View source for United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War

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{{Infobox bilateral relations|Iraq-United States|Ba'athist Iraq|USA|title=|map=Iraq USA Locator.svg}}
[[United States]] support for [[Ba'athist Iraq]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]], in which it fought against [[Iranian Revolution|post-revolutionary]] [[Iran]], included several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale of [[dual-use technology]], military intelligence, and special operations training.<ref name="spidersweb">Friedman, Alan. ''Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq'', Bantam Books, 1993.</ref><ref name="deathlobby">Timmerman, Kenneth R. ''The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq''. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.</ref> The U.S. refused to sell arms to Iraq directly due to Iraq's ties to [[State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list)|Palestinian groups which the U.S. designates as terrorist organizations]] such as the [[Palestinian Liberation Front]] and [[Abu Nidal Organization]],<ref>{{Cite web | title=Saddam Hussein's Support for International Terrorism | url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect5.html | access-date=2024-05-05 | website=georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov}}</ref> but several sales of "dual-use" technology have been documented; notably, Iraq purchased 45 [[Bell Textron|Bell helicopters]] for $200 million in 1985.<ref>{{cite book | author-link=Elaine Sciolino | last=Sciolino | first=Elaine | title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis | publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]] | year=1991 | isbn=978-0-471-54299-5 | page=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/168 168]}}</ref><ref name="Byrne">{{cite book | last=Byrne | first=Malcolm | title=The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives | chapter=Critical Oral History: A new approach to examining the United States' role in the war | publisher=[[Routledge]] | year=2013 | isbn=978-0-415-68524-5}}</ref> Of particular interest for contemporary [[Iran–United States relations]] are accusations that the U.S. government actively encouraged Iraqi leader [[Saddam Hussein]] to invade Iran (proponents of this theory frequently describe the U.S. as having given Saddam a green-light), supported by a considerable amount of evidence and generally regarded as the conventional wisdom in the [[Arab world]], but several scholars and former U.S. government officials deny that any such collusion occurred, and no direct documentary proof of it has been found.<ref name="Emery" /><ref name="Brands" />
U.S. government support for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open sessions of the [[United States Senate|Senate]] and [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]]. On June 9, 1992, [[Ted Koppel]] reported on [[American Broadcasting Company|ABC]]'s ''[[Nightline (US news program)|Nightline]]'' that the "Reagan/Bush administrations permitted—and frequently encouraged—the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq."<ref name="abc2">Koppel, Ted. [https://web.archive.org/web/20040824084457/http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-nightline-19920701.html The USS Vincennes: Public War, Secret War], ABC ''Nightline''. July 1, 1992.</ref>
American views toward Iraq were not enthusiastically supportive in its conflict with Iran, and activity in assistance was largely to prevent an Iranian victory. This was encapsulated by [[Henry Kissinger]] when he remarked, "It's a pity they both can't lose."<ref>{{cite news | url=http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/292496/it-s-pity-somebody-has-win-andrew-c-mccarthy | title=It's a Pity Somebody Has to Win | last=McCarthy | first=Andrew C. | newspaper=National Review Online | date=3 March 2012 | access-date=7 November 2012 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130330234452/http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/292496/it-s-pity-somebody-has-win-andrew-c-mccarthy | archive-date=30 March 2013 | url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | author-link=Elaine Sciolino | last=Sciolino | first=Elaine | title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis | publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]] | year=1991 | isbn=978-0-471-54299-5 | page=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/163 163]}}</ref>
== U.S. reaction to the conflict ==
<!-- Everything in this section is sourced to Emery unless stated otherwise. -->
[[File:The Shah with Atherton, Sullivan, Vance, Carter and Brzezinski, 1977.jpg|upright=0.9|right|thumb|The Iranian [[Shah]] [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] meeting with President [[Jimmy Carter]] and [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], 1977.]]
=== U.S. intelligence sharing with post-Revolutionary Iran ===
Following the [[Iranian Revolution]], the [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter|Carter administration]] continued to see Iran as a bulwark against [[Iraq]] and the [[Soviet Union]], and therefore attempted to forge a strategic partnership with the new [[Interim Government of Iran]] under Prime Minister [[Mehdi Bazargan]]. [[Chargé d'affaires]] at the American embassy in [[Tehran]], [[Bruce Laingen]], realized that Iranian officials were acutely interested in U.S. intelligence on Iraq, and convinced [[Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs]] [[Harold H. Saunders]] to approve an intelligence-sharing liaison with the Iranian government, culminating in an October 15, 1979 meeting between longtime [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) officer [[George W. Cave]] and the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister [[Abbas Amir-Entezam]] and Foreign Minister [[Ebrahim Yazdi]]. Cave told [[Mark J. Gasiorowski]] that he briefed Entezam and Yazdi on Iraqi military preparations and covert operations seemingly designed to facilitate a large-scale invasion of Iran, although no final decision had been made (the content of Cave's briefing was corroborated by Laingen, Yazdi, Entezam, and Bazargan).<ref name="Emery" />{{sfn|Gasiorowski|2012|pp=622–623}} In particular, echoing a March 1979 warning from [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]] analyst [[Howard Teicher]] regarding Iraqi designs on Iran's oil-rich [[Khuzestan province]], Cave pointed out that Iraq had created a front organization that could instigate unrest among Khuzestan's majority–[[Khuzestani Arabs|Arab inhabitants]]—yet Cave emphasized that war could still be avoided if the strength of Iran's armed forces did not continue its post-revolutionary decline.{{sfn|Gasiorowski|2012|pp=614, 617, 620, 622–623}} Furthermore, Cave urged his Iranian interlocutors to monitor the movement of Iraqi troops using the CIA-built [[IBEX (surveillance)|IBEX]] systems from the reign of [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|the Shah]]. Although Teicher and Cave's predictions proved accurate, they were the product of circumstantial evidence disputed internally within the U.S. government, and the significance of Cave's briefing has been debated.<ref name="Byrne" /><ref name="Emery">{{cite book | last=Emery | first=Chris | title=The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives | chapter=Reappraising the Carter Administration's response to the Iran-Iraq war | publisher=[[Routledge]] | year=2013 | isbn=978-0-415-68524-5}}</ref>{{sfn|Gasiorowski|2012|p=620}} For example, according to [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]] (INR) analyst Wayne White, who was not aware of the intelligence that informed Cave's briefing: "The Iraqi army was doing little more than continuing its well-known annual schedule of primarily battalion and brigade-level training exercises&nbsp;... Very little of the Iraqi military was anywhere near the Iraqi-Iranian frontier." Similarly, the head of the Iran desk at the [[United States Department of State|State Department]], Henry Precht, stated: "I had no impression at the time that anyone believed Iraq was planning a major attack although we thought that [Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein] might be stirring up [[Kurds in Iran|the Kurds]]. At the time I did not think he would take on his larger and still probably more potent neighbor."<ref name="Emery" />{{sfn|Gasiorowski|2012|p=620}} On the other hand, Gasiorowski contended that "If Iran's leaders had acted on the information provided in Cave's briefings&nbsp;... the brutal eight–year [Iran–Iraq War] might never have occurred."{{sfn|Gasiorowski|2012|pp=626–627}}
=== Pre-war relations between Iraq and Iran ===
The [[Iraqi invasion of Iran]] in September 1980 was preceded by a long period of tension between the two countries throughout 1979 and 1980, including frequent border skirmishes, calls by Iranian leader [[Ruhollah Khomeini]] for the [[Shia Islam|Shia Muslims]] in Iraq to revolt against the ruling Sunni [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region|Ba'ath Party]], and allegations of Iraqi support for ethnic separatists in Iran. On June 18, 1979, U.S. chargé d'affaires Charlie Naas asked Yazdi about the deterioration in relations; Yazdi stated he "does not know what might be bothering Iraq&nbsp;... certainly we have done nothing to bother them." Khomeini had recently condemned Iraq's arrest of Shi'ite leader [[Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr]], but Yazdi claimed this had nothing to do with any effort to [[The policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution|export the Islamic Revolution]] to Iraq: Iran was merely concerned with protecting the sacred Shi'ite sites in [[Najaf]] and [[Karbala]]. Nevertheless, in a subsequent conversation between Naas and Entezam, it emerged that the latter was unaware of [[National Iranian Radio and Television]]'s broadcasts denouncing Iraq.<ref name="Emery" /> Continuing to seek good relations with Iranian authorities, U.S. officials uncovered considerable evidence of Iraqi support for Kurdish rebels in Iran under the leadership of [[Jalal Talabani]]. While these rebels were not considered capable of overthrowing the Iranian government militarily, they were undermining Iranian moderates, prompting Precht to broach the possibility of meeting with Iraqi officials to persuade them that Iraq's support for the Kurds was not in its best interest.<ref name="Emery" /> Throughout this time, Chris Emery states that Iraq's intentions toward Iran were not entirely clear, as Saddam invited an Iranian delegation to the country following his assumption of the presidency in July,<ref name="Brands" /> while the CIA concluded in November (despite Cave's warning the previous month) that Iraq sought a diplomatic settlement with Iran.<ref name="Emery" /> Saddam was willing to work with Iranian moderates such as Yazdi, whom he met in [[Havana]] in October, but the collapse of Bazargan's government following the November 4th seizure of the U.S. embassy and initiation of the [[Iran hostage crisis]]—and the resulting consolidation of power under Khomeini—"would profoundly change Saddam's decision-making calculus," according to Emery.<ref name="Emery" /> While the Iraqi archives suggest that Saddam contemplated invading Iran as early as February 1979, he was deterred from doing so until July 1980, at which point post-revolutionary purges had rendered Iran grossly unprepared for the attack.{{sfn|Gasiorowski|2012|pp=614, 620–621, 623, 626–627}} A key July 1980 report by Iraqi [[Directorate of General Military Intelligence|military intelligence]] concluded: "It is clear that, at present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend on a large scale."<ref name="Brands" /><ref>{{cite book | last1=Murray | first1=Williamson | last2=Woods | first2=Kevin M. | title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History | chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger' | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | year=2014 | isbn=978-1-107-06229-0 | pages=59–61, 63 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>
