View source for Worker representation on corporate boards of directors

'''Worker representation on corporate boards of directors''', also known as '''board-level employee representation''' (BLER),<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gold|first1=Michael|last2=Waddington|first2=Jeremy|date=2019-09-01|title=Introduction: Board-level employee representation in Europe: State of play|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680119830556|journal=European Journal of Industrial Relations|language=en|volume=25|issue=3|pages=205–218|doi=10.1177/0959680119830556|s2cid=159358979 |issn=0959-6801}}</ref> refers to the right of workers to vote for representatives on a [[board of directors]] in [[corporate law]]. In 2018, a majority of [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]], and a majority of countries in the [[European Union]], had some form of law guaranteeing the right of workers to vote for board representation. Together with a right to elect [[work councils]], this is often called '''codetermination'''.
The first laws requiring worker voting rights include the [[Oxford University Act 1854]] and the [[Port of London Act 1908]] in the [[United Kingdom]], the Act on Manufacturing Companies of 1919 in [[Massachusetts]] in the [[United States]] (although the act's provisions were completely voluntary), and the Supervisory Board Act 1922 (''Aufsichtsratgesetz 1922'') in [[Germany]], which codified collective agreement from 1918 and expanded it in the [[Mitbestimmungsgesetz|1976 Mitbestimmungsgesetz]].<ref>E McGaughey, 'The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law' (2016) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579932 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135]</ref>
==Overview==
There are three main views as to why codetermination exists: to reduce management-labour conflict by improving and systematizing communication channels;<ref>Prominent views of codetermination have thus been "social" in nature, concerned with expanding democratic participation in new spheres as a good in itself, reducing "alienation", and smoothing management-labour relations to prevent strong conflicts. A collection of views of this nature are found in [http://www.boeckler.de/92462_16613.html ''Magazin Mitbestimmun''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090803220938/http://www.boeckler.de/92462_16613.html |date=2009-08-03 }}</ref> to increase bargaining power of workers at the expense of owners by means of legislation;<ref>A conservative economic approach views codetermination as not benign: a political means for transfer of wealth from shareholders to employees and to increase power of political and perhaps union actors; as evidence it is noted firms rarely adopt codetermination voluntarily: see Pejovich, Svetozar. ''The economics of property rights: towards a theory of comparative systems''. Chapter 8. Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic, 1990.</ref> and to correct [[market failure]]s by means of public policy.<ref>Another economist argues that codetermination in effect corrects several market failures so lack of voluntary adoption cannot be viewed as evidence that codetermination is inefficient: see [[Stephen C. Smith (economist)|Stephen C. Smith]], "On the economic rationale for codetermination law", ''Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation'', Vol. 16 (December 1991), pp. 261-281.</ref> The evidence on "efficiency" is mixed, with codetermination having either no effect or a positive but generally small effect on enterprise performance.<ref>For example see Felix R. Fitzroy and Kornelius Kraft, "Co-determination, efficiency and productivity", ''British Journal of Industrial Relations'', Vol. 43, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 233-247.</ref>
The following is a list of 35 countries in the [[Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]] and their practices of worker representation on corporate [[boards of directors]].<ref>See [http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2 worker-participation.eu] and Z Adams, L Bishop and [[S Deakin]], ''CBR Labour Regulation Index (Dataset of 117 Countries)'' (Cambridge: Centre for Business Research [https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/256566/cbr-lri-117-countries-codebook-and-methodology.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 2016]))</ref>
{| class="wikitable sortable" id="constituents"
|-
!|Country|| Law || Minimum worker representation || Minimum number of employees at which law applies|| Notes
|-
|{{flag|Austria}} (private companies) || rowspan="2" | Labour Constitution Act 1975<ref>{{Cite web|title=Federal Act on the Labour Constitution and freedom of association (BGBl. 1974/22). Text 9.|url=https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/42238/102316/F1140951746/AUT42238.pdf|access-date=2021-03-10|publisher=Rechtsinformationssystem (RIS)}}</ref> || 33.3% || 300 || rowspan="2" | One-third of the [[supervisory board]] from 300 employees in private companies; no employee threshold for public limited companies.
