Communist Party]]".<ref name=nationcpdc>{{cite journal|last=Carden|first=James|title=Steve Bannon's Foreign Policy Crusade Against China|journal=The Nation|date=August 5, 2019|url=https://www.thenation.com/article/steve-bannon-foreign-policy-crusade-china/|access-date=January 19, 2020|archive-date=December 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191205082504/https://www.thenation.com/article/steve-bannon-foreign-policy-crusade-china/|url-status=live}}</ref> The CPDC takes the view that there is "no hope of coexistence with China as long as the Communist Party governs the country".<ref name=diplomatcpdc/> [[Charles W. Freeman Jr.]] at the [[Watson Institute]] called the CPDC "a ''[[Who's Who]]'' of contemporary [[wingnut (politics)|wing-nut]]s, very few of whom have any expertise at all about China and most of whom represent ideological causes only peripherally connected to it."<ref name=nationcpdc/>
In a May 2019 opinion piece published by ''[[Foreign Policy]]'', [[Paul Musgrave]], an assistant professor at the [[University of Massachusetts Amherst]] commented that the [[First presidency of Donald Trump|Trump administration]] revealed details about a long-term strategy in dealing with the [[rise of China]] via a "[[:wikt:slip of the tongue|slip]]" by then-director of policy planning [[Kiron Skinner]] at the [[United States Department of State|US State Department]]. In a speech at the Future Security Forum on April 29, 2019, Skinner characterized the Cold War as "a huge fight within the Western family" and due to that shared heritage and value-system, breakthroughs could be made; on China however, she argued there can be no accommodation or cooperation because it is "... a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology" and "it's the first time that we will have a great-power competitor that is not [[Caucasian race|Caucasian]]".<ref name=FP/>
A study on China produced by a small working group within the department led by Skinner reportedly envisioned a world of constant, unavoidable civilizational conflict.<ref name=FP>{{cite web|last=Musgrave|first=Paul|title=The Slip That Revealed the Real Trump Doctrine|date=May 2, 2019|publisher=Foreign Policy|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/the-slip-that-revealed-the-real-trump-doctrine/|access-date=September 1, 2019|archive-date=August 7, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190807120404/https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/the-slip-that-revealed-the-real-trump-doctrine/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=NYT>{{cite web|last=Sanger|first=David E.|title=State Dept. Officials Force Out Top Policy Planner and Adviser to Mike Pompeo|date=August 2, 2019|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/kiron-skinner-state-department-pompeo.html|access-date=September 1, 2019|archive-date=August 28, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828010510/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/kiron-skinner-state-department-pompeo.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The study was informally called "Letter X" in reference to [[George F. Kennan]]'s [[X Article]] that advocated for a containment strategy against the [[Soviet Union]].<ref name=NYT/> In August 2019, ''[[The New York Times]]'' reported that Skinner had been forced out of her job at the United States Department of State, and that Trump administration officials privately dismissed her comments.<ref name=NYT/> Earlier in the year, an open letter titled "China is not an enemy" was released by five China-focused scholars and foreign policy experts, and was endorsed by some business leaders, in which they decried what they saw in the U.S. approach as "counterproductive", and urged the Trump administration to continue the more "cooperative" approach.<ref>{{cite web|last=Albert|first=Eleanor|title=The US-China Relationship: Why Words Matter|publisher=The Diplomat|date=July 19, 2019|url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-us-china-relationship-why-words-matter/|access-date=January 19, 2020|archive-date=July 19, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190719163442/https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-us-china-relationship-why-words-matter/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="wash_Opinion_China">{{Cite web |title=China is not an enemy |last1=Fravel |first1=M. Taylor |last2=Roy |first2=J. Stapleton |last3=Swaine |first3=Michael D. |last4=Thornton |first4=Susan A. |last5=Vogel |first5=Ezra |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |date=July 2, 2019 |access-date=February 1, 2021 |url= https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html}}</ref>
With questions about the continued purpose of the [[NATO|North Atlantic Treaty Organization]] (NATO) in the [[post–Cold War era]], NATO countries have refrained from re-orienting toward and labeling the PRC an outright "enemy", but NATO chief [[Jens Stoltenberg]] said the organization needs to recognize the "challenges" posed by China at a NATO event in 2019, saying "China will soon have the world's biggest economy. And it already has the second largest defense budget, investing heavily in new capabilities."<ref>{{cite web|last=Griffiths|first=James|title=A challenge from China could be just the thing to pull NATO together|publisher=CNN|date=December 4, 2019|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/03/asia/nato-china-russia-intl-hnk/index.html|access-date=January 19, 2020|archive-date=December 24, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191224115316/https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/03/asia/nato-china-russia-intl-hnk/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref> He also said that NATO did not want to "create new adversaries". The United States' NATO representative at the event referred to China as a "competitor".<ref>{{cite web|last=Holly Ellyatt and David Reid|title=China's military might has now become a top issue for NATO|publisher=CNBC|date=December 3, 2019|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/03/china-should-be-natos-main-focus-at-summit-experts-say.html|access-date=January 19, 2020|archive-date=January 1, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200101193027/https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/03/china-should-be-natos-main-focus-at-summit-experts-say.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
According to a report by [[Reuters]], in 2019 the United States CIA began a clandestine campaign on [[Internet in China|Chinese social media]] to spread negative narratives about the [[Xi Jinping Administration|Xi Jinping administration]] in an effort to influence Chinese public opinion against the government.<ref name=":06">{{Cite news |last=Bing |first=Christopher |last2=Schectman |first2=Joel |date=March 14, 2024 |title=Exclusive: Trump Launched CIA Covert Influence Operation against China |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-launched-cia-covert-influence-operation-against-china-2024-03-14/ |access-date=June 14, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]] |archive-date=March 27, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240327081927/https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-launched-cia-covert-influence-operation-against-china-2024-03-14/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The CIA promoted narratives that Communist Party leaders were hiding money overseas and that the [[Belt and Road Initiative]] was corrupt and wasteful.<ref name=":06" /> As part of the campaign, the CIA also targeted foreign countries where the United States and China compete for influence.<ref name=":06" />
On May 20, 2020, in accordance with the [[John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019]], the Trump administration delivered a report, "U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China" to members of the [[U.S. Congress]]. The report states a [[whole-of-government approach]] to China under the [[National Security Strategy (United States)#2017 NSS|2017 National Security Strategy]], which says it is time the U.S. "rethink the failed policies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners".<ref name="defe_United_States">{{Cite web |title=United States Strategic Approach to The People |author= |publisher=[[U.S. Department of Defense]] |date=May 20, 2020 |access-date=February 5, 2021 |url= https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2193725/united-states-strategic-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/}}</ref><ref name="trum_United_States">{{Cite web |title=United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China |author= |publisher=[[The White House]] |date=May 26, 2020 |access-date=February 5, 2021 |url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/united-states-strategic-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ |archive-date=February 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210213211133/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/united-states-strategic-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The report says it "reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to" the leaders of China, adding "The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems."<ref name="trum_United_States_2">{{Cite web |title=United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China |author= |publisher=[[The White House]] |date=May 20, 2020 |access-date=5 February 2021 |url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf |archive-date=20 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210120212538/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