=== Claims of U.S. involvement and "green-light" accusations ===
Iranian leaders, including Khomeini and his successor [[Ali Khamenei]], have long espoused a belief that the U.S. gave Saddam Hussein a "green-light" to launch the invasion of Iran. U.S. officials have strongly denied this charge.<ref name="Emery" /> [[Joost Hiltermann]] observes that a U.S. green-light is also "the conventional wisdom in the [[Arab world]]."<ref>{{cite book | last1=Blight | first1=James G. | title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 | year=2012 | publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers | isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 | display-authors=etal | page=68}}</ref> In fact, Iranian suspicions that the U.S. would use Iraq to retaliate for the hostage-taking predated the invasion, as Carter noted in his diary on April 10, 1980: "The Iranian terrorists are making all kinds of crazy threats to kill the American hostages if they are invaded by Iraq—whom they identify as an American puppet." There are several reasons for this perception, including some circumstantial evidence.<ref name="Emery" />
First, although the Carter administration had been interested in engagement with Iraq since 1977,<ref name="Brands" /> the longstanding U.S.-Iran alliance effectively rendered this impossible. After the dramatic break in [[Iran–United States relations]], however, both American and Iraqi officials made a number of positive gestures towards one another; notably, Saddam publicly condemned the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]], and on April 10, [[Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs]] [[David D. Newsom]], offered "to resume diplomatic relations with Iraq at any time." Saddam later stated that Iraq had accepted Newsom's offer shortly before the outbreak of the war, but "when the war started, and to avoid misinterpretation, we postponed the establishment of relations."<ref name="Emery" /><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=4&pagewanted=print | title=Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy | work=[[The New York Times]] | date=1990-09-23 | access-date=2017-05-12 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171006013058/http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=4&pagewanted=print | archive-date=2017-10-06 | url-status=live}}</ref> In another widely publicized remark, Carter's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] told a television interviewer on April 14 that "We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq&nbsp;... we do not feel that [[Iraq–United States relations|American–Iraq relations]] need to be frozen in antagonism."<ref>{{cite book | author-link=Elaine Sciolino | last=Sciolino | first=Elaine | title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis | publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]] | year=1991 | isbn=978-0-471-54299-5 | pages=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/162 162]-[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/163 163] | quote=When Iraq invaded Iran five months later, Saddam assumed—rightly—that the United States would do nothing to stop him.}}</ref> Moreover, the CIA—desperate for intelligence on Iran—maintained contacts with Iranian opposition figures including [[Shapour Bakhtiar]] and [[Gholam Ali Oveissi]], who were themselves in touch with Iraqi officials and had encouraged Saddam to invade. Although there is no evidence either Bakhtiar or Oveissi were acting at the behest of the U.S., Iranian awareness of such contacts through documents seized in the U.S. embassy fueled suspicion.<ref name="Emery" />
The July 9 [[Nojeh coup plot]], a failed military ''coup d'état'' against Khomeini funded by Iraqi intelligence through Bakhtiar, solidified the Iranian view that the U.S. and Iraq were conspiring to reverse the Iranian Revolution. Bakhtiar falsely told the plotters that their efforts had the "blessing" of America, but there was no U.S. involvement.<ref name="Emery" /><ref name="Brands" /> After a peak earlier in 1980, Saddam reduced bilateral tensions with Iran leading up to the coup attempt, perhaps seeing a successful coup as an alternative to war.<ref name="Brands" /> In August, Saddam made a trip to [[Saudi Arabia]] in which [[King of Saudi Arabia|King]] [[Khalid of Saudi Arabia|Khalid]] is reported to have pledged Saudi support for an invasion of Iran, which Bryan R. Gibson commented was "a very significant gesture, especially in light of the closeness of [[Saudi Arabia–United States relations|American–Saudi relations]]."<ref name="Gibson on Greenlight">{{cite book | last=Gibson | first=Bryan R. | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IPv7XdBmPDcC&q=Saddam+did+so+in+August+1980%2C+when+he+traveled+to+Saudi+Arabia+to+consult+with+King+Khalid+about+his+invasion+plans | title=Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 | publisher=[[ABC-Clio]] | year=2010 | isbn=978-0-313-38610-7 | pages=31–36}}</ref> [[United States Secretary of State]] [[Alexander Haig]] told Carter's successor, [[Ronald Reagan]], that it was during this visit that "President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through [Crown Prince] [[Fahd of Saudi Arabia|Fahd]],"<ref>{{cite web | author-link=Alexander Haig | last=Haig | first=Alexander | url=https://consortiumnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/AlexanderHaigTalkingPoints.pdf | title=TALKING POINTS (TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE) | access-date=2022-02-15}}</ref> but at a 2008 conference several academics and former U.S. officials questioned the veracity of this assertion as well as the motives of both Haig and Fahd in promulgating it.<ref name="Emery" /><ref>{{cite book | last1=Blight | first1=James G. | title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 | year=2012 | publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers | isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 | display-authors=etal | pages=5, 58–59, 63–69, 260–262}}</ref><ref>[[United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia]] [[James E. Akins]] provided an anecdote that may be related to the rumored green-light: "When disintegration started, and a report was prepared on this—the economic and political and military disintegration of [Iran]—the army had been totally purged, and the people who were taking over were young and incompetent. The implication was that the government would not last too much longer. A copy of such a report was given to the Saudis, and the Saudis were quite impressed by it, because they were deathly afraid of the government of Iran's mullahs. What the Saudis did with this report is where this narrative breaks down somewhat. There are a lot of people who believe that the Saudis gave a copy of this to Saddam. But no Saudis ever told me that it was given, and no Iraqi has ever told me that they got a copy of this report from the Saudis, although they could have. Whether they did or not, Saddam also reached the same conclusion on his own. There's no doubt about that. If he got confirmation of his conclusion from an American report, that would have made him even more determined to move against Iran." See {{cite web | url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/akins.html | title=An Interview with James Akins | work=[[Frontline (U.S. TV series)|PBS Frontline]] | year=2000 | access-date=2017-05-01 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171005152002/https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/akins.html | archive-date=2017-10-05 | url-status=live}}</ref> As described by Malcolm Byrne: "The American veterans were unanimous that no 'green light' was ever given, and that the Haig document, while intriguing on its face, leaves far too much room for interpretation to be definitive.&nbsp;... the Saudi comments did not address the various policy arguments that militated against an invasion—chiefly, the potential danger posed to the American hostages in Tehran".<ref name="Byrne" /> In the view of [[Hal Brands]]: "Haig had not been in government in September 1980&nbsp;... The Haig memo therefore provides hard evidence only of the fact that one of the secretary's sources believed the green light thesis to be true."<ref name="Brands">{{cite journal | author-link=Hal Brands | last=Brands | first=Hal | url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/14682745.2011.564612 | title=Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light? | journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] | volume=12 | issue=2 | year=2012 | publisher=[[Routledge]] | pages=319–343 | doi=10.1080/14682745.2011.564612 | s2cid=154354622}}</ref> On the other hand, senior U.S. diplomat [[Chas W. Freeman Jr.|Chas Freeman]] told journalist [[Andrew Cockburn]] that "he remembers coming across a 'memcon' summarising a meeting in late June 1980—three months before the war began—between Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a senior Iraqi diplomat. In the meeting Brzezinski clearly stated that America would be content with an Iraqi attack on Iran—a green light if ever there was one."<ref>{{Cite news | last=Cockburn | first=Andrew | date=4 July 2024 | title=Why didn't you tell me? | url=https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v46/n13/andrew-cockburn/why-didn-t-you-tell-me | access-date= | work=[[London Review of Books]] | language= | volume=46 | issue=13 | issn=0260-9592}}</ref>
Additionally, sources linked to the Iranian government have accused Brzezinski of personally meeting with Saddam in [[Amman]], [[Jordan]] in July 1980. King [[Hussein of Jordan]] is said to have acted as an interlocutor, but two of the king's biographers—[[Avi Shlaim]] and [[Nigel J. Ashton]]—found nothing to corroborate that such a meeting occurred. [[Gary Sick]], a close aide who accompanied Brzezinski during a 1980 trip to the Middle East, told Brands that the meeting as described was impossible: "I was with him at least 14 hours a day, including a brief visit to Jordan, and I can attest absolutely that (1) Iraq was not on the agenda, and (2) he could not physically have made such a visit—even if he stayed up all night and got a secret flight to Baghdad," the latter being a variation on the original claim.<ref name="Brands" /> Nevertheless, Sick states that "a year before the war," Saddam did in fact meet with King Hussein and CIA officials in Amman; per Sick, having received no "red light" from the U.S., this amounted to a "green light" to Saddam, although "this hardly constituted a US-backed war against Iran."<ref>{{Cite book | last=Johnson | first=Rob | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0o5KEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA91 | title=The Iran-Iraq War | date=2010 | publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] | isbn=978-1-137-26778-8 | pages=91 | language=}}</ref>