|-
|{{flag|Austria}} (public limited companies) || 33.3% || 0
|-
|{{flag|Belgium}}|| || || N/A || No general law, but some public companies have employee representatives.<ref>See I Ferreras, ''Firms as Political Entities: Saving Democracy through Economic Bicameralism'' (2017)</ref>
|-
|{{flag|Bulgaria}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law, but employees have rights to speak at shareholder general meetings.
|-
|{{flag|Croatia}} (limited companies) || rowspan="2" | LL 2009 art 166 || "One" || 300 || rowspan="2" | Employee representative on the [[supervisory board]] if the company has over 300 employees (limited companies); no employee threshold for public limited companies
|-
|{{flag|Croatia}} (public limited companies) || "One" || 0
|-
|{{flag|Cyprus}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Czech Republic}} (private companies) || || 0% || N/A || No general law. Before 2014, private companies over 50 employees had one-third employee representation.
|-
|{{flag|Czech Republic}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || || 33.3% (may be increased up to 50% voluntarily) || 1 ||
|-
|{{flag|Denmark}}|| Companies Act 2010 s 140 || ≤33.3% (two members minimum)|| 35 || At least two members of the board, up to one-third of the board's membership.
|-
|{{flag|Estonia}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Finland}}|| Co-operation Act 2021 s 31<ref>{{Cite web|title=Co-operation Act (1333/2021)|url=https://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2021/en20211333_20230091.pdf|access-date=2024-01-14|publisher=Government of Finland}}</ref> || 20% || 150 || From 150 employees, there must be an agreement on employee representation. If there is none, employee representation automatically defaults to one-fifth of board members.
|-
|{{flagicon|France}} [[French labour law|France]] (private companies) || rowspan="2" | Commercial Code Art. L. 225-79 || "One" or "Two" || 1000<br>(or 5000 worldwide) || rowspan="2" | Private companies over 1000 employees in France or 5000 worldwide must have at least one or two board members.
|-
|{{flagicon|France}} [[French labour law|France]] ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || 33.3% || 1
|-
| rowspan="2" |{{flagicon|Germany}} [[German labour law|Germany]]|| rowspan="2" | Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 2003 (One-third Participation Act 2004),<ref>{{Cite web|title=DrittelbG - Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat|url=https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/drittelbg/BJNR097410004.html|access-date=2021-03-25|website=www.gesetze-im-internet.de}}</ref> [[Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976]] (Codetermination Act 1976),<ref>{{Cite web|title=MitbestG - Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer|url=https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/mitbestg/BJNR011530976.html|access-date=2021-03-25|website=www.gesetze-im-internet.de}}</ref> Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz 1951 (Coal and Steel Codetermination Act 1951)<ref>{{Cite web|title=MontanMitbestG - nichtamtliches Inhaltsverzeichnis|url=https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/montanmitbestg/index.html|access-date=2021-03-25|website=www.gesetze-im-internet.de}}</ref>|| 33.3% || 500 || Enterprises with over 500 employees must have one-third representation on a [[supervisory board]].
|-
| 50% || 2000 || Enterprises with over 2000 employees must have one-half representation on a [[supervisory board]], but the [[Chairperson|chair]] of the [[supervisory board]] is a shareholder representative and has a [[casting vote]]. In coal and steel companies shareholder representatives do not have a deciding vote.
|-
|{{flag|Greece}} (private companies) || || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Greece}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || || "One" || 1 ||
|-
|{{flag|Hungary}}|| || 33.3% || 200 || From 200 employees, one-third of [[supervisory board]] members are employees.
|-
|{{flag|Ireland}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || Workers Participation (State Enterprises) Act, 1977<ref>{{Cite web|title=Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act, 1977|url=http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1977/act/6/enacted/en/html|access-date=2021-03-10|publisher=electronic Irish Statute Book (eISB)}}</ref>  || 33.3% || 1 ||
|-
|{{flag|Italy}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Latvia}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Lithuania}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
| rowspan="2" | {{flag|Luxembourg}} (private companies) || rowspan="2" | || ≤33.3% || ≤1000 || rowspan="2" | A third of the board in companies with 1,000 or more employees, up to a third in others
|-
| 33.3% || 1000
|-
|{{flag|Luxembourg}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || || 33.3% || 1 ||
|-
|{{flag|Malta}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Malta}}|| || ? || 1 || For companies owned by unions or the Labour Party.