[[File:President Biden met with Xi Jinping before the 2022 G20 Bali Summit.jpg|thumb|[[Paramount leader|Chinese leader]] [[Xi Jinping]] with US President [[Joe Biden]] at the [[2022 G20 Bali summit|17th G20 in Bali]], November 2022]]
In February 2021, [[U.S. president]] [[Joe Biden]] said that China is the "most serious competitor" that poses challenges on the "prosperity, security, and democratic values" of the U.S.<ref name="whit_Remarks_by">{{Cite web |title=Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World |publisher=[[The White House]] |date=February 4, 2021 |access-date=February 6, 2021 |url=https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ |archive-date=October 28, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211028095635/https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ |url-status=live }}</ref> U.S. secretary of state [[Antony Blinken]] stated that previous optimistic approaches to China were flawed, and that China poses "the most significant challenge of any nation-state in the world to the United States". Blinken also agreed that Biden's predecessor, [[Donald Trump]], "was right in taking a tougher approach to China".<ref name="wsj._Blinken_Backs"/>
In April 2021, the [[U.S. Senate]] introduced major legislation in response to China's growing clout in international affairs. The bill, titled "Strategic Competition Act of 2021", reflects hardline attitude of both congressional Democrats and Republicans, and sets out to counter the Chinese government's diplomatic and strategic initiatives.<ref name="reut_Details_of">{{Cite web |title=Details of sweeping effort to counter China emerge in U.S. Senate |last1=Zengerle |first1=Patricia |last2=Brunnstrom |first2=David |work=[[Reuters]] |date=April 8, 2021 |access-date=April 13, 2021 |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-senate/details-of-sweeping-effort-to-counter-china-emerge-in-u-s-senate-idUSKBN2BV1UE |archive-date=April 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413163045/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-senate/details-of-sweeping-effort-to-counter-china-emerge-in-u-s-senate-idUSKBN2BV1UE |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] Chairman [[Bob Menendez]] (D-NJ) said, "The Strategic Competition Act of 2021 is a recognition that this moment demands a unified, strategic response that can rebuild American leadership, invest in our ability to out-compete China, and reground diplomacy in our core values", adding "The United States government must be clear-eyed and sober about Beijing's intentions and actions, and calibrate our policy and strategy accordingly."<ref name="fore_Chairman_Menendez">{{Cite web |title=Chairman Menendez Announces Bipartisan Comprehensive China Legislation {{!}} United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations |author= |publisher=[[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] |date=8 April 2021 |access-date=13 April 2021 |url=https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-menendez-announces-bipartisan-comprehensive-china-legislation |archive-date=13 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413174944/https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-menendez-announces-bipartisan-comprehensive-china-legislation |url-status=live }}</ref>
In May 2021, the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was consolidated into a larger bill, the [[United States Innovation and Competition Act]] (USICA), authorizing {{USD|110 billion}} for basic and advanced technology research over a five-year period.<ref name="nlr">{{cite news |last1=Rattigan |first1=Kathryn M. |title=The Endless Frontier Act: Shifting the Focus from Defense to Offense |url=https://www.natlawreview.com/article/endless-frontier-act-shifting-focus-defense-to-offense |access-date=13 May 2021 |work=National Law Review, Volume XI, Number 105 |date=April 15, 2021 |archive-date=13 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210513090302/https://www.natlawreview.com/article/endless-frontier-act-shifting-focus-defense-to-offense |url-status=live }}</ref> In June 2021, the USICA passed 68–32 in the Senate with bipartisan support.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Basu|first1=Zachary|url=https://www.axios.com/senate-china-competition-bipartisan-e2fa3f88-16d4-4d79-bab0-1b9c6a4f2774.html|title=Senate passes sweeping China competition bill in rare bipartisan vote|website=Axios|date=June 8, 2021|access-date=June 8, 2021|archive-date=June 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210608230357/https://www.axios.com/senate-china-competition-bipartisan-e2fa3f88-16d4-4d79-bab0-1b9c6a4f2774.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Military strategy===
[[File:United States Department of Defense conducted a flight test of a conventionally configured ground-launched cruise missile at San Nicolas Island on 18 August 2019.jpg|thumb|United States test firing a conventionally configured ground-launched medium-range cruise missile on 18 August 2019]]
The United States' [[Indo-Pacific#Geopolitical context|Indo-Pacific strategy]] has broadly been to use the surrounding countries around China to blunt its influence. This includes strengthening the bonds between [[South Korea]] and [[Japan]]<ref>{{cite web|last=Mehta|first=Aaron|title=Tension between South Korea and Japan could hurt US goals in the Pacific—and China is watching|publisher=DefenseNews|date=August 15, 2019|url=https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/08/15/tension-between-south-korea-and-japan-could-hurt-us-goals-in-the-pacific-and-china-is-watching/|access-date=September 1, 2019}}{{Dead link|date=March 2022 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> as well as trying to get [[India]], another large developing country to help with their efforts.<ref>{{cite web|last=Zhou|first=Laura|title=Indian leader Modi wants no part of China-US rivalry, but still manages to keep Beijing happy|publisher=South China Morning Post|date=June 5, 2018|url=https://amp.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2149237/indian-leader-modi-wants-no-part-china-us-rivalry-still|access-date=September 1, 2019|archive-date=August 25, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190825161245/https://amp.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2149237/indian-leader-modi-wants-no-part-china-us-rivalry-still|url-status=live}}</ref> Additionally, with the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty#US withdrawal and termination|US withdrawal]] from the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]] with [[Russia]] (in part because China wasn't a party to it), the US has reportedly wanted to find a host in the Asia-Pacific region to point the previously banned weapons at China.<ref>{{cite web|last=Peck|first=Michael|title=100 Billion Reasons Why: Why Australia Said No to American Missiles Aimed At China|publisher=The National Interest|date=August 18, 2019|url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/100-billion-reasons-why-why-australia-said-no-american-missiles-aimed-china-74206|access-date=September 1, 2019|archive-date=August 21, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200821152653/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/100-billion-reasons-why-why-australia-said-no-american-missiles-aimed-china-74206|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition to [[soft power]] diplomacy within the region, the US is physically surrounding China with [[list of United States military bases|military bases]] in the event of any conflict.<ref>{{cite web|last=Reed|first=John|title=Surrounded: How the U.S. Is Encircling China with Military Bases|publisher=Foreign Policy|date=August 20, 2013|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/surrounded-how-the-u-s-is-encircling-china-with-military-bases/|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=April 1, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200401222547/https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/surrounded-how-the-u-s-is-encircling-china-with-military-bases/|url-status=live}}</ref> The United States has developed many military bases in the Asia Pacific equipped with [[warship]]s, [[nuclear missile]]s and nuclear-capable [[strategic bomber]]s as a deterrent and to achieve [[full spectrum dominance]] in a strategy similar to that of the Cold War.<ref>{{cite web|last=Reed|first=John|title=Surrounded: How the U.S. Is Encircling China with Military Bases|publisher=Foreign Policy|date=August 20, 2013|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/surrounded-how-the-u-s-is-encircling-china-with-military-bases/|access-date=January 1, 2020|archive-date=April 1, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200401222547/https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/surrounded-how-the-u-s-is-encircling-china-with-military-bases/|url-status=live}}</ref>