French historian [[Pierre Razoux]] wrote, "a meticulous analysis of the events, context, and statements by contemporary authorities, combined with more recent sources and interviews granted by certain key participants, has left no doubt that the American government did not push Saddam Hussein to criminal behavior".<ref>{{cite book | last=Razoux | first=Pierre | author-link=Pierre Razoux | date=2015 | title=The Iran-Iraq War | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT88 | publisher=The Belknap Press | isbn=978-0-674-08863-4 | pages=68–69}}</ref>
=== Prelude to the Iraqi invasion of Iran ===
On April 9, the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] (DIA) received information from a [[Human intelligence (intelligence gathering)|human source]] considered reliable, postulating a 50% chance Iraq would invade Iran.<ref name="Emery" /><ref name="Brands" /> An April 11 CIA analysis is more blunt: "Evidence indicates that Iraq had probably planned to initiate a major military move against Iran with the aim of toppling the Khomeini regime"—and had "sought to engage the [[Kuwait]]is to act as intermediary in obtaining United States approval and support for Iraqi military action against Iran."<ref name="Emery" /><ref>{{cite document | publisher=Strategic Warning Staff | title=Possible Iranian–Iraqi Conflict | date=1980-04-11 | page=2}} Available online [https://www.scribd.com/doc/104034796/US-Intel-Assistance-to-Iran here.] Retrieved 2017-10-05.</ref> Carter himself has confirmed that fear the U.S. hostages would be executed if Iraq attacked was one reason he approved [[Operation Eagle Claw|a failed rescue mission]] on April 24. In light of these alerts, the claims of senior Carter administration officials involved with Iran—including White, Naas, Precht, and Sick—that they were surprised by the invasion require some explanation.<ref name="Emery" />
Brands states that the April 9 DIA memo "was an outlier in the overall pattern of American intelligence analysis" and that "the one US official [Teicher] who claims to have anticipated the invasion (in a report dated November 1979) laments that he had no luck convincing anyone else in the national security apparatus that such an eventuality was likely."<ref name="Brands" /> Emery hypothesizes that these warnings went unheeded because "those who doubted they amounted to compelling evidence won the argument"; it was not until September 17 that the CIA indicated "the intensification of border clashes between Iran and Iraq has reached a point where a serious conflict is now a distinct possibility."<ref name="Emery" /> Even then, State Department official [[W. Nathaniel Howell]] recounted that the majority of his colleagues thought Saddam was bluffing. White recalled: "The outbreak of war [on September 22] did, in fact, come as a surprise to most of us because a decent portion of Iraq's ground forces were still in garrison. The hasty movement of the remaining units up to the front immediately after the beginning of major hostilities was the activity that tended to nudge me toward the abrupt scenario in which Saddam ordered the attack before all military preparations had been completed."<ref name="Emery" /><ref>This hypothesis was later confirmed by the Iraqi archives. See {{cite web | last=Gibson | first=Bryan R. | url=http://eng.majalla.com/2010/11/article55178283 | title=Re-Writing History: The Iran-Iraq war 30 years later | work=The Majalla: The Leading Arab Magazine | date=2010-11-02 | access-date=2022-02-15 | quote=These transcripts and documents show that Iraqi generals were ordered to invade Iran only days before the actual invasion took place. Caught completely unaware, the generals had only limited resources and could only execute the war as far as their logistical tethers would allow. This created problems in Baghdad, because the regime wanted its forces to advance, but its troops could not get enough supplies to the front to continue the assault. This completely debunks previous explanations for the start of the war that Saddam had intended to fight a limited war in order to physically retake the [[Shatt al-Arab]] river and establish a buffer zone to ensure Iraq's supremacy over the waterway. | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160502043945/http://eng.majalla.com/2010/11/article55178283 | archive-date=2016-05-02 | url-status=live}}</ref> According to Gibson, Iraq also kept its invasion plans secret from the Soviets, despite this being a violation of a 1972 treaty.<ref name="Gibson on Greenlight">{{cite book | last=Gibson | first=Bryan R. | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IPv7XdBmPDcC&q=Saddam+did+so+in+August+1980%2C+when+he+traveled+to+Saudi+Arabia+to+consult+with+King+Khalid+about+his+invasion+plans | title=Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 | publisher=[[ABC-Clio]] | year=2010 | isbn=978-0-313-38610-7 | pages=31–36}}</ref> Technically, Brands states that senior Iraqi official [[Tariq Aziz]] waited until September 21 to brief officials in [[Moscow]] about the invasion which would take place the next day, thereby remaining in formal compliance with the Soviet–Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation.<ref name="Brands" /> Thus, in Emery's view, "it is unlikely that the United States was ever in possession of clear evidence of Saddam's intention to invade Iran.&nbsp;... the disorganized and apparently impetuous nature of the invasion, with much of the Iraqi army still in garrison, and occurring in the context of border skirmishes and aggressive propaganda, muddied the waters for U.S. observers."<ref name="Emery" />
CIA analyst [[Bruce Riedel]] notes that U.S. intelligence officials closely monitored Soviet military exercises for an invasion of Iran throughout 1980.<ref>{{cite book | last1=Blight | first1=James G. | title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 | publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers | year=2012 | isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 | pages=20–21, 69–70 | quote='''[[Bruce Riedel]]:''' All through 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we got intercepted Soviet communications about a command post exercise for the invasion of Iran.&nbsp;... What you couldn't tell was if the Soviets were actually planning to invade, or whether this was just a planning exercise.&nbsp;... was this the first time they had done it, or did they do this every year but we just found out about it ''this'' year?}}</ref> The [[Oversight of United States covert operations#NSC Special Coordination Committee|Special Coordination Committee]] (SCC) of the U.S. [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] (NSC) was very concerned about preventing Soviet encroachment into Iran, a consideration which precluded the Carter administration from taking stronger measures against Iran in response to the hostage crisis. In September 1980, the SCC resolved to warn the Soviets that if they invaded Iran, it would be considered cause for war with the United States. In sum, as described by Brands, "the Carter administration's attention was elsewhere in the period preceding the invasion; at an NSC meeting on the [[Persian Gulf]] on 12 September, it was the possibility of a Soviet, not an Iraqi, invasion of Iran that occasioned preoccupation."<ref name="Brands" />
=== U.S. initial neutrality during the war ===
Once the war began, the [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter|Carter Administration]]'s policy was broadly neutral and included several actions that favored Iran, although these could also be seen as aimed primarily at preventing a wider war. While many U.S. officials were optimistic that limited Iraqi gains would force Iran to agree to an arms-for-hostages deal (this proved unnecessary because Iran purchased adequate arms and equipment from [[Syria]], [[Libya]], [[North Korea]], the [[Soviet Union]], and [[Israel]]), a consensus soon emerged that the war had ''disrupted'' whatever progress had been made during negotiations with [[Sadeq Tabatabaei]].<ref name="Emery" /> When Iraq unilaterally attempted to station [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23|MiG-23]] aircraft, helicopters, and special forces in several Persian Gulf states to use for operations against Iran, the Iraqi presence was initially tolerated in [[Oman]] and [[Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah|Ras al Khaimah]] of the [[United Arab Emirates]] (UAE), but U.S. officials, fearful of a regional conflict, "successfully pressured Omani and UAE officials to refuse Saddam's request," per Brands.<ref name="Emery" /><ref name="Brands" /> The State Department warned Saddam against annexing Iranian territory.<ref name="Brands" /> On October 3, Brzezinski advised Carter that "we should actively seek new contacts with Iran to explore the possibility of helping it just enough to put sufficient pressure on Iraq to pull back from most, if not all, its current acquisitions," citing the need "to safeguard Iran from Soviet penetration or internal disintegration."<ref name="Emery" /> The U.S. tried, unsuccessfully, to stop the flow of weapons from Jordan to Iraq. Despite this, the U.S. tolerated the provision of weapons and intelligence from [[Egypt]] to Iraq, in exchange for Iraq's assistance in ending the diplomatic isolation Egypt had endured as a result of its [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty|peace treaty with Israel]]. In addition, Emery states that the U.S. worked to ensure "that Iraq's ability to export [oil] through the Gulf&nbsp;... could be quickly restored after the cessation of hostilities".<ref name="Emery" /> According to Peter Hahn, "Carter first contemplated sending military aid to Iraq only in December, after he had lost the [[1980 United States presidential election|presidential election of 1980]]."<ref name="Hahn" />
Brands's analysis of U.S. archival documents suggests that U.S. officials were generally dismayed by Iraq's invasion, but Brzezinski may have been an exception. Sick recalled that "Zbig made no secret of the fact that he saw the Iraqi attack as a potentially positive development that would put pressure on Iran to release the hostages" in exchange for spare parts for Iran's largely U.S.-built military (yet Sick denied any foreknowledge of the invasion by Brzezinski). However, Brzezinski's plan was undermined, at least in the short-term, by Israel and [[Vietnam]] supplying the U.S.-origin spares that Iran needed. Brands considers it ironic that "the green light thesis&nbsp;... assumes that the Carter administration was clever enough to manoeuvre a dictator with a history of antipathy to the United States into a disastrous war, but clumsy enough that it failed to prevent an ally [Israel] from taking actions that would bankrupt the entire initiative."<ref name="Brands" />
[[File:Bush reagan.jpg|upright=0.9|right|thumb|President [[Ronald Reagan]] and Vice President [[George H. W. Bush]] work in the Oval Office of the White House, July 20, 1984.]]