|-
|{{flag|Netherlands}}|| Works Constitution Act 1971, amended in 2004 || ≤33.3% || 100 ||
|-
| rowspan="3" |{{flag|Norway}}|| rowspan="3" | Limited Liability Companies Act 1973 || "One" || 30-50 || rowspan="3" | One director in companies with 30 to 50 employees; one-third of the seats in companies with more than 50, with the possibility of an extra seat in companies with more than 200
|-
| 33.3% || 51-200
|-
| 33.3%+1 || 201
|-
|{{flag|Poland}} (private companies) || rowspan="2" | Law on Workers’ Self Management of 1981 || 0% || || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Poland}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || 33.3% || 1 || In state-owned companies employees have one-third of supervisory board seats, and a seat on the management board.
|-
|{{flag|Portugal}}|| 1976 Constitution, Arts. 30 and 33 and Law 46/79 || || || No co-determination, but, in state owned companies, workers have a right to be consulted. In private companies work councils ''may'' elect representatives, but the number is determined by the employer.
|-
|{{flag|Romania}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law, but unions can be heard at meetings.
|-
|{{flag|Slovakia}} (private companies) || Labour Code (Law 311/2001), Art. 233-236 || 33.3% (may be increased up to 50% voluntarily) || 50 ||
|-
|{{flag|Slovakia}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || || 50% || 1 || Half the supervisory board in state-owned companies.
|-
|{{flag|Slovenia}}|| 1991 Constitution art 75, and 1993 law. || 50% - 33.3% || 50 || Between a third and a half of seats in companies with [[supervisory board]] plus management board member if more than 500 employees; around a third in companies with single tier board
|-
|{{flag|Spain}}|| Law 41/1962, repealed 1980 || 0% || N/A || Some state-owned companies retain two board members though it has not been compulsory since 1980 to have employee representation in private companies.
|-
|{{flag|Sweden}}|| Board Representation (Private Sector Employees) Act (1987:1245) <ref>{{Cite web|title=Board Representation (Private Sector Employees) Act|url=https://www.government.se/contentassets/af2a3399726a445ea0e6655d58ac9508/19871245-board-representation-private-sector-employees-act/|access-date=2024-01-14|publisher=Government of Sweden}}</ref> || 33.3% || 25 || Over 25 employees, around one-third representation on boards.
|-
|{{flag|Switzerland}}|| || 0% || N/A || Representation in postal services. No general law, but there was employee representation in railways.
|-
|{{flag|United Kingdom}}|| [[Cambridge University Act 1856]],<ref>{{Cite web|title=Cambridge University Act 1856|url=https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/19-20/88|access-date=2021-03-30|publisher=Government of the United Kingdom}}</ref> [[National Health Service Act 2006]] etc. || 0% || N/A || No general law, except in universities, and in NHS foundation trusts. The [[Financial Reporting Council]] has a comply or explain rules for employee representation in the [[UK Corporate Governance Code]]
|-
|{{flag|Australia}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Canada}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|New Zealand}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|United States}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law, although in [[Massachusetts]] manufacturing firms may voluntarily have employees on boards. Any collective agreement can achieve the same result.