In October 2023, President [[Joe Biden]] asked Congress for 4 billion to counter China in the Indo-Pacific.<ref>{{cite news |title=Biden asks Congress for $106 billion for Ukraine, Israel, U.S. border |url=https://www.axios.com/2023/10/20/biden-budget-request-ukraine-israel-border |work=Axios |date=Oct 20, 2023}}</ref>
===Sanctions===
{{Main|United States sanctions against China}}
The use of [[United States sanctions|economic sanctions]] has always been a tool of American foreign policy and has become used more frequently in the 21st century, from targeting individuals and sometimes whole countries by using the centrality of the [[Banking in the United States|US financial system]] and the position of the [[US dollar]] as the world's [[reserve currency]] to limit trade and cashflow.<ref>{{cite web|last=Gilsinan|first=Kathy|title=A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions|publisher=The Atlantic|date=May 3, 2019|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625/|access-date=January 1, 2020|archive-date=October 7, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191007190427/https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625/|url-status=live}}</ref>
====Xinjiang====
{{See also|Xinjiang internment camps|persecution of Uyghurs in China|International human rights law}}
[[File:Uyghur boycott 20Sept2020.jpg|thumb|Call for boycott of products from China's [[Xinjiang]] province, New York, 2020. The US officially recognized the Chinese government's treatment of the [[Uyghurs]] in Xinjiang as a genocide.]]
In the area of [[human rights]] and [[international law]], the U.S. has worked to put pressure on China internationally by drawing attention to its human rights record. In particular, U.S. policymakers have focused on the status of China's [[Xinjiang internment camps|internment camps]] for those accused of [[Islamic extremism|religious extremism]] in China's [[Xinjiang Autonomous Region]], the region inhabited by the Muslim [[Uyghurs|Uyghur minority]], as well as the [[2019–20 Hong Kong protests|protests in Hong Kong]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Wong|first=Edward|title=Congress Wants to Force Trump's Hand on Human Rights in China and Beyond|work=The New York Times|date=December 27, 2019|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/us/politics/trumps-human-rights-congress.html|access-date=January 5, 2020|archive-date=January 5, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200105022346/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/us/politics/trumps-human-rights-congress.html|url-status=live}}</ref> These camps, which some NGOs such as the Washington-based [[Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation]]<ref name="jpolrisk.com">{{Cite journal |last=Zenz |first=Adrian |author-link=Adrian Zenz |title=Brainwashing, Police Guards and Coercive Internment: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang's "Vocational Training Internment Camps" |url=http://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps |journal=Journal of Political Risk |date=July 2019 |volume=7 |issue=7 |access-date=1 July 2019 |archive-date=3 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190803233129/http://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[East Turkistan National Awakening Movement]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/11/14/2003725807|title=China running more camps in Xinjiang than thought: group|website=[[Taipei Times]]|date=14 November 2019|access-date=19 November 2019|quote=Uighur activists on Tuesday said that they have documented nearly 500 camps and prisons run by China to detain members of the ethnic group, alleging that Beijing could be holding far more than the commonly cited figure of 1 million people. The Washington-based East Turkistan National Awakening Movement, a group that seeks independence for the Xinjiang region, gave the geographic coordinates of 182 suspected "concentration camps" where Uighurs are allegedly pressured to renounce their culture.|archive-date=21 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191121102527/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/11/14/2003725807|url-status=live}}</ref> estimated to have a population of over one million people, have been described as "indoctrination camps" that are reportedly run like prisons to eradicate Uyghur culture and religion in an attempt at [[Sinicization]].<ref name=asiatimes>{{cite web|title=China defends its Xinjiang 're-education' camps|date=December 9, 2019|url=https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/12/article/china-defends-its-xinjiang-re-education-camps/|access-date=January 5, 2020|archive-date=December 18, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191218162941/https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/12/article/china-defends-its-xinjiang-re-education-camps/|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[United States Congress]] has responded to these reports with calls for the imposition of sanctions under the [[Magnitsky Act|Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act]]; in December 2019, the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] and [[United States Senate|Senate]] passed the [[Uighur Human Rights Policy Act]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Flatley|first=Daniel|title=U.S. House Passes Xinjiang Bill, Prompting Threat From China|publisher=Bloomberg|date=December 3, 2019|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-03/u-s-house-ramps-up-china-tensions-with-uighur-human-rights-bill|access-date=January 5, 2020|archive-date=December 4, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191204124523/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-03/u-s-house-ramps-up-china-tensions-with-uighur-human-rights-bill|url-status=live}}</ref>
====Hong Kong====
{{Main|Hong Kong–United States relations}}
U.S. policy toward Hong Kong had been governed by the [[United States-Hong Kong Policy Act]] which said that the U.S. would continue to treat Hong Kong apart from the [[People's Republic of China]] even after the [[Transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong|1997 transfer of sovereignty]]. This changed drastically in 2020 when the U.S. passed the [[Hong Kong Autonomy Act]] and [[Executive Order 13936]] in response to the [[2019–2020 Hong Kong protests]] and imposition of the [[2020 Hong Kong national security law|Hong Kong national security law]] by the [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress]] of China. Under EO13936, the U.S. government has no longer treated Hong Kong as separate from China.<ref name="clearygottlieb">{{cite web|url= https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2020/executive-order-eliminates-differential-treatment-for-hong-kong.pdf|title= Executive Order Eliminates Differential Treatment for Hong Kong|date= July 21, 2020|publisher= Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP|archive-date= September 30, 2020|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200930064310/https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2020/executive-order-eliminates-differential-treatment-for-hong-kong.pdf|url-status= live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Trump ends preferential economic treatment for Hong Kong |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53412598 |agency=BBC |access-date=2023-07-16 |archive-date=2020-11-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201117140801/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53412598 |url-status=live }}</ref>
===Economic strategy===
With China [[China and the World Trade Organization|entering]] the [[World Trade Organization]] in 2001 with approval from the US, China and the world economy benefited from [[globalization]] and the access to new markets and the increased trade that resulted. Despite this, some in the United States lament letting China in the WTO because part of the motivation to do so, the political liberalization of the PRC's government along the lines of the [[Washington Consensus]] never materialized. The US hoped [[economic liberalization]] would eventually lead to political liberalization to a government more akin to the then recently repatriated [[Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]] under "One country, two systems."<ref>{{cite web|last=Pethokoukis|first=James|title=What if the global economy had stayed closed to China?|publisher=American Enterprise Institute|date=September 5, 2019|url=https://www.aei.org/economics/what-if-the-global-economy-had-stayed-closed-to-china/|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=October 8, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191008142511/https://www.aei.org/economics/what-if-the-global-economy-had-stayed-closed-to-china/|url-status=live}}</ref>