In Emery's judgement, claims that the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]]'s later "tilt" in favor of Iraq was merely a continuation of Carter-era policies cannot be supported by available evidence: "The impetus for America to adjust its policy of neutrality, and take a definitive position on which side to back, came in 1982, when the Iranian military threatened to overrun Iraq."<ref name="Emery" /> In Carter's own account, "I despised Saddam Hussein, because he attacked Iran when my hostages were being held. It was President Reagan who established diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein after I left office."<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.democracynow.org/2007/9/10/fmr_president_jimmy_carter_on_palestine | title=Fmr. President Jimmy Carter on "Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid," Iraq, Greeting the Shah of Iran at the White House, Selling Weapons to Indonesia During the Occupation of East Timor, and More | work=[[Democracy Now!]] | date=2007-09-10 | access-date=2016-09-27 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160930115336/http://www.democracynow.org/2007/9/10/fmr_president_jimmy_carter_on_palestine | archive-date=2016-09-30 | url-status=live}}</ref> Gibson avers: "If Washington had any foreknowledge of the invasion, logic would suggest that the timing would be postponed until after the hostages were successfully released."<ref name="Gibson on Greenlight" /> Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods describe the green-light theory as having been "convincingly debunked," citing Gibson.<ref>{{cite book | last1=Murray | first1=Williamson | last2=Woods | first2=Kevin M. | title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History | chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] | year=2014 | isbn=978-1-107-06229-0 | pages=102–103 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> Hahn states that "there is no evidence to support the Iranian contention" that the U.S. helped instigate the conflict, finding several holes in this theory.<ref name="Hahn">{{cite book | last=Hahn | first=Peter | title=Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq Since World War I | publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] | year=2011 | isbn=978-0-19-533338-1 | pages=72–73 | quote=There is no evidence to support the Iranian contention that the Carter administration encouraged Hussein to invade Iran. As tensions increased during early 1980, Iran openly accused the United States of instigating an Iraqi assault, a charge that Carter strongly denied. 'We had no previous knowledge of nor influence over this move,' Carter wrote in his memoirs about a reported Iraqi threat to invade Iran in April 1980, 'but Iran was blaming us for it nevertheless.'  As the scholar Bruce Jentleson notes, it seems unlikely that Carter—having staked his domestic political reputation to his ability to resolve the Iran hostage crisis—would have supported Iraqi aggression that complicated his mission to liberate the hostages either in the military rescue mission of April 1980 or in the diplomatic initiatives launched later in the year. Indeed, in mid-September, U.S. officials negotiated terms of a hostage release deal with Sadegh Tabatabai, an Iranian emissary who agreed to present the terms favorably to Khomeini. But the Iraqi invasion of September 22 delayed Tabatabai's return to Tehran and thereafter distracted the Khomeini regime from considering the terms. The U.S. president also expressed fears that the invasion would imperil the lives of the hostages or envelop other Gulf states. Carter first contemplated sending military aid to Iraq only in December, after he had lost the [[1980 United States presidential election|presidential election of 1980]].}}</ref> Brands concludes: "There is no hard evidence that a green light was given, while there is substantial documentary proof that the Carter administration neither expected nor welcomed the war."<ref name="Brands" />
As of 2012, no reference to an agreement with the U.S. regarding the invasion of Iran has been found in available Iraqi archives. To the contrary, in an October 17, 1980 meeting Aziz was recorded worrying that "Khomeini may not support it, but for his hatred of us he will accept [U.S. support] over an agreement with us," and in the same meeting Saddam speculated that U.S. [[airborne early warning and control]] systems (AWACs) supplied to Saudi Arabia were being used to spy on Iraq: "They are monitoring the operations zone and we do not feel safe from such a procedure&nbsp;... We are afraid that the information collected will go [to] the Iranians in one way or another."<ref name="Brands" /> Regardless of whether the U.S. provided any express green-light to Saddam, Iranians continue to view the failure of the [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) to condemn Iraq's invasion—or to recognize Iraq as the aggressor until after Iraq's [[invasion of Kuwait]] nearly a decade later—as a form of tacit complicity in Iraq's aggression against Iran—not just on the part of the U.S., but the entire world.<ref>{{cite book | last1=Blight | first1=James G. | title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 | year=2012 | publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers | isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 | display-authors=etal | pages=71–82, 261–262}}</ref><ref>cf. the view of former Iranian official [[Seyed Hossein Mousavian]]: {{cite book | author-link1=Seyed Hossein Mousavian | last1=Mousavian | first1=Seyed Hossein | last2=Shahidsaless | first2=Shahir | title=Iran and the United States: An Insider's View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace | publisher=[[Bloomsbury Publishing]] | year=2015 | isbn=978-1-5013-1206-9 | page=82 | quote=In any case, Iran's assessment was based on what they witnessed, not on any knowledge of secret talks. To them, the fact that the US government did not condemn Iraq's invasion, recognize it as a breach of international law and an act of aggression, nor call for the evacuation of Iraqi troops from occupied lands in Iran was clear proof that the Americans backed Iraq's invasion.}}</ref>
== Support ==
=== U.S. shift towards backing Iraq by 1982 ===
By mid-1982, the war's momentum had shifted decisively in favor of Iran, which [[Operation Ramadan|invaded Iraq]] to depose Saddam's government.<ref name="Byrne" /><ref>cf. {{cite web | last=Tanner | first=Henry | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/world/iran-says-iraqis-withdrawal-won-t-end-war.html | title=Iran Says Iraqis' Withdrawal Won't End War | work=[[The New York Times]] | date=1982-06-22 | access-date=2016-12-10 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171023202305/http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/world/iran-says-iraqis-withdrawal-won-t-end-war.html | archive-date=2017-10-23 | url-status=live}}</ref> Riedel recounted: "You just had a series of ''catastrophic'' Iraqi defeats. They had been driven out of Iran, and the Iraqi army looked like it was falling apart."<ref name="Blight">{{cite book | last1=Blight | first1=James G. | title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 | year=2012 | publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers | isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 | display-authors=etal | pages=97, 112–119, 362}}</ref> "The Reagan administration feared that Iran's army might slice through Iraq to the oilfields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia," as described by Judith Yaphe;<ref name="Yaphe">{{cite book | last=Yaphe | first=Judith | title=The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives | chapter=Changing American Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq war | publisher=[[Routledge]] | year=2013 | isbn=978-0-415-68524-5}}</ref> [[Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs|Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs]] [[Nicholas A. Veliotes]] "outlined a nightmare scenario in which the Iranians invade Iraq, they defeat Iraq, and then head straight for Israel, which is distracted and debilitated by its ongoing [[1982 Lebanon War|adventure in Lebanon]]." As a result, the U.S. gradually abandoned its policy of neutrality.<ref name="Blight" /> Hiltermann says that the U.S. "began the tilt after Iraq, the aggressor in the war, was expelled from Iranian territory by a resurgent Iran, which then decided to pursue its own, fruitless version of regime change in Baghdad."<ref name="America didn't seem to mind" />
{{Events leading to the Iraq War}}
In February 1982, Iraq was removed from the [[United States Department of State|State Department]]'s list of [[State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list)|State Sponsors of Terrorism]] to ease the transfer of [[dual-use technology]] to that country.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/13/world/confrontation-gulf-us-aid-helped-hussein-s-climb-now-critics-say-bill-due.html Confrontation in the Gulf; U.S. Aid Helped Hussein's Climb; Now, Critics Say, the Bill Is Due] ''The New York Times'', 13 August 1990.</ref><ref name="nsarchiv" /> According to investigative journalist [[Alan Friedman]], Haig was "upset at the fact that the decision had been made at the White House, even though the State Department was responsible for the list." "I was not consulted," Haig is said to have complained.<ref name=spidersweb />