|-
|{{flag|Chile}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Israel}} (private companies) || || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Israel}} ([[State-owned enterprise|state-owned companies]]) || 1977 Law and a 1985 High Court decision, ''Dapey Shituf ''(Tel-Aviv 1985) || ? || 1 || Worker representation in government companies
|-
|{{flag|Japan}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|South Korea}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|-
|{{flag|Turkey}}|| || 0% || N/A || No general law
|}
===Canada===
{{see also|Canadian labour law}}
During the [[2021 Canadian federal election|2021 federal election]], [[Conservative Party of Canada|Conservative Party]] leader [[Erin O'Toole]] pledged to require that federally regulated employers with over 1,000 employees or $100 million in annual revenue include worker representation on their boards of directors should he be elected Prime Minister.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.conservative.ca/conservative-leader-erin-otoole-to-ensure-canadian-workers-have-their-voices-heard|title = Conservative Leader Erin O'Toole to ensure Canadian workers have their voices heard|date = 23 August 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-conservatives-would-give-workers-a-seat-on-board-of-directors-at-large|title = Conservatives pledge worker representation on boards, but union leaders remain skeptical about shift in approach|newspaper = The Globe and Mail|date = 23 August 2021|last1 = Rendell|first1 = Mark}}</ref>
===China===
{{main|Workplace democracy#Staff and Worker Representative Congresses}}
In [[China]], during the late twentieth century, worker representation on corporate boards of directors was mandated by law for [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] and permitted in non-state-owned collectives and companies via "Staff and Worker Representative Congresses" (SWRCs), composed of workers directly elected by all workers in the workplace to represent them. As of the 1980s and 1990s, SWRCs were, in principle, broadly similar to continental European and Japanese workers' workplace councils in terms of rights and powers and consensus building. Research based on interviews in 1997 suggested that in practice, SWRCs did have some real power, including some cases of dismissing managers.<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Zhu|last1=Xiaoyang|first2=Anita|last2=Chan|url=http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/IPS/PSC/CCC/publications/papers/Anita_Staff_and_Workers_Rep_Congress_pdf.pdf |journal=[[Chinese Sociology and Anthropology]]|volume=37|pages=6–33|date=2005|title=Staff and Workers' Representative Congress|doi=10.1080/21620555.2005.11038349 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200613151932/http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/IPS/PSC/CCC/publications/papers/Anita_Staff_and_Workers_Rep_Congress_pdf.pdf |archive-date=2020-06-13}}</ref>
===Germany===
{{see also|German labour law|Codetermination in Germany|Mitbestimmungsgesetz}}
The first codetermination plans began at companies and through collective agreements.<ref>E McGaughey, 'The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law' (2016) [https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/3pyku 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135], page 22</ref> Prior to 1976,  German coal and steel producers employing more than 1,000 workers already commonly maintained a board of directors composed of 11 members: five directors came from management, five were workers' representatives, with the eleventh member being neutral. (Note: Boards could be larger as long as the proportion of representation was maintained.) In 1976, the law's scope was expanded to cover all firms employing more than 2,000 workers; with some changes concerning to the board structure, which has an equal number of management and worker representatives, with no neutral members (except in the Mining-and-steel industries where the old law remained in force). The new board's head would represent the firm's owners and had the right to cast the deciding vote in instances of stalemate. (The original law comprising coal-and-steel industries thus remained unchanged in force)<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/montanmitbestg/BJNR003470951.html |access-date=3 December 2018|title=MontanMitbestG - Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie}}</ref>
===New Zealand===
The Companies Empowering Act 1924<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/cea192415gv1924n52294/|title=Companies Empowering Act 1924 (15 GEO V 1924 No 52)|website=www.nzlii.org|access-date=2018-03-22}}</ref> allowed companies to issue shares for labour and have them represented by directors, but it was little used,<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SkCDr0i68nsC&q=companies+act+%22labour+shares%22+nz&pg=PA2900|title=Parliamentary Debates. House of Representatives|last=Parliament|first=New Zealand|date=1986|language=en}}</ref> even its chief promoter, [[Henry Valder]], being unable to get his company board to agree to it.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3v2/valder-henry|title=Valder, Henry|last=Taonga|first=New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu|website=teara.govt.nz|language=en|access-date=2018-03-22}}</ref> It was consolidated into the Companies Act in 1933.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.enzs.auckland.ac.nz/docs/1933/1933A29.pdf|title=Companies Act 1933}}</ref> The [[New Zealand Law Commission|Law Commission]] recommended its abolition in 1988 for lack of use.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFormats/NZLC%20PP5.pdf|title=Preliminary Paper No. 5 COMPANY LAW A discussion paper|date=1988}}</ref> The [[Companies Act 1993]] did not allow for labour shares.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/ca19931993n105134/|title=Companies Act 1993 (1993 No 105)|website=www.nzlii.org|access-date=2018-03-22}}</ref>