====Trans-Pacific Partnership====
{{Main|Trans-Pacific Partnership}}
In part, the [[Trans-Pacific Partnership]] (TPP), [[geopolitical]]ly was thought by some to likely bring China's neighbors closer to the United States and reduce its economic leverage and dependence on Chinese trade.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-obama-us-trade-xi/ |title=What Will the TPP Mean for China? |website=Foreign Policy |date=7 October 2015 |access-date=24 May 2016 |archive-date=2 June 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160602145246/http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-obama-us-trade-xi/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html |title=U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China |last=Perlez |first=Jane |date=6 October 2015 |newspaper=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331 |access-date=24 May 2016 |archive-date=12 October 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151012205911/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/26627/trade_is_a_national_security_imperative.html |title=Trade Is a National Security Imperative - Harvard - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs |website=belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu |access-date=24 May 2016 |archive-date=7 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160807185910/http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/26627/trade_is_a_national_security_imperative.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/asia/geopolitical-necessity-trade/ |title=The Geopolitical Necessity of Trade |last=Boot |first=Max |date=2016-04-29 |archive-date=2019-06-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190630064729/https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/asia/geopolitical-necessity-trade/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url=http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-death-tpp-the-best-thing-ever-happened-china-19232?page=show |title=The Death of TPP: The Best Thing That Ever Happened to China |last=Magnusson |first=Earl Anthony Wayne, Oliver |newspaper=The National Interest |language=en |access-date=2017-01-31 |archive-date=2017-02-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203150224/http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-death-tpp-the-best-thing-ever-happened-china-19232?page=show |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="foreign policies icy.com">{{Cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/03/this-isnt-realpolitik-this-is-amateur-hour/|title=This Isn't Realpolitik. This Is Amateur Hour.|website=Foreign Policy|date=3 May 2017 |access-date=2017-05-04|archive-date=2017-05-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170504005239/https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/03/this-isnt-realpolitik-this-is-amateur-hour/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/06/trump-will-be-haunted-by-the-ghost-of-tpp-in-asia/ |title=Trump Will Be Haunted by the Ghost of TPP |website=Foreign Policy |date=6 November 2017 |access-date=2017-11-22 |archive-date=2017-11-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122054739/http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/06/trump-will-be-haunted-by-the-ghost-of-tpp-in-asia/ |url-status=live }}</ref> If ratified, the TPP would have strengthened American influence on future rules for the global economy. [[US Secretary of Defense]] [[Ash Carter]] claimed the passage of the TPP to be as valuable to the United States as the creation of another [[aircraft carrier]].<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal|last1=Green|first1=Michael J.|last2=Goodman|first2=Matthew P.|date=2 October 2015|title=After TPP: the Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific|journal=The Washington Quarterly|volume=38|issue=4|pages=19–34|doi=10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125827|s2cid=155763676|issn=0163-660X}}</ref> President Barack Obama has argued "if we don't pass this agreement—if America doesn't write those rules—then countries like China will".<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/business/international/trans-pacific-trade-deal-tpp-vietnam-labor-rights.html |title=Trans-Pacific Partnership Text Released, Waving Green Flag for Debate |last=Calmes |first=Jackie |date=5 November 2015 |newspaper=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331 |access-date=24 May 2016 |archive-date=16 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160416213502/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/business/international/trans-pacific-trade-deal-tpp-vietnam-labor-rights.html |url-status=live }}</ref> However, on January 23, 2017, the newly elected [[President Donald Trump]] formally [[Trans-Pacific Partnership#United States withdrawal|withdrew the United State]]s from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
====Trade War====
{{Main|China–United States trade war}}
[[File:President Trump at the G20 (48162296741).jpg|thumb|President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the [[2019 G20 Osaka summit]]]]
In what would become the [[China–United States trade war]], President Donald Trump began setting [[tariffs]] and other [[trade barriers]] on China in 2018 with the goal of forcing it to make changes to what the U.S. says are "unfair trade practices".<ref>{{cite web|last=Swanson|first=Ana|title=Trump's Trade War With China Is Officially Underway|work=The New York Times|date=July 5, 2018|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=July 20, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200720192852/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The US says those trade practices and their effects are the growing [[trade deficit]], the theft of [[intellectual property]] and the forced transfer of American technology to China.<ref>{{cite web|title=Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974|publisher=Office of the United States Trade Representative|date=March 22, 2018|url=https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180322171057/https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF|url-status=dead|archive-date=March 22, 2018|access-date=November 6, 2019}}</ref> Jeff Spross, an economics and business correspondent at [[The Week|TheWeek.com]], commented that China is pursuing economic development much in the same way as many other modern industrialized economies before it, except in a world where the rules of the global [[free trade]] order are enforced by institutions like the [[World Bank]], the [[International Monetary Fund]], and the World Trade Organization, ensuring economic development is driven by private investors.<ref>{{cite web|last=Spross|first=Jeff|title=China isn't cheating at trade. It's just running America's old plays.|publisher=The Week|date=April 12, 2019|url=https://theweek.com/articles/834610/china-isnt-cheating-trade-just-running-americas-old-plays|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=November 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191105144227/https://theweek.com/articles/834610/china-isnt-cheating-trade-just-running-americas-old-plays|url-status=live}}</ref>