In March, President Reagan signed National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 4–82—seeking "a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East"—and in June Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) co-written by Teicher, who was now at the NSC, which determined: "The United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran."<ref name="Yaphe" /><ref name="nsarchiv" /> Pursuant to this Directive, [[Thomas Twetten]] arrived in [[Baghdad]] on July 27 to share CIA satellite imagery on Iranian troop movements with the Iraqi [[Iraqi Intelligence Service|Mukhabarat]]. This was "the first U.S. provision of intelligence to Iraq," and sparked a short-lived debate over whether Iraq would tolerate a CIA presence in the country: Mukhabarat head [[Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti|Barzan Tikriti]] told Twetten to "get the hell out of Iraq," but Iraqi military intelligence—"having already drooled over it and having said repeatedly how valuable it was"—subsequently informed Twetten "we'll continue to look at your information, and we'll assess whether it is of use to us in any way."<ref name="Blight" /> The US government supplied Iraq with satellite photos showing Iranian deployments,<ref>{{cite news | last=Dickey, Christopher | first=Thomas, Evan | date=22 September 2002 | title=How Saddam Happened | url=http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2002/09/22/how-saddam-happened.html | url-status=dead | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111213041515/http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2002/09/22/how-saddam-happened.html | archive-date=13 December 2011 | access-date=20 August 2011 | newspaper=Newsweek}}</ref> which were later deemed to be misleading intelligence information designed to prolong the war with Iran and increase US influence in the region, contributing to the Iraqi defeat in the [[First Battle of al-Faw]] in February 1986.<ref>{{Cite news | last=Times | first=Special to the New York | date=19 January 1987 | title=IRAQ ASCRIBES A KEY DEFEAT IN '86 TO MISINFORMATION FROM THE U.S. | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/19/world/iraq-ascribes-a-key-defeat-in-86-to-misinformation-from-the-us.html | access-date=17 February 2024 | work=The New York Times | language=en-US | issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
Reports of Iraq's use of [[Iraqi chemical weapons program|chemical weapons]] against Iran reached the CIA as early as 1983, but the U.S. took no action to restrain Iraq's violations of [[international law]], failing even to alert the UN.<ref>{{cite web | last1=Harris | first1=Shane | last2=Aid | first2=Matthew M. | url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/ | title=Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran | work=[[Foreign Policy]] | date=2013-08-26 | access-date=2017-05-07 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140915042349/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/25/secret_cia_files_prove_america_helped_saddam_as_he_gassed_iran?page=0%2C2 | archive-date=2014-09-15 | url-status=live}}</ref> By November 1983, the State Department had been briefed on Iraq's "almost daily use of [chemical weapons]".<ref name="Dobbs 2002" />
=== Normalization of relations and covert support ===
In late 1983, Reagan selected [[Donald Rumsfeld]] as his envoy to the Middle East; Rumsfeld met Saddam in Baghdad in December 1983 and March 1984. "On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored [[Iraq–United States relations|diplomatic relations]]."<ref name="nsarchiv" /> The U.S. reportedly sought to normalize relations with Iraq in late 1983, but Saddam did not agree until 1984.<ref name="Dobbs 2002" />
According to Teicher's 1995 affidavit and separate interviews with former Reagan and Bush administration officials, the CIA secretly directed armaments and hi-tech components to Iraq through false fronts and friendly third parties such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait, and they quietly encouraged rogue arms dealers and other [[Private military company|private military companies]] to do the same:
<blockquote>[T]he United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat ... The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.<ref name="teicher">[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf Statement by former NSC official Howard Teicher] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120526041432/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf |date=2012-05-26 }} to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. [https://archive.today/20121223092544/http://www.overcast.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/print/spidersweb/teicher.htm Plain text version]</ref></blockquote>
[[File:Shakinghands high.OGG|thumb|thumbtime=05|[[Donald Rumsfeld]] meets Saddam Hussein on 19–20 December 1983. Rumsfeld visited again on 24 March 1984, the day the UN reported that Iraq had used [[mustard gas]] and [[Tabun (nerve agent)|tabun]] nerve agent against Iranian troops. The ''NY Times'' reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name."<ref name="nsarchiv">Battle, Joyce. [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980–1983] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120204034420/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm |date=2012-02-04 }}, ''National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82''. George Washington University National Security Archive, February 25, 2003.</ref>]]The full extent of these covert transfers is not yet known. Teicher's files on the subject are held securely at the [[Ronald Reagan Presidential Library]] and many other Reagan-era documents that could help shine new light on the subject remain classified.<ref name="Dobbs 2002">{{cite news | last=Dobbs | first=Michael | url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/12/30/us-had-key-role-in-iraq-buildup/133cec74-3816-4652-9bd8-7d118699d6f8/ | title=U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup | newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] | date=2002-12-30 | access-date=2022-05-26}}</ref> Teicher would also, under threat of a grand jury indictment for possibly violating his national security oath due to his disclosures, sign an affidavit retracting everything he had said.<ref>{{Cite web | last=Hibbard | first=Justin | date=2 March 2003 | title=THE CHILEAN CONNECTION / Carlos Cardoen – arms dealer to Iraq, former friend of the U.S. government, and now fugitive – still lines his pockets with profits from our appetite for wine | url=https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php | access-date=2023-06-17 | website=SFGATE | language=en-US}}</ref>
[[File:President Ronald Reagan and Tariq Aziz.jpg|right|thumb|[[Ronald Reagan]] hosts then-Iraqi foreign minister [[Tariq Aziz]] of the Saddam Hussein administration at the White House, 1984]]
About two of every seven licenses for the export of "dual use" technology items approved between 1985 and 1990 by the U.S. Department of Commerce "went either directly to the Iraqi armed forces, to Iraqi end-users engaged in weapons production, or to Iraqi enterprises suspected of diverting technology" to weapons of mass destruction, according to an investigation by [[United States House Committee on Financial Services|House Banking Committee]] Chairman [[Henry B. Gonzalez]]. Confidential Commerce Department files also reveal that the Reagan and Bush administrations approved at least 80 direct exports to the [[Iraqi security forces|Iraqi military]]. These included computers, communications equipment, aircraft navigation and radar equipment.<ref>Smith, R. Jeffrey. [https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/74038683.html?dids=74038683:74038683&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&fmac=&date=Jul+22%2C+1992&author=R.+Jeffrey+Smith&desc=Dozens+of+U.S.+Items+Used+in+Iraq+Arms Dozens of U.S. Items Used in Iraq Arms] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121008200551/http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/74038683.html?dids=74038683:74038683&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&fmac=&date=Jul+22,+1992&author=R.+Jeffrey+Smith&desc=Dozens+of+U.S.+Items+Used+in+Iraq+Arms |date=2012-10-08 }}, ''Washington Post''. July 22, 1992.</ref>
In conformance with the [[Presidential directive]], the U.S. began providing tactical battlefield advice to the Iraqi Army. "The prevailing view", says Alan Friedman, "was that if Washington wanted to prevent an Iranian victory, it would have to share some of its more sensitive intelligence photography with Saddam."<ref name=spidersweb />
<blockquote>At times, thanks to the White House's secret backing for the intelligence-sharing, U.S. intelligence officers were actually sent to Baghdad to help interpret the satellite information. As the White House took an increasingly active role in secretly helping Saddam direct his armed forces, the United States even built an expensive high-tech annex in Baghdad to provide a direct down-link receiver for the satellite intelligence and better processing of the information ...<ref name=spidersweb />{{rp|27}}<br /><br />
The American military commitment that had begun with intelligence-sharing expanded rapidly and surreptitiously throughout the Iran–Iraq War. A former White House official explained that "by 1987, our people were actually providing tactical military advice to the Iraqis in the battlefield, and sometimes they would find themselves over the Iranian border, alongside Iraqi troops."<ref name=spidersweb />{{rp|38}}</blockquote>
Iraq used this data to target Iranian positions with chemical weapons, says ambassador Galbraith.<ref name="galbraith">Galbraith, Peter W. "[https://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/08/31/the_true_iraq_appeasers?mode=PF The true Iraq appeasers] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090915222423/http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/08/31/the_true_iraq_appeasers?mode=PF |date=2009-09-15 }}, ''The Boston Globe''. August 31, 2006.</ref>
[[File:Mk84bomb.png|upright=0.9|thumb|left|The [[Mark 84 bomb|MK-84]]: Saudi Arabia transferred to Iraq hundreds of U.S.-made general-purpose "dumb bombs".<ref name=spidersweb />]]According to retired [[United States Army|Army]] [[Colonel]] [[W. Patrick Lang]], senior defense intelligence officer for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose."<ref>Tyler, Patrick E. [https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/18/world/officers-say-us-aided-iraq-in-war-despite-use-of-gas.html Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630202109/http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/18/world/officers-say-us-aided-iraq-in-war-despite-use-of-gas.html |date=2017-06-30 }} ''New York Times'' August 18, 2002.</ref> Lang disclosed that more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments. He cautioned that the DIA "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival." The Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports affirming the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.<ref>Pear, Robert. [https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/15/world/us-says-it-monitored-iraqi-messages-on-gas.html U.S. Says It Monitored Iraqi Messages on Gas] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130025429/http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/15/world/us-says-it-monitored-iraqi-messages-on-gas.html |date=2018-01-30 }}, ''New York Times''. September 15, 1988.</ref><ref>Chadwick, Alex & Shuster, Mike. [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4859238 U.S. Links to Saddam During Iran–Iraq War] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180226122547/https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4859238 |date=2018-02-26 }} ''National Public Radio''. September 22, 2005.</ref>
Hiltermann says that when the Iraqi military turned its chemical weapons on the Kurds during the war, killing approximately 5,000 people in the town of Halabja and injuring thousands more, the Reagan administration sought to obscure Iraqi leadership culpability by suggesting, inaccurately, that the [[Halabja massacre#Allegations of Iranian involvement|Iranians were partially responsible for the attack]].<ref name="America didn't seem to mind">[[Joost Hiltermann|Hiltermann, Joost R.]] [http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/01/17/edjoost_ed3_.php Halabja: America didn't seem to mind poison gas] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051019230334/http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/01/17/edjoost_ed3_.php |date=2005-10-19 }}, ''International Herald tribune''. January 17, 2003.</ref>
=== Forms of U.S. support ===
==== Bear Spares ====
With the UN-imposed embargo on warring parties, and with the Soviet Union opposing the conflict, Iraqi engineers found it increasingly difficult to repair and replace hardware damaged in battle.<ref>{{cite AV media | quote=The Iraqis used mostly Soviet-made equipment, and because the Russians were honoring the arms embargo, the Iraqis were about to run out of ammunition. | people=Martin, Terrence L. & Reid, Rob (executive producers) | title=Merchants of Death | publisher=Discovery Channel Productions | date=July 12, 1999 | id=[[TCM Movie Database]]:[https://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/title/472132/merchants-of-death/ 472132] {{QID|Q131761773}}}}</ref><ref>"Egypt had purchased great quantities of Soviet weaponry throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and it still had large stockpiles of Soviet ammunition, spare parts, rocket launchers, and aircraft. ... Only days after the Soviet Union imposed the embargo in late September 1980, [Anwar] Sadat conferred with the Carter administration, then announced that Egypt would sell Iraq $1 billion worth of Soviet arms." Timmerman, Kenneth R. ''The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq'', p 86.</ref> According to [[Kenneth R. Timmerman]], "Saddam did foresee one immediate consequence of his invasion of Iran: the suspension of arms supplies from the USSR."<ref name="deathlobby" />
<blockquote>When he launched his attack, the Soviets were busy playing games in Iran. They were not amused that the Iraqis upset their plans. For generations the KGB had been working to penetrate Iran's Shiite clergy. In February 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini took power and threw the Americans out of Iran, the Soviets stood to gain more than they had ever believed possible. ... KGB boss [[Yuri Andropov]] [had] little difficulty in convincing [[Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev]] and [[Alexei Kosygin|Kosygin]] to agree to an embargo on arms to Iraq ... <sup>p. 83-84</sup></blockquote>
According to Howard Teicher, the United States assisted Iraq through a military aid program known as "Bear Spares", whereby the U.S. military "made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs."<ref name="teicher" /> According to Teicher's 1995 court affidavit:
<blockquote>If the "Bear Spares" were manufactured outside the United States, then the U.S. could arrange for the provision of these weapons to a third country without direct involvement. Israel, for example, had a very large stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition captured during its various wars. At the suggestion of the United States, the Israelis would transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries ... Similarly, Egypt manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs and provided these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other countries.<ref name="teicher" /></blockquote>
==== Dual-use exports ====
[[File:Bacillus anthracis Gram.jpg|upright=0.9|thumb|right|Iraq purchased 8 strains of [[anthrax]] from the United States in 1985, according to British biological weapons expert [[David Kelly (weapons expert)|David Kelly]].<ref>Lauria, Joe. [http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/2001/1022iraq.htm Iraq Purchased Anthrax From US Company] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150814143929/https://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/2001/1022iraq.htm |date=2015-08-14 }}, ''Vancouver Sun''. October 22, 2001.</ref> The Iraqi military settled on the American Type Culture Collection strain 14578 as the exclusive strain for use as a biological weapon, according to [[Charles Duelfer]].<ref>Duelfer, Charles. [http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol3.pdf Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121015180912/http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol3.pdf |date=October 15, 2012 }}, 30 September 2004, Vol 3, "Biological Warfare", p.21.</ref>]]
On February 9, 1994, Senator Riegle delivered a report—commonly known as the [[Riegle Report]]—in which it was stated that "pathogenic (meaning 'disease producing'), toxigenic (meaning 'poisonous'), and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the [[U.S. Department of Commerce]]." It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction."<ref>U.S. Senate Banking Committee. [http://www.gulfwarvets.com/arison/banking.htm Second Staff Report on U.S. CBW-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161130023512/http://www.gulfwarvets.com/arison/banking.htm |date=2016-11-30 }}, May 25, 1994.</ref> The report then detailed 70 shipments (including [[Bacillus anthracis|anthrax]]) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."<ref>Riegle, Jr., Donald W. [http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/riegle1.html U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120706121855/http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/riegle1.html |date=2012-07-06 }}, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May 25, 1994.</ref>
[[Donald W. Riegle, Jr.|Donald Riegle]], Chairman of the [[U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs|Senate committee]] that authored the aforementioned [[Riegle Report]], said:
<blockquote>U.N. inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programs. ... The executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think that is a devastating record.</blockquote>
The [[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention|U.S. Centers for Disease Control]] sent Iraq 14 separate agents "with biological warfare significance," according to Riegle's investigators.<ref>Drury, Tom. [http://www.sptimes.com/2003/03/16/news_pf/Perspective/How_Iraq_built_its_we.shtml How Iraq built its weapons programs, with a little help from its friends] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170323122057/http://www.sptimes.com/2003/03/16/news_pf/Perspective/How_Iraq_built_its_we.shtml |date=2017-03-23 }}, ''St. Petersburg Times''. March 16, 2003.</ref>
==== Combat planning and battlefield intelligence ====
More than 60 US [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] officers provided combat planning assistance, and the US also provided battlefield intelligence including satellite pictures to Saddam Hussein's military.<ref>[[National Security Archive]], 31 Jan. 1995, Declaration of Howard Teicher before the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida [www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf]</ref><ref>National Public Radio, 22 Sept. 2005, [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4859238 "U.S. Links to Saddam During Iran-Iraq War"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180226122547/https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4859238 |date=2018-02-26 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book | last1=Robert | first1=Fisk | title=The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East | date=2005 | publisher=Fourth Estate | location=England}}</ref>
==== Diplomatic support ====
In 1984, Iran introduced a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council, citing the [[Geneva Protocol]] of 1925, condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons on the battlefield. In response, the United States instructed its delegate at the UN to lobby friendly representatives in support of a motion to take "no decision" on the use of chemical munitions by Iraq. If backing to obstruct the resolution could be won, then the U.S. delegation were to proceed and vote in favour of taking zero action; if support were not forthcoming, the U.S. delegate were to refrain from voting altogether.
<blockquote>USDEL should work to develop general Western position in support of a motion to take "no decision" on Iranian draft resolution on use of chemical weapons by Iraq. If such a motion gets reasonable and broad support and sponsorship, USDEL should vote in favor. Failing Western support for "no decision," USDEL should abstain.<ref>Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations. "[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq47.pdf UN Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140628160242/http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq47.pdf |date=2014-06-28 }}," March 14, 1984.</ref></blockquote>
Representatives of the United States argued that the UN Human Rights Commission was an "inappropriate forum" for consideration of such abuses. According to Joyce Battle, the Security Council eventually issued a "presidential statement" condemning the use of unconventional weapons "without naming Iraq as the offending party."<ref name="nsarchiv" /> In 1988, Iraqi Foreign Minister [[Tariq Aziz]] acknowledged [[Iraqi chemical attacks against Iran|Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran]], but said that Iran had used them against Iraq first.<ref>{{Cite news | last1=Schmemann | first1=Serge | last2=Times | first2=Special To the New York | date=2 July 1988 | title=Iraq Acknowledges Its Use of Gas But Says Iran Introduced It in War | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/02/world/iraq-acknowledges-its-use-of-gas-but-says-iran-introduced-it-in-war.html | access-date=16 February 2024 | work=The New York Times | language=en-US | issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
== Parties involved ==
According to Russ Baker, writing in the ''Columbia Journalism Review'', a "vast network" based in the U.S. and elsewhere, fed Iraq's warring capabilities right up until August 1990, when Saddam invaded Kuwait.<ref name=Baker1993 />
=== Sarkis Soghanalian ===
[[File:McDonnell Douglas MD 500 Defender 3-view line drawing.png|upright=0.9|thumb|right|[[MD 500 Defender]]: Iraq acquired 60 multi-role military helicopters directly from the United States in 1983. Additional helicopter sales prompted congressional opposition, forcing the Reagan administration to explore alternative ways of assisting Saddam.<ref name=spidersweb />]]Alan Friedman writes that [[Sarkis Soghanalian]], one of the most notorious arms dealers during the [[Cold War]], procured Eastern Bloc and French origin weaponry, and brokered vast deals with Iraq, with the tacit approval of the Central Intelligence Agency.<ref name=spidersweb />
<blockquote>The most prominent [arms merchant] was Sarkis Soghanalian, a Miami-based former CIA contractor who brokered tens of billions of dollars' worth of military hardware for Iraq during the 1980s, reporting many of his transactions to officials in Washington. [Soghanalian] was close to the Iraqi leadership and to intelligence officers and others in the Reagan administration. In many respects he was the living embodiment of [[plausible deniability]], serving as a key conduit for CIA and other U.S. government operations.<sup>p. 36</sup></blockquote>
In an interview with William Kistner, Soghanalian stated that he was "working closely with the U.S. government".<ref name ="frontline">Kistner, William. [https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/soghanalian.html The Cold War's largest arms merchant] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180724044655/http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/soghanalian.html |date=2018-07-24 }}. PBS ''Frontline''. March 2001</ref> According to Timmerman, Soghanalian also helped the Iraqis obtain [[BGM-71 TOW|TOW anti-tank missiles]], for which he was later prosecuted by the United States Department of Justice.<ref name="deathlobby" />
=== Banca Nazionale del Lavoro ===
The "Iraqgate" scandal revealed that a branch of Italy's smallest bank, [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] (BNL), in [[Atlanta, Georgia]] relied partially on U.S. government-guaranteed loans to funnel $5&nbsp;billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] agents raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, branch manager Christopher Drogoul was charged with making unauthorized, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq – some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.<ref name="FAS">{{Cite magazine | title=The Administration's Iraq Gate Scandal | first=William | last=Safire | date=19 May 1992 | work=Congressional Record | url=http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992/h920519l.htm | access-date=15 July 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513124339/http://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992/h920519l.htm | archive-date=13 May 2016 | url-status=live}}</ref> According to classified U.S. government documents obtained by the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', several federal agencies "issued warnings of serious irregularities with the program," including that the loan guarantees allowed Iraq to purchase arms. "Iraqi officials&nbsp;... acknowledged that the Department of Agriculture funds had been diverted for military purposes," however "evidence of improprieties was largely ignored." [[George H. W. Bush]], "first as vice president and then as President, intervened repeatedly over a period of almost a decade to obtain special assistance for Saddam Hussein—financial aid as well as access to high-tech equipment that was critical to Iraq's quest for nuclear and chemical arms." As late as October 1989, President Bush authorized $1 billion in loan guarantees to Iraq, although this was reduced to $400 million after several senior Iraqi officials were implicated in the BNL scandal.<ref>{{Cite web | last1=Frantz | first1=Douglas | last2=Waas | first2=Murray | date=25 February 1992 | title=U.S. Loans Indirectly Financed Iraq Military : Foreign aid: Baker pushed through agriculture credits that helped Hussein free up money for arms. | url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-02-25-mn-2628-story.html | access-date= | website=Los Angeles Times | language=en-US}}</ref> An investigation by the [[Presidency of Bill Clinton|Clinton administration]] concluded "We did not find evidence that U.S. agencies or officials illegally armed Iraq or that crimes were committed through bartering of [U.S. agricultural] commodities for military equipment".<ref>{{Cite news | date=1995-03-20 | title=Opinion {{!}} Making a Scandal Where None Exists | language=en-US | work=The New York Times | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/20/opinion/l-making-a-scandal-where-none-exists-325095.html | access-date=2023-12-21 | issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
According to the ''[[Financial Times]]'', the companies involved in the scandal by shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq were [[Hewlett-Packard]], [[Tektronix]], and [[Arms-to-Iraq|Matrix Churchill]]'s [[Ohio]] branch.<ref name=Baker1993>{{cite web | url=http://www.russbaker.com/archives/CJR%20-%20Iraqgate,%20by%20Russ%20W_%20Baker.htm | last=Baker | first=Russ W. | title=Iraq-gate: The Big One That (Almost) Got Away | work=Columbia Journalism Review | date=March 1993 | access-date=2012-11-08 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121105210925/http://www.russbaker.com/archives/CJR%20-%20Iraqgate,%20by%20Russ%20W_%20Baker.htm | archive-date=2012-11-05 | url-status=live}}</ref>
Even before the [[Gulf War|Persian Gulf War]] started in 1990, the ''Intelligencer Journal'' of Pennsylvania in a string of articles reported: "If U.S. and Iraqi troops engage in combat in the Persian Gulf, weapons technology developed in Lancaster and indirectly sold to Iraq will probably be used against U.S. forces ... And aiding in this ... technology transfer was the Iraqi-owned, British-based precision tooling firm Matrix Churchill, whose U.S. operations in Ohio were recently linked to a sophisticated Iraqi weapons procurement network."<ref name=Baker1993 />
"One entire facility, a tungsten-carbide manufacturing plant that was part of the Al Atheer complex," Kenneth Timmerman informed the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, "was blown up by the IAEA in April 1992 because it lay at the heart of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program, PC-3. Equipment for this plant appears to have been supplied by the Latrobe, Pennsylvania manufacturer, Kennametal, and by a large number of other American companies, with financing provided by the Atlanta branch of the BNL bank."<ref>Timmerman, Kenneth R. "Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs", October 27, 1992.</ref>
Aside from the ''New York Times'', the ''Los Angeles Times'', and ABC's Ted Koppel, the Iraq-gate story never picked up much momentum, even though the U.S. Congress became involved with the scandal. See an article by journalist [[William Safire]], introduced into the ''[[Congressional Record]]'' by Rep. [[Tom Lantos]].<ref name=FAS />
By contrast, Alcolac International, a Maryland company, transported [[thiodiglycol]], a [[mustard gas]] precursor, to Iraq. Alcolac was successfully prosecuted for its violations of export control law.
=== Index of American companies ===
According to German daily newspaper ''[[Die Tageszeitung]]'', which is reported to have reviewed an uncensored copy of Iraq's 11,000-page declaration to the [[UN Security Council|U.N. Security Council]] in 2002, almost 150 foreign companies supported Saddam Hussein's [[Weapons of mass destruction|WMD]] program. Twenty-four U.S. firms were involved in exporting materials to Baghdad.<ref>Paterson, Tony. [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/leaked-report-says-german-and-us-firms-supplied-arms-to-saddam-611332.html Leaked Report Says German and US Firms Supplied Arms to Saddam] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081211162243/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/leaked-report-says-german-and-us-firms-supplied-arms-to-saddam-611332.html |date=2008-12-11 }} ''The Independent''. December 18, 2002.</ref> An even longer list of American companies and their involvements in Iraq was provided by the ''LA Weekly'' in May 2003.<ref>Crogan, Joe. [http://www.laweekly.com/2003-05-01/news/made-in-the-usa-part-iii-the-dishonor-roll Made in the USA, Part III: The Dishonor Roll] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110619081724/http://www.laweekly.com/2003-05-01/news/made-in-the-usa-part-iii-the-dishonor-roll/ |date=2011-06-19 }}, ''LA Weekly''. May 01, 2003.</ref>
== Energy development and security ==
=== Aqaba pipeline project ===
[[File:Rafinerija.jpg|upright=0.9|thumb|right]]
The United States government supported the construction of a new oil pipeline that would run westward from Iraq across the land to the Jordanian port city of [[Aqaba]], permitting access from the Red Sea. The [[Bechtel]] Corporation was the prime contractor for this project. Donald Rumsfeld discussed the advantages of the pipeline personally with Saddam Hussein in 1983. The Aqaba project never made it past the drawing board, however, because of its proximity to Israel, which planners insisted upon. So near to the border it would run, the Iraqi leadership feared the Israeli side could disable the pipeline at a later date, simply by "lobbing a few hand grenades" at it.<ref name="deathlobby" />
=== Tanker War and U.S. military involvement ===
The [[Tanker War]] started when Iraq attacked Iranian tankers and the oil terminal at [[Kharg Island|Kharg]] island in 1984. Iran struck back by attacking tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait and then any tanker of the Persian Gulf states supporting Iraq. Both nations attacked oil tankers and merchant ships, including those of neutral nations, in an effort to deprive the opponent of trade. After repeated Iraqi attacks on Iran's main exporting facility on [[Bushehr Province#Kharg Island (Khark Island)|Khark Island]], Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker near [[Bahrain]] on May 13, 1984, and a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on May 16. Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, and this phase of the war was dubbed the "Tanker War."
[[Lloyd's of London]], a British insurance market, estimated that the Tanker War damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian mariners. The largest of attacks were directed by Iran against Kuwaiti vessels, and on November 1, 1986, Kuwait formally petitioned foreign powers to protect its shipping. The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the [[United States Navy]] offered to provide protection for tankers [[flag of convenience|flying the U.S. flag]] on March 7, 1987. [[Operation Prime Chance]] was a United States Special Operations Command operation intended to protect U.S.-flagged oil tankers from Iranian attack. The operation took place roughly at the same time as [[Operation Earnest Will]], the largely Navy effort to escort the tankers through the Persian Gulf.[[File:Hellenic Navy AB-212 ASW (1).JPG|upright=0.9|thumb|left|[[UH-1N Twin Huey|Agusta-Bell 212 ASW]]: The Italian subsidiary of [[Bell Helicopter|Bell Textron]] sold Iraq military helicopters fitted out for [[anti-submarine warfare]]. This deal needed, and duly received, government approval.<ref name="deathlobby" />]] Under international law, an attack on such ships would be treated as an attack on the U.S., allowing the U.S. to retaliate militarily. This support would protect ships headed to Iraqi ports, effectively guaranteeing Iraq's revenue stream for the duration of the war.
Special Operations Forces also assisted in this effort. The [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment]] operated [[MH-6 Little Bird|AH-6]] helicopters from a large barge anchored at sea. A second platform was flown by Special Forces from Fort Bragg, piloting [[OH-58D]]s. "These things looked extremely sinister. They were all black and bristling with antennas and had a huge round sight module about two feet in diameter stuck on a mast above the rotor blades. ... The impression you got, just looking at one of these things on the ground, was of a giant insect staring at you before you die", a Special Forces officer is quoted as saying.<ref name="spidersweb" />
On April 14, 1988, the frigate USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'' was badly damaged by an Iranian mine. U.S. forces responded with [[Operation Praying Mantis]] on April 18, the United States Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian ships were destroyed, killing 55 sailors in the process, and an American helicopter was shot down, killing the two pilots.<ref name="nohigherhonor" />
A number of researchers and former military personnel contend that the United States carried out [[Black operations]] against Iranian military targets during the war. Lt. Col. Roger Charles, who worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, says the Navy used specially equipped Mark III patrol boats during the night, with the intent of [[Q-ships|luring Iranian gunboats]] away from territorial waters, where they could be fired upon and destroyed. "They took off at night and rigged up false running lights so that from a distance it would appear there was a merchant ship, which the Iranians would want to inspect."<ref name="spidersweb" />
Information collected from [[Operation Eager Glacier]], a top-secret intelligence-gathering program, was also used to bomb manufacturing plants inside Iran by the CIA.<ref name="spidersweb" />
==== The USS ''Stark'' incident ====
An Iraqi jet fighter mistakenly attacked the [[USS Stark (FFG-31)|USS ''Stark'']] in May 1987, killing 37 servicemen and injuring 21.<ref name=ROE>{{cite journal | journal=Military Law Review | volume=143 | date=Winter 1994 | title=Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering | first=Mark S. | last=Martins | pages=43–46 | url=https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/27687D~1.pdf | access-date=2017-12-29 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172209/http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/27687D~1.pdf | archive-date=2017-10-11 | url-status=live}}</ref> But attention in Washington was on isolating Iran; accepting Saddam's apology for the error, the White House criticized Iran's mining of international waters, and in October 1987, the U.S. attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker [[MV Sea Isle City|''Sea Isle City'']].<ref name="nohigherhonor">Peniston, Bradley. ''[http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-stark.shtml No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120622121924/http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-stark.shtml |date=2012-06-22 }}'', Naval Institute Press. 2006.</ref>
=== Longer term interests ===
In response to [[Iran–Iraq War#Operation Mersad and end of the war|further Iraqi chemical attacks on Kurdish civilians]] after the August 1988 ceasefire with Iran, U.S. [[United States Senate|senators]] [[Claiborne Pell]] and [[Jesse Helms]] called for comprehensive economic [[sanctions against Iraq]], including an oil embargo and severe limitations on the export of dual-use technology. Although the ensuing legislation passed in the U.S. Senate, it faced strong opposition within the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] and did not become law. In a rare rebuke, Secretary of State [[George Shultz]] condemned Iraq's "unjustified and abhorrent" attacks, which Shultz's assistant [[Charles E. Redman]] characterized as "unacceptable to the civilized world." Even after these pronouncements, however, the State Department advised against sanctions.<ref>{{cite book | author-link=Elaine Sciolino | last=Sciolino | first=Elaine | title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis | publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]] | year=1991 | isbn=978-0-471-54299-5 | page=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/171 171]}}</ref>
In October 1989, President Bush signed NSD 26, which begins, "Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security." With respect to Iraq, the directive stated, "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Persian Gulf and the Middle East."<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf | title=National Security Directive 26 | access-date=2006-10-12 | date=1989-10-02 | publisher=The White House | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030318074048/http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf | archive-date=2003-03-18 | url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | author-link=Elaine Sciolino | last=Sciolino | first=Elaine | title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis | publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]] | year=1991 | isbn=978-0-471-54299-5 | pages=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/172 172]-[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/173 173]}}</ref>
== See also ==
{{div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[CIA activities in Iraq]]
* [[International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War]]
* [[Iran Air Flight 655]]
* [[Iran–Contra affair]]
* [[Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict]]
* [[Operation Staunch]] was created in spring 1983 by the United States State Department to stop the illicit flow of U.S. arms to Iran.
* [[Soviet support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war]]
* [[Italian support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war]]
{{div col end}}
== References ==
{{reflist}}
== Sources ==
*{{cite journal | author-link=Mark J. Gasiorowski | last=Gasiorowski | first=Mark J. | url=http://www2.tulane.edu/liberal-arts/political-science/upload/gasioroski-MEJfall2012.pdf | title=US Intelligence Assistance to Iran, May–October 1979 | journal=[[The Middle East Journal]] | volume=66 | issue=4 | date=Fall 2012 | pages=613–627 | doi=10.3751/66.4.13 | s2cid=144299252}}
== Further reading ==
*{{cite book | last1=Blight | first1=James G. | title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988 | year=2012 | publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers | isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8 | display-authors=etal}}
* Bryan R. Gibson, ''Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988''. Praeger, 2010.
* Bruce Jentleson, ''With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990''. New York, W. W. Norton, 1994.
* Mark Phythian, ''Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam's War Machine''. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1997.
== External links ==
* [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980–1984] National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82
* [http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 – 2 August 1990] Timeline
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