===United Kingdom===
{{see also|United Kingdom labour law}}
In the UK, the earliest examples of codetermination in management were codified into the [[Oxford University Act 1854]] and the [[Cambridge University Act 1856]]. In private enterprise, the [[Port of London Act 1908]] was introduced under [[Winston Churchill]]'s [[Board of Trade]].<ref>E McGaughey, 'Votes at work in Britain: shareholder monopolisation and the ‘single channel’ (2018) [https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/2xn6q 47(1) Industrial Law Journal 76], page 9.</ref>
While most enterprises in the UK do not have worker representation, universities there have done so since the 19th century. Generally the more successful the university, the more staff representation on governing bodies:{{cn|date=August 2024}} Cambridge,<ref>[[Cambridge University Act 1856]]</ref> Oxford,<ref>[[Oxford University Act 1854]]</ref> Edinburgh, Glasgow and other Scottish universities.<ref>[[Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016]] [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/15/contents ss 10-11]</ref>
===United States===
{{see also|United States labor law}}
[[Massachusetts]] has the world's oldest codetermination law that has been continually in force since 1919, although it is voluntary and only for manufacturing companies.<ref>"An Act To Enable Manufacturing Corporations To Provide For The Representation Of Their Employees On The Board Of Directors", [https://archive.org/details/actsresolvespass1919mass/page/45 General Acts of 1919], [https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/82634 chapter 70], page 45, approved 3 April 1919.</ref><ref>E McGaughey, 'Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor's Vote in Corporate Governance' (2019) [https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol42/iss2/18/ 42 Seattle University Law Review 697]</ref>
== Impact ==
A 2020 study in the ''Quarterly Journal of Economics'' found that codetermination in Germany had no impact on wages, the wage structure, the labor share, revenue, employment or profitability of the firm, but it increased capital investment.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jäger|first1=Simon|last2=Schoefer|first2=Benjamin|last3=Heining|first3=Jörg|date=2020|title=Labor in the Boardroom|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=136|issue=2|pages=669–725|language=en|doi=10.1093/qje/qjaa038|doi-access=free}}</ref>
A 2021 study by the ''Bureau of Economic Research'' found that "the European model of codetermination is neither a panacea for all of the problems faced by 21st-century workers, nor a destructive institution that is dramatically inferior to shareholder primacy. Rather, as currently implemented, it is a moderate institution with, on net, nonexistent or small positive effects. Board-level and shop-floor worker representation cause at most small increases in wages, possibly lead to slight increases in job security and satisfaction, and have largely zero or small positive effects on firm performance."<ref>
{{Cite journal|last1=Jäger|first1=Simon|last2=Noy|first2=shakked|last3=Schoefer|first3=Benjamin|date=2021|title=What Does Codetermination do?
|journal= NBER Working Paper Series|id=working paper 28921|language=en|doi=10.3386/w28921|s2cid=235706486|url=http://economics.mit.edu/files/21562|doi-access=free}}</ref>
==History==
Some of the first codetermination laws emerged in [[universities in the UK]] during the 19th century, such as the [[Oxford University Act 1854]] and the [[Cambridge University Act 1856]]. Further acts included the [[South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896]] ([[59 & 60 Vict.]] c. ccxxvi) and the [[Port of London Act 1908]].<ref>E McGaughey, 'Votes at Work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the ‘Single Channel’' (2017) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2432068 46(4) Industrial Law Journal 444]. See also JS Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1870) discussing, albeit very different, Henry Briggs & Son Co, incorporated 1865, which had an employee share plan and a worker director. [http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/27002/pages/5329/page.pdf South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896 extract in the London Gazette], abolished by the [[Gas Act 1948]].</ref> In Germany, there were experiments with worker representation through [[work councils]] over the late 19th century, after the first attempts to introduce worker voice by an ex-member of the [[Frankfurt Parliament]] named Carl Degenkolb.<ref>HJ Teuteberg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten betrieblichen Arbeitervertretungen in Deutschland’ (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69. See the [[Arbeitsverordnung 1890]], the first law enabling worker councils, but only on a voluntary basis. The Hilfsdienstgesetz 1916 was a war time requirement for worker councils in some industries.</ref> At the end of [[World War I]], the German trade unions made an historic [[collective agreement]] with representatives of German business for full partnership in economic management throughout the country. This was put into the [[Weimar Constitution]] article 165, and resulted in a work council law in 1920,<ref>[[Betriebsrätegesetz 1920]]</ref> and a board representation law in 1922.<ref>[[Aufsichtsratsgesetz 1922]]. E McGaughey, 'The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law' (2016) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579932 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135]</ref> The fascist government abolished codetermination in 1934, but after [[World War II]], German unions again made collective agreements to resurrect [[work councils]] and board representation. These agreements were codified in law in 1951 and 1952.<ref>E McGaughey, 'The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law' (2016) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579932 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135]. See the {{lang|de|Montan-mitbestimmungsgesetz}} 1951, the Betriesbrätegesetz 1952 and the Mitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz 1956.</ref>
In most countries around Europe, different forms board representation law spread slowly, especially from the 1970s. In the UK there were repeated experiments from iron and steel<ref>[[Iron and Steel Act 1967]] Sch 4, Part V, created a negotiation process with trade unions in [[British Steel Corporation]] to introduce workers, put into effect from 1968. For its implementation, see: [https://archive.org/details/jones-worker-directors-speak Bank, John, and Jones, Ken, ''Worker Directors Speak: The British Steel Corporation Employee Directors'' (Gower Press, Farnborough, 1977)]</ref> to the post office,<ref>[[Post Office Act 1977]] s 1(2) created worker directors for the [[Post Office]] by amending the [[Post Office Act 1969]].</ref> with worker directors.<ref>The [[Transport Act 1968]] allowed the secretary of state to appoint members of the [[British Railways Board]]. In 1997, [[John Prescott]] appointed a worker director overseeing some aspects of the now privatised industry.</ref> However, after the [[Bullock Report]] of 1977 failed to pass and [[Margaret Thatcher]] won the 1979 election, almost all worker participation was ended.<ref>[[Transport Act 1985]], privatised the bus networks. [[Employee share ownership plans]] were created by Labour councils as this happened, as a way to protect workers, though shares were quickly bought up by ordinary business owners.</ref> Germany recast and extended its laws in 1972 and 1976.<ref>The Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972, standardised law for one third employees on company boards with over 500 staff. The [[Codetermination Act 1976]] required one half in large companies, but with the upper hand for shareholders. Now, the Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 2004, [http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/drittelbg/ BGBl. I S. 974, in German] codified again, one third worker directors in companies with over 500 staff.</ref> The [[European Commission]] did propose a [[Draft Fifth Company Law Directive]], but it did not complete passage. In the [[United States]], growing interest in worker "involvement" through [[Scanlon plan]]s led to unions such as the [[United Steelworkers]] at [[Chrysler]], or at [[United Airlines]] to negotiate board representation, although usually this was forcibly linked to employee share schemes. Notably, the share scheme at [[Enron]] failed in 2003. Almost all modern worker representation laws enable votes without any requirement to invest money. In 2013, France became the largest country to create a modern board representation law to mandate workers with equal rights to all other directors to be on boards.
==See also==
*[[Codetermination in Germany]]
*[[Cooperative]]
**[[Worker cooperative]]
*[[Corporatism]]
*[[Employee stock ownership]]
*[[Labour law]]
**[[European labour law]] and [[European company law]]
**[[UK labour law]] and [[UK company law]]
**[[German labour law]]
**[[French labour law]]
**[[Indian labour law]]
**[[US labor law]] and [[US corporate law]]
*[[Labor union]]
*[[Market socialism]]
*[[Paritarian Institutions]]
*[[Polder model]]
*[[Social Partnership]]
*[[Social ownership]]
*[[Works council]]
*[[Workers' council]]
*[[Workplace democracy]]
==Notes==
{{Reflist|2}}
==References==
*[https://archive.org/details/jones-worker-directors-speak Bank, John, and Jones, Ken, ''Worker Directors Speak: The British Steel Corporation Employee Directors'' (Gower Press, Farnborough, 1977)]
*I Ferreras, ''Firms as Political Entities: Saving Democracy through Economic Bicameralism'' (2017)
*TH Hammer, SC Currall and RN Stern, ‘Worker Representation on Boards of Directors: A Study of Competing Roles’ (1991) 44(4) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 661–680
*LW Hunter, ‘Can Strategic Participation be Institutionalized? Union Representation on American Corporate Boards’ (1998) 51(4) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 557–578
*E McGaughey, 'Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor's Vote in Corporate Governance' (2019) [https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol42/iss2/18/ 42 Seattle University Law Review 697]
*E McGaughey, 'The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law' (2016) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579932 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135]
*E McGaughey, 'Votes at Work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the ‘Single Channel’' (2017) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2432068 46(4) Industrial Law Journal 444]
*RB McKersie, ‘Union-Nominated Directors: A New Voice in Corporate Governance’ (1 April 1999) MIT Working Paper
*RB McKersie, ‘Labor's voice at the strategic level of the firm’ (2001) 7 Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 480
*[[Hans Jürgen Teuteberg|HJ Teuteberg]], ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten betrieblichen Arbeitervertretungen in Deutschland’ (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69
*[[Hans Jürgen Teuteberg|HJ Teuteberg]], ''Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung in Deutschland'' (1961)
*J Waddington (ed.), 'European board-level employee representation: national variations in influence and power' (2018), Kluwer Law international editions [https://law-store.wolterskluwer.com/s/product/european-boardlevel-employee-represent-national-variations-power-influence/01t0f00000J3aMr]
*J Waddington, A Conchon, 'Board-level employee representation in Europe: priorities, power and articulation' (2016), Routledge edition [https://www.routledge.com/Board-Level-Employee-Representation-in-Europe-Priorities-Power-and-Articulation/Waddington-Conchon/p/book/9781138616875]
*S Webb and B Webb, ''[[Industrial Democracy]]'' (1920)
*S Webb and B Webb, ''[[The History of Trade Unionism]]'' (1920) Appendix VIII
;Articles
*E Batstone, A Ferner and M Terry, Unions on the board: an experiment in industrial democracy (1983)
*P Brannen, ‘Worker directors: an approach to analysis. The case of the British Steel Corporation’ in C Crouch and FA Heller, ''Organizational Democracy and Political Processes'' (Wiley 1983)
*E Chell, ‘Worker Directors on the Board: Four Case Studies’ (1980) 2(6) Employee Relations 1
*PL Davies and KW Wedderburn, ‘The Land of Industrial Democracy’ (1977) 6(1) ILJ 197
*E McGaughey, 'The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law' (2016) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579932 23(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 135]
*E McGaughey, 'Votes at Work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the ‘Single Channel’' (2018) [https://ssrn.com/abstract=2432068 47(1) Industrial Law Journal 76]
*E McGaughey, 'Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor's Vote in Corporate Governance' (2019) [https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol42/iss2/18/ 42 Seattle University Law Review 697]
*[[Hans Jürgen Teuteberg|HJ Teuteberg]], ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten betrieblichen Arbeitervertretungen in Deutschland’ (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69
*S Vitols, 'Prospects for trade unions in the evolving European system of corporate governance' (2005) [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00299.pdf#page=20 ETUI], summarising different economic results of codetermination
*[[Lord Wedderburn]], ‘Companies and employees: common law or social dimension’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 261
;Books
* [https://archive.org/details/jones-worker-directors-speak Bank, John, and Jones, Ken, ''Worker Directors Speak: The British Steel Corporation Employee Directors'' (Gower Press, Farnborough, 1977)]
*[[Hans Jürgen Teuteberg|HJ Teuteberg]], ''Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung in Deutschland'' (1961)
*S Webb and B Webb, ''The History of Trade Unionism'' (1920) Appendix VIII
;Reports
*Lord Donovan, ''Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations'' (1968) Cmnd 3623
*Liberal Party, ''The Report of the Industrial Partnership Committee: Partners at Work'' (1968)
*Uday Dokras, doctoral thesis, published as a book, The Act on Codetermination at Work- An Efficacy Study, Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm Sweden, 1990
==External links==
*[http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2 worker-participation.eu]
*Z Adams, L Bishop and [[S Deakin]], ''CBR Labour Regulation Index (Dataset of 117 Countries)'' (Cambridge: Centre for Business Research [https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/256566/cbr-lri-117-countries-codebook-and-methodology.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 2016]))
==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20120127184358/http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GERMANY/CODETERMINATION-DE.htm Emire: Germany - Co-Determination]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100111082740/http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/AUSTRIA/ANCHOR-MITBESTIMMUNG-AT.htm Emire: Austria - Co-Determination]
* [http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/literature/daad93/daad93-40.htm German Law in English - 40. Works council. Co-determination]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090726002211/http://www.macro.org.il/co-determination.html Co-Determination and Cooperative Culture in Israel]
;EU Draft Fifth Company Law Directive
* [http://www2.eudor.net/aoquegoo/download/ORDCMD_EHD_4480.zip 1983 Revision]{{Dead link|date=November 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
* [http://www2.eudor.net/uxaeshom/download/ORDCMD_EHD_4481.zip 1991 Amendment]{{Dead link|date=November 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
[[Category:Democracy]]
[[Category:Human resource management]]
[[Category:Labour law]]
[[Category:Corporate law]]
[[Category:Board of directors]]