At the [[Bretton Woods Conference]], the US representative, [[Harry Dexter White]], insisted that the world reserve currency be the [[United States dollar]] instead of a proposed new international unit of currency and that the IMF and World Bank be under the purview of the United States.<ref name=atimestrade>{{Cite web|url = https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/02/opinion/why-the-us-china-trade-war-might-not-end/|title = Why the US-China trade war might not end|date = 18 February 2019|access-date = 26 January 2020|archive-date = 26 January 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200126182023/https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/02/opinion/why-the-us-china-trade-war-might-not-end/|url-status = live}}</ref> The Reagan administration and US Trade Representative [[Robert Lighthizer]], and Donald Trump as a private citizen, made identical claims in the 1980s when Japan was undergoing its [[economic miracle]] which led Japan to signing the [[Plaza Accord]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Griffiths|first=James|title=The US won a trade war against Japan. But China is a whole new ball game|publisher=CNN|date=May 24, 2019|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/business/us-china-trade-war-japan-intl/index.html|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=October 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191005215847/https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/business/us-china-trade-war-japan-intl/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Like the TPP, it has been argued that the trade war is simply a more direct attempt to stifle China's development and is indicative of a shift in the US public perception of China as a "rival nation to be contained and beaten" among the two major political parties in Congress, the general public and even the business sector.<ref>{{cite web|last=Yuwen|first=Deng|title=The US sees the trade war as a tactic to contain China. So does Beijing|date=July 4, 2018|publisher=South China Morning Post|url=https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153587/us-sees-trade-war-tactic-contain-china-so-does|access-date=September 1, 2019|archive-date=September 1, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190901194628/https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153587/us-sees-trade-war-tactic-contain-china-so-does|url-status=live}}</ref> It has been argued however that employing the Cold War playbook for the seemingly destined-to-fail Soviet Union, a [[social ownership|state-run]] and largely [[closed economy]] will not work in the case of China because of its sheer size, growing wealth and vibrant economy.<ref>{{cite web|last=Saetren|first=Will|title=US cold war containment strategy against China may not end the Soviet way. Instead, it could explode into armed conflict|publisher=South China Morning Post|date=September 17, 2018|url=https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2164221/us-cold-war-containment-strategy-against-china|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=September 14, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190914173531/https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2164221/us-cold-war-containment-strategy-against-china|url-status=live}}</ref> To halt development progress, particularly the [[Made in China 2025]] plan, the US has responded by making it harder for Chinese [[tech companies]] from obtaining US technologies by investing in or acquiring US tech companies, and even attempting to stifle specific companies, namely [[Huawei]], [[ZTE]] and [[ByteDance]], from doing business domestically and abroad allegedly due to unspecified or speculative national security risks.<ref>{{cite web|last=Kharpal|first=Arjun|title=China's tech ambition is 'unstoppable' — with or without the trade war, analyst says|publisher=CNBC|date=September 29, 2019|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/30/chinas-70th-anniversary-us-technology-leadership-under-threat.html|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=October 14, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014054740/https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/30/chinas-70th-anniversary-us-technology-leadership-under-threat.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=atimestrade/> With senior Trump administration officials such as [[John Bolton]], [[Peter Navarro]] and Robert Lighthizer demanding any comprehensive trade deal feature "structural changes" which would essentially entail China surrendering its sovereignty over its [[socialist market economy|economic system]] and planning (its [[Made in China 2025]] industrial plan) and permanently ceding technology leadership to the US-an untenable situation to the Chinese- some see trade tensions continuing long into the future.<ref name=atimestrade/>
In the face of the US tariffs in the trade war and the [[International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War|sanctions on Russia]] following the [[annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]], [[Sino-Russian relations since 1991|China and Russia]] have cultivated closer economic ties as well as security and defense cooperation to offset the losses.<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3009679/china-and-russia-arent-economic-equals-thanks-us-trade-war|title = US trade war makes Russia an indispensable partner for China|date = 2019-05-14|access-date = 2019-12-15|archive-date = 2019-12-15|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20191215074001/https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3009679/china-and-russia-arent-economic-equals-thanks-us-trade-war|url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web| url=https://thehill.com/opinion/international/473474-sanctions-encourage-sino-russian-cooperation| title=Sanctions encourage Sino-Russian cooperation| date=2019-12-11| access-date=2019-12-15| archive-date=2019-12-15| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191215074002/https://thehill.com/opinion/international/473474-sanctions-encourage-sino-russian-cooperation| url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.newsweek.com/china-russia-getting-along-us-1451832|title = China and Russia are getting along better than ever, the U.S. Has only made it easier for them|website = [[Newsweek]]|date = 2019-08-07|access-date = 2019-12-15|archive-date = 2019-12-15|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20191215195113/https://www.newsweek.com/china-russia-getting-along-us-1451832|url-status = live}}</ref>
====Belt and Road Initiative====
{{Main|Belt and Road Initiative}}
Another high-profile debate among some people in the United States and China on the international stage is the observation about China's growing geopolitical footprint in "soft power diplomacy" and [[development finance institution|international development finance]]. Particularly, this surrounds China's [[Belt and Road Initiative]] (formerly "One Belt, One Road"), which U.S. officials have labeled as "aggressive" and "[[Debt-trap diplomacy|debt trap diplomacy]]".<ref>{{cite journal| author=Thomas P. Cavanna| date=July 2019| title=Unlocking the Gates of Eurasia: China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for U.S. Grand Strategy| journal=Texas National Security Review| volume=2| issue=3| url=https://tnsr.org/2019/07/unlocking-the-gates-of-eurasia-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-implications-for-u-s-grand-strategy/| access-date=2019-10-06| archive-date=2019-10-06| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191006194727/https://tnsr.org/2019/07/unlocking-the-gates-of-eurasia-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-implications-for-u-s-grand-strategy/| url-status=live}}</ref>
==== Indo-Pacific Economic Framework ====
{{Main|Indo-Pacific Economic Framework|Friendshoring}}
The Biden administration and major regional economies such as India and Japan have participated in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to varying degrees, which is seen as a way to increase ties between friendly countries economically.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Limited Hard Balancing: Explaining India's Counter Response to Chinese Encirclement |language=en-US |work=Air University (AU) |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371481/limited-hard-balancing-explaining-indias-counter-response-to-chinese-encircleme/ |access-date=2023-04-26 |archive-date=2023-04-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230426222747/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371481/limited-hard-balancing-explaining-indias-counter-response-to-chinese-encircleme/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
==Bilateral relationships==
===Australia===
{{Main|Australia–United States relations|Five Eyes}}
Starting in 2012, US marines began [[Marine Rotational Force – Darwin|deploying]] to Australia on a rotational basis.<ref>{{cite news |title=Obama visit: Australia agrees US Marine deployment plan |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15739995 |agency=BBC |access-date=2023-07-17 |archive-date=2023-07-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230717033230/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15739995 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=First Marines in Australia as U.S. ramps up Asia-Pacific focus |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-marines-australia-idUKBRE83214Z20120404 |work=Reuters |access-date=2023-07-17 |archive-date=2023-07-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230717033232/https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-marines-australia-idUKBRE83214Z20120404 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2017, Australia [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue#2017 ASEAN Summit|rejoined]] the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue after [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue#Australia's departure during Rudd|leaving]] the strategic grouping in 2008 and in 2021, it became a member of [[AUKUS]].
===India===
{{Main|India-United States relations}}{{See also|Necklace of Diamonds}}[[File:India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue Press Availability (49239820232).jpg|thumb|Secretary of State [[Michael Pompeo]] and Secretary of Defense [[Mark Esper]] hold a joint press availability with Indian Minister of External Affairs [[S. Jaishankar]] and Minister of Defence [[Rajnath Singh]] after the [[2+2 Ministerial Dialogue]]]]
Against the backdrop of the [[Sino-Indian border dispute|ongoing border dispute between India and the People's Republic of China]], the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement in October 2020 which enabled greater information-sharing and facilitated defense cooperation.<ref>{{cite web |last1= Griffiths |first1= James  |title= India signs defensive agreement with US following Himalayan standoff with China |url= https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/asia/us-india-defense-china-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=27 October 2020 |website=CNN |date= 27 October 2020 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201028052816/https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/asia/us-india-defense-china-intl-hnk/index.html | archive-date=28 October 2020}}</ref> In December 2022, based on BECA, the United States provided real-time location information of the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA]] soldiers to help India rout China, during a confrontation in [[Arunachal Pradesh]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-03-21 |title=US shared intel with India to repel Chinese troops? White House says… |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-shared-intel-with-india-to-repel-chinese-troops-white-house-says-101679378652669.html |access-date=2023-03-22 |website=Hindustan Times |language=en |archive-date=2023-03-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230322045206/https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-shared-intel-with-india-to-repel-chinese-troops-white-house-says-101679378652669.html |url-status=live }}</ref> As with Australia, Japan and the United States, India is a member of the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]].
[[India–Russia relations|India's relationship with Russia]] has emerged as an impediment to the US in forming a fully-developed united front with India against China. Policymakers in New Delhi see maintaining ties with Moscow as a way to limit China's influence over Russia and thwart any coordinated action the two might take against India.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Schuman |first=Michael |date=2023-03-01 |title=What Limits Any U.S. Alliance With India Over China |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/03/india-relations-us-china-modi/673237/ |access-date=2023-03-01 |website=The Atlantic |language=en |archive-date=2023-03-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230301144226/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/03/india-relations-us-china-modi/673237/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-02-13 |title=The Enduring Russian Impediment to U.S.-Indian Relations |url=https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/the-enduring-russian-impediment-to-u-s-indian-relations/ |access-date=2023-07-18 |website=War on the Rocks |language=en-US}}</ref>
===Japan===
{{Main|Japan-United States relations|U.S.-Japan Alliance}}
As [[Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan|treaty allies]], both Japan and the United States have deepened their security alliance since the late 1990s in response to the rise of China which has emerged as a top geopolitical threat to both countries.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Jennifer M |title=Let's Not be Laughed at Anymore: Donald Trump and Japan from the 1980s to the Present |journal=Journal of American-East Asian Relations |volume=25 |issue=2 |page=152}}</ref> In 2018, members of the [[Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade]] held joint exercises with [[United States Marine Corps|American]] marines<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.businessinsider.nl/japanese-armored-vehicles-first-military-exercise-on-foreign-soil-2018-10/ | title=Amid rising tensions with China, Japan just sent armored vehicles to foreign soil for the first time since World War II | date=6 October 2018 | access-date=17 July 2023 | archive-date=26 December 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221226015711/https://www.businessinsider.nl/japanese-armored-vehicles-first-military-exercise-on-foreign-soil-2018-10/ | url-status=live }}</ref> and in 2023, Japan approved an American plan to station a new marine unit in Okinawa.<ref>{{cite news |title=U.S. and Japan agree to step up security cooperation amid China worries |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-increase-number-anti-ship-missiles-japan-sources-2023-01-11 |work=Reuters}}</ref> As with Australia, India and the United States, Japan is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
===Philippines===
{{Main|Philippines–United States relations|Philippines v. China}}
The Philippines and the United States are [[Mutual Defense Treaty (United States–Philippines)|treaty allies]] and their security alliance has deepened in light of the [[China–Philippines relations#Territorial disputes|ongoing territorial dispute between the Philippines and the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea]]. In 2014, both countries signed the [[Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement]] which allows the United States to rotate troops into the Philippines for extended stays and allows the United States to build and operate facilities on Philippine bases for both American and Philippine forces.
===South Korea===
{{Main|South Korea–United States relations|Korean conflict}}
[[File:The first of two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors is launched during a successful intercept test - US Army.jpg|thumb|right|THAAD missile system]]
In accordance with the [[Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea|ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty]], the U.S. has maintained a [[United States Forces Korea|military presence in the South]] since the end of the Korean War. In late 2016, the United States and South Korea jointly announced the deployment of the [[Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense]] (THAAD) in response to nuclear and missile threats by North Korea.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Sherman |first1=Paul |last2=Haenle |first2=Anne |date=2016-09-12 |title=The Real Answer to China's THAAD Dilemma |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/the-real-answer-to-chinas-thaad-dilemma/ |access-date=2022-04-29 |website=The Diplomat |language=en-US |archive-date=2022-04-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220423203808/https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/the-real-answer-to-chinas-thaad-dilemma/ |url-status=live }}</ref> South Korea's decision to host the weapon system on its territory led to a significant deterioration in [[China–South Korea relations#Deployment of THAAD in South Korea|relations between South Korea and China]], which viewed the deployment as a threat to its security.
===Taiwan (ROC)===
{{see also|Taiwan–United States relations|Cross-Strait relations}}
[[File:AIT NOC dedication ceremony - Flickr id 29162044008.jpg|thumb|Taipei Main Office of the American Institute in Taiwan, with the [[flag of the United States]] flown out front.]]
While the United States has had formal relations with the PRC government which was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of China in 1979, it has simultaneously maintained [[Taiwan–United States relations|unofficial relations with Taiwan]] over which, it emphasizes that it does not take any official position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-09-26 |title=US Does Not Take a Position on Taiwan's Sovereignty, State Department Says |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/us-does-not-take-a-position-on-taiwan-s-sovereignty-state-department-says-/6764381.html |access-date=2023-08-17 |website=VOA |language=en |archive-date=2023-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231207132325/https://www.voanews.com/a/us-does-not-take-a-position-on-taiwan-s-sovereignty-state-department-says-/6764381.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The US only “acknowledges” but does not “endorse” PRC's position over Taiwan,<ref>{{Cite web |author=[[Steve Chabot]] |title=Text - H.Con.Res.88 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations. |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/88/text/ih |accessdate=2019-04-14 |date=2016-05-17 |work= [[United States Congress]] |quote= Whereas the Six Assurances are guidelines to conduct relations between the United States and Taiwan and stipulate that the United States would not—......(6) formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. |archive-date=2020-12-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201217181811/https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/88/text/ih |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=[[Michael Green (political expert)|Michael J. Green]]|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter |title=What Is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and Why Does it Matter? |publisher=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies|CSIS]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220423100948/https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter |url-status=live|archive-date=23 April 2022|date=13 January 2017|access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354 |title=What is the 'One China' policy? |date=10 February 2017 |work=BBC News |access-date=9 January 2019 |language=en-GB |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190109041259/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354 |archive-date=9 January 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf|website=Congressional Research Service|title=China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei|date=2014-10-10|language=en|pages=39|quote=In the Chinese text, the word for “acknowledge” is “cheng ren” (recognize), a change from “ren shi” (acknowledge),used in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. During debate on the TRA in February 1979, Senator Jacob Javits noted the difference and said that “it is very important that we not subscribe to the Chinese position on One China either way.” Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded that “we regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word ‘acknowledge’ as being the word that is determinative for the U.S.” (Wolff and Simon, pp. 310-311).|access-date=2017-03-07|archive-date=2017-04-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170410204327/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> and has considered [[Taiwan's political status]] as “undetermined”.<ref>{{cite web | title=U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | author1=Shirley A. Kan | author2=Wayne M. Morrison | page=4 | url=http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | date=2013-01-04 | publisher=Congressional Research Service | quote=The position of the United States, as clarified in the China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional Research Service (date: July 9, 2007) is summed up in five points:<br>1. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.<br> 2. The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.<br> 3. U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;<br>4. U.S. policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and <br>5. U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as undetermined. U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled.<br> These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service. | access-date=2017-05-11 | archive-date=2016-12-11 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161211221234/http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | url-status=live }}</ref>
The position of the United States, as clarified in the ''China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy'' report of the Congressional Research Service (date: 9 July 2007) is summed up in five points:
# The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the [[Three Communiqués|three US-PRC Joint Communiqués]] of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
# The United States "acknowledged" the "[[One China]]" position of both sides of the [[Taiwan Strait]].
# U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;
# U.S. policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and
# U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled.
These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service.<ref>
{{cite web | title=U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | author1=Shirley A. Kan | author2=Wayne M. Morrison | page=4 | url=https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | date=4 January 2013 | publisher=Congressional Research Service | access-date=25 June 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171231211949/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | archive-date=31 December 2017 | url-status=live }}
</ref>
The US has consistently held to its version of [[One China]] policy and has stated that in regards to [[Cross-Strait relations]];
<Blockquote>
We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. We continue to have an abiding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.<ref>{{Cite web |title=U.S. Relations With Taiwan |url=https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ |access-date=2023-08-17 |website=United States Department of State |language=en |archive-date=2023-03-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311230117/https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
- US Department of State
</Blockquote>
A cornerstone in the bilateral relationship is the [[Taiwan Relations Act]] through which the United States has maintained its policy of strategic ambiguity. Prior to the normalization of diplomatic ties with the PRC, the US was a treaty ally of Taiwan under the [[Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty]]. The treaty essentially prevented the [[People's Liberation Army]] from taking over the island of Taiwan, prolonged and assisted the Republic of China in maintaining legitimacy as the sole government of the whole of mainland China until the early 1970s and also helped US policymakers to shape the policy of containment in East Asia together with South Korea and Japan against the spread of communism.
The recent decade has seen an increasing frequency of [[List of US arms sales to Taiwan|US arms sales to Taiwan]] alongside expanding commercial ties. On December 16, 2015, the Obama administration announced a deal to sell $1.83 billion worth of arms to the [[Republic of China Armed Forces|Armed Forces of Taiwan]], a year and eight months after U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2014 to allow the sale of Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates to Taiwan. The deal would include the sale of two decommissioned U.S. Navy frigates, anti-tank missiles, Assault Amphibious Vehicles, and FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, amid the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
A new $250 million compound for the [[American Institute in Taiwan]] was unveiled in June 2018, accompanied by a "low-key" American delegation. The Chinese authorities denounced this action as violation of the "one China" policy statement and demanded the US to stop all relations with Taiwan without intercession of China. In 2019, the US approved the sale of 108 [[M1A2 Abrams]] tanks and 250 Stinger missiles for $2.2 billion and 66 F-16V fighter jets for $8 billion. With the sale, China vowed to sanction any companies involved in the transactions.<ref>{{cite web|last=Thrall|first=A. Trevor|title=Selling F-16s to Taiwan Is Bad Business|publisher=Defense One|date=September 17, 2019|url=https://cdn.defenseone.com/a/defenseone/interstitial.html?v=9.8.1&rf=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defenseone.com%2Fideas%2F2019%2F09%2Fselling-f-16s-taiwan-bad-business%2F159915%2F|access-date=November 6, 2019|archive-date=August 21, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200821152653/https://cdn.defenseone.com/a/defenseone/interstitial.html?v=9.8.1&rf=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defenseone.com%2Fideas%2F2019%2F09%2Fselling-f-16s-taiwan-bad-business%2F159915%2F|url-status=live}}</ref> In May 2020, the U.S. Department of State approved a possible [[Foreign Military Sales]] of 18 [[Mark 48 torpedo|MK-48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology heavy weight torpedoes]] for Taiwan in a deal estimated to cost $180 million.<ref>{{cite web |last1= Defense Security Cooperation Agency | title= Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (tecro) – MK 48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology (at) Heavy Weight Torpedo (HWT)|url= https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-tecro-mk-48-mod-6| website=DSCA |access-date=22 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200923065120/https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-tecro-mk-48-mod-6| archive-date=23 September 2020}}</ref>
==Multilateral relationships==
===US–Japan–Australia===
{{Main|Japan–United States relations|Australia–United States relations|Australia–Japan relations}}
Then-U.S. secretary of state [[Condoleezza Rice]] visited [[Australia]] in March 2006 for the "trilateral security forum" with the [[Japan]]ese foreign minister [[Taro Aso]] and his Australian counterpart [[Alexander Downer]].<ref>Jain, Purnendra (March 18, 2006). [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html "A 'little NATO' against China"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060318223606/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HC18Ad01.html |date=2006-03-18 }}. ''[[Asia Times Online]]''.</ref><ref>Weisman, Steven (March 17, 2006). [https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/asia/17rice.html "Rice and Australian Counterpart Differ About China"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903161749/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/asia/17rice.html |date=2014-09-03 }}. ''[[The New York Times]]''.</ref>
===US–Japan–Australia–India (the "Quad")===
{{Main|Quadrilateral Security Dialogue}}
[[File:Ships of each country participating in Malabar2022.jpg|thumb|[[Malabar (naval exercise)|Malabar exercise]] in 2022]]
In May 2007, the four nations signed a strategic military partnership agreement, the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]]. In 2017, with the support of then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the United States restarted the "Quad".
===US–Japan–India===
{{Main|India–Japan relations|India–United States relations}}
The three nations held their first trilateral meeting in December 2011.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/23/inside-the-first-ever-u-s-japan-india-trilateral-meeting/|title=Inside the first ever U.S.-Japan-India trilateral meeting|date=23 December 2011 |access-date=7 July 2018|archive-date=7 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180707201801/https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/23/inside-the-first-ever-u-s-japan-india-trilateral-meeting/|url-status=live}}</ref>
== Chinese response ==
The People's Republic of China officially opposes using the term "competition" to define relations between it and the United States.<ref>{{cite web |title=China opposes using competition to define China-US relations |url=https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/china/china-opposes-using-competition-to-define-china-us-relations-293167.html |publisher=People's Daily |access-date=30 Jan 2023 |archive-date=9 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230209213405/https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/china/china-opposes-using-competition-to-define-china-us-relations-293167.html |url-status=live }}</ref> China's [[Xi Jinping]] claimed “Western countries led by the United States have contained and suppressed us in an all-round way, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our development”.<ref>{{Cite web |last=He |first=Laura |date=2023-03-07 |title=Xi Jinping hits out at US as he urges China's private firms to 'fight' alongside Communist Party {{!}} CNN Business |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/07/economy/china-two-sessions-xi-jinping-speech-us-challenges-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=2023-03-16 |website=CNN |language=en |archive-date=2023-03-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316054218/https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/07/economy/china-two-sessions-xi-jinping-speech-us-challenges-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In August 2022, U.S. politician [[Nancy Pelosi]], serving as the [[Speaker of the United States House of Representatives|Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives]], [[2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan|visited Taiwan]] for the first time in 25 years. China announced plans for live-fire military drills soon after her visit.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-08-02 |title=Taiwan: Nancy Pelosi meets President Tsai to Beijing's fury |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62398029 |access-date=2023-07-18}}</ref>
On 3 July 2023, at the 2023 International Forum for Trilateral Cooperation in [[Qingdao]], China's chief diplomat [[Wang Yi (politician)|Wang Yi]] said it was important for the two countries to "remember their roots" during a speech towards the participating Japanese and South Korean audience where he called for [[China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit|Japan and South Korea to work together with China]] to "[[Economy of East Asia|prosper together]], revitalize [[East Asia]], revitalize Asia and benefit the world" by controversially stating that "most [[European American|American]]s and Europeans can't tell [[China]], [[Japan]] and [[South Korea]] apart" and that "no matter how [[Blue-eyed blonde|blonde]] you dye your hair, how sharp you shape your [[Aquiline nose|nose]], you can never become a [[Ethnic groups in Europe|European]] or [[European American|American]], you can never become a [[White people|Westerner]]." before further adding they must know where their "roots lie."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-07-04 |title=Remember your 'roots', China tells neighbors |url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2605135/remember-your-roots-china-tells-neighbours |access-date=July 4, 2023 |website=[[Bangkok Post]] |archive-date=26 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230726035407/https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2605135/remember-your-roots-china-tells-neighbours |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Gan |first=Nectar |date=2023-07-04 |title='You can never become a Westerner:' China's top diplomat urges Japan and South Korea to align with Beijing and 'revitalize Asia' |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/04/china/wang-yi-china-japan-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=July 4, 2023 |website=[[CNN]] |archive-date=4 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230704182744/https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/04/china/wang-yi-china-japan-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Some scholars criticized Wang's speech, as it appeared to overtly endorse the notion of actively supporting and advocating for the establishment of a racially-based alliance among [[East Asians]] in [[East Asia]] as racist. Geopolitical scholars in the academic community drew parallels between Wang's acerbic political rhetoric, which was implicitly marked by pronounced racial undertones, owing to its reminiscent resemblance and resonating traits of  [[Imperial Japan]]'s conceptualization of the [[Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere]] during the earlier part of the 20th century.<ref>{{Cite news |date=5 July 2023 |title=China dismisses criticism of top diplomat's comments appearing to push for race-based alliance |work=[[Associated Press]] |url=https://apnews.com/article/china-japan-korea-race-controversy-b1fb99824d31b3f88a0893cacf6f54f0 |access-date=6 July 2023 |archive-date=5 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230705232659/https://apnews.com/article/china-japan-korea-race-controversy-b1fb99824d31b3f88a0893cacf6f54f0 |url-status=live }}</ref>
==See also==
; American geostrategy related
* [[Free and Open Indo-Pacific]]
* [[AirSea Battle]]
* [[Blue Team (U.S. politics)]]
* [[Geostrategy in Central Asia]]
* [[Island chain strategy]]
* [[Second Cold War]]
; Chinese geostrategy related
* [[Belt and Road Initiative]]
* [[Chinese Century|Chinese century]]
* [[China's peaceful rise]]
* [[:Category:Territorial disputes of China|List of disputed territories of China]]
* [[String of Pearls (Indian Ocean)]]
; Bilateral and multilateral relations
* [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]]
* [[Post–Cold War era]]
* [[Malabar (naval exercise)]]
* [[Australia–United States relations]]
* [[China–United States relations]]
* [[India–United States relations]]
* [[Japan–United States relations]]
* [[Philippines–United States relations]]
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
==Further reading==
{{Library resources box}}
{{Main|China–United States relations#Further reading}}
* Blackwill Robert D., and Richard Fontaine. ''Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power'' (Oxford University Press, 2024)
* Buzan, Barry and Evelyn Goh, eds. ''Rethinking Sino-Japanese Alienation: History Problems and Historical Opportunities'' (Oxford University Press, 2020)
* Goh, Evelyn, and Rosemary Foot. ''From containment to containment? Understanding US relations with China since 1949'' (Blackwell, 2003).
* Goh, Evelyn, and Sheldon W. Simon, eds. ''China, the United States, and South-East Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics'' (2007)
* Green, Michael J. ''By more than providence: Grand strategy and American power in the Asia Pacific since 1783'' (Columbia UP, 2017).
* Sahashi, Ryo. "Japan’s strategy amid US–China confrontation." ''China International Strategy Review'' 2.2 (2020): 232–245.
{{China–United States relations}}
{{Foreign relations of the United States}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:China Containment Policy}}
[[Category:China–United States relations]]
[[Category:United States foreign policy